Naval War College Review
Volume 68
Number 3 Summer

Article 24

2015

Summer 2015 Review
The U.S Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
War College, The U.S Naval (2015) "Summer 2015 Review," Naval War College Review: Vol. 68 : No. 3 , Article 24.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

War College: Summer 2015 Review

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Summer 2015
Volume 68, Number 3

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

2

War College: Summer 2015 Review

NAVAL WAR C OLLEGE PRESS ADVISORY B OARD

Adam Bellow
Seth Cropsey
Jeffrey Kline
Gale A. Mattox
Robert A. Silano
Marin Strmecki
Dov S. Zakheim
NAVAL WAR C OLLEGE REVIEW EDITORIAL B OARD

Donald Chisholm
Audrey Kurth Cronin
Stephen Downes-Martin
Andrew Erickson
Col. Theodore L. Gatchel, USMC (Ret.)
Sean Henseler
James Kraska
Thomas Mangold
John Maurer
Col. Mackubin Owens, USMC (Ret.)
Cdr. Derek S. Reveron, USN
Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.)
Capt. David Teska, USCGR
Scott C. Truver
James J. Wirtz

PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR C OLLEGE

Rear Adm. P. Gardner Howe III, USN
PROVOST

Dr. Lewis M. Duncan
DEAN OF NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES

Thomas J. Culora
NAVAL WAR C OLLEGE PRESS

Carnes Lord, Editor
Pelham G. Boyer, Managing Editor
Timothy J. Demy and Brad Carter, Book Review
Editors
Lori A. Almeida, Administrative Assistant and
Circulation Manager
Frank Uhlig, Jr., Editor Emeritus
Naval War College Review
Code 32, Naval War College
686 Cushing Rd., Newport, RI 02841-1207
Fax: 401.841.1071
DSN exchange, all lines: 841
Website: www.usnwc.edu/press
http://twitter.com/NavalWarCollege
Editor, Circulation, or Business
401.841.2236
press@usnwc.edu
Managing Editor
401.841.4552
managingeditor@usnwc.edu
Essays and Book Reviews
401.841.6584
bookreviews@usnwc.edu
Other Naval War College Offices
401.841.3089

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

Summer2015Review.indb 2

3

4/21/15 1:49 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 as a forum for discussion of
public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The thoughts and opinions
expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those
of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or the Naval War College.
The journal is published quarterly. Distribution is limited generally to commands
and activities of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; regular and
reserve officers of U.S. services; foreign officers and civilians having a present or
previous affiliation with the Naval War College; selected U.S. government officials
and agencies; and selected U.S. and international libraries, research centers, publica
tions, and educational institutions.
Contributors
Please request the standard contributors’ guidance from the managing editor or
access it online before submitting manuscripts. The Naval War College Review nei
ther offers nor makes compensation for articles or book reviews, and it assumes no
responsibility for the return of manuscripts, although every effort is made to return
those not accepted. In submitting work, the sender warrants that it is original, that
it is the sender’s property, and that neither it nor a similar work by the sender has
been accepted or is under consideration elsewhere.
Permissions
Reproduction and reprinting are subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and appli
cable treaties of the United States. To obtain permission to reproduce material
bearing a copyright notice, or to reproduce any material for commercial pur
poses, contact the editor for each use. Material not bearing a copyright notice
may be freely reproduced for academic or other noncommercial use; however, it
is requested that the author and Naval War College Review be credited and that the
editor be informed.

Periodicals postage paid at Newport, R.I. POSTMASTERS, send address changes
to: Naval War College Review, Code 32S, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Rd.,
Newport, R.I. 02841-1207.
ISSN 0028-1484

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

Summer2015Review.indb 3

4

4/21/15 1:49 PM

War College: Summer 2015 Review

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

5

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

CONTENTS

From the Editors ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5
President’s Forum ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9
Fighting the Naval Hegemon
Evolution in French, Soviet, and Chinese Naval Thought ����������������������������������������������������������13
Martin N. Murphy and Toshi Yoshihara
Strategies of asymmetric naval warfare for use by the weak against the strong have waxed and
waned since the late nineteenth century, but they have reached a remarkable maturity in the contemporary Chinese navy.

Asia Rising
Implications of Xi Jinping’s “True Maritime Power”
Its Context, Significance, and Impact on the Region ��������������������������������������������������������������������40
Captain Sukjoon Yoon, Republic of Korea Navy (Retired)
When the Middle Kingdom was the hegemon of East Asia, the surrounding seas constituted a medium through which its power, influence, attitudes, and values were propagated. Xi Jinping’s policy
of “true maritime power” aims to reestablish this system around modern China.

The JMSDF’s Resilient Power for Civil Society
Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake ������������������������������������������������������������������������������64
Captain Takuya Shimodaira, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
The response of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force to the earthquake and tsunami of March
2011 displayed not only the capabilities of the force and the importance of the U.S. alliance but the
critical importance of working alongside civil and nongovernmental organizations.

Leadership
Mentoring in the U.S. Navy
Experiences and Attitudes of Senior Navy Personnel �������������������������������������������������������������������76
W. Brad Johnson and Gene R. Andersen
Forward-leaning organizations, including the U.S. Navy, are increasingly deliberate about creating
leadership cultures conducive to high-quality mentoring. The first empirical study of mentoring in
the U.S. Navy since the proliferation of compulsory matching programs nearly a decade ago asks
how “deck plate” officers and senior enlisted personnel perceive mentoring in the Navy.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

6780_TOC.indd 1

6

4/21/15 2:08 PM

2

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2015 Review

Naval History
“The Navy’s Success Speaks for Itself”?
The German Navy’s Independent Energy Security Strategy, 1932–1940 ����������������������������91
Anand Toprani
From the perspective of contemporary energy security, the example of the German navy’s attempts
to secure its own sources of oil before 1939 represents a valuable lesson in resource management in
an era of tight economic and financial constraints.

Frogmen against a Fleet
The Italian Attack on Alexandria 18/19 December 1941 ����������������������������������������������������������119
Vincent P. O’Hara and Enrico Cernuschi
One of the most successful unconventional attacks in modern naval history was delivered as an
integral part of a conventional campaign and achieved thereby a disproportionate operational and
strategic effect.

Review Essay
Grand Strategy and World Order����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������138
What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from
Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, by Hal Brands
World Order, by Henry Kissinger
reviewed by Karl Walling

Book Reviews
The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America
as the Global Superpower, by Michael Pillsbury
reviewed by Arthur Waldron ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������148
The Evil Hours: A Biography of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, by David J. Morris
reviewed by Christopher Nelson ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������151
More than Just War: Narratives of the Just War Tradition and Military Life,
by Charles A. Jones
reviewed by Joseph M. Hatfield������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������153

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

6780_TOC.indd 2

7

4/21/15 2:08 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

CONTENTS

3

In Defence of War, by Nigel Biggar
reviewed by Martin L. Cook ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������155
At War in Distant Waters: British Colonial Defense in the Great War,
by Phillip G. Pattee
reviewed by Richard J. Norton�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������157
Loyal Sons: Jews in the German Army in the Great War,
by Peter C. Appelbaum
reviewed by Timothy J. Demy��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������158
Hotel Florida: Truth, Love, and Death in the Spanish Civil War,
by Amanda Vaill
reviewed by Jeffrey M. Shaw ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������160
Through a Screen Darkly: Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy,
and America’s Image Abroad, by Martha Bayles
reviewed by Kenneth D. M. Jensen�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������161
Invasion of Laos, 1971: Lam Son 719, by Robert D. Sander
reviewed by Joseph Hammond������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������163
Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific,
by Robert Haddick
reviewed by Ian T. Sundstrom �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������165
The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics, edited by Wayne P. Hughes
reviewed by Charles H. Lewis ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������166

Rediscoveries
Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity,
by Alan M. Wachman
reviewed by Andrew S. Erickson ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������167

Reflections on Reading����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������171

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

6780_TOC.indd 3

8

4/22/15 10:21 AM

War College: Summer 2015 Review

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

6780_TOC.indd 4

9

4/21/15 2:08 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

FROM THE EDITORS
In our lead article, “Fighting the Naval Hegemon: Evolution in French, Soviet,
and Chinese Naval Thought,” Martin N. Murphy and Toshi Yoshihara explore
a strand of naval thought in modern times that tends to be neglected by those
whose outlooks have been shaped primarily by the Anglo-American school most
famously exemplified by Alfred Thayer Mahan at the turn of the twentieth century. The so-called Jeune École (“Young School”) emerged in the 1870s in France
as a novel approach to dealing with the French navy’s long-standing inferiority
to its principal rival, the British Royal Navy. The central claim of this school was
that a weaker naval power could pose (as we say now) an “asymmetric” threat to
a stronger power through reliance on a large number of inexpensive small craft
armed with the recently invented torpedo instead of on a small fleet of expensive
capital ships. Somewhat later, the submarine would join the torpedo boat as the
weapon of choice for a weaker naval power, a weapon directed primarily against
the enemy’s commerce rather than its navy. In both world wars of the last century,
of course, Germany’s employment of the submarine arm provided a powerful
demonstration of the merits of such a strategy.
Less familiar is the way the legacy of the Jeune École shaped the naval thought
and practice of the Soviet Union and, more recently, of the People’s Republic of
China. The authors argue that China is currently at a “crossroads,” as its navy
is poised to transition from a defensive, littorally focused force to one capable
of operating in blue water and around the globe. While China’s eventual course
remains unclear, they argue, Chinese thinking about maritime strategy will
continue to be influenced strongly by a naval heritage that privileges methods
of asymmetric and guerrilla-style warfare. Martin Murphy is a research fellow at
the Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, Dalhousie University; Toshi Yoshihara is
the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Naval War College.
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that nothing is as important in assessing the
future strategic environment facing the United States as the intentions of China’s
current leadership. Sukjoon Yoon, in “Implications of Xi Jinping’s ‘True Maritime
Power’: Its Context, Significance, and Impact on the Region,” makes a compelling
case that China’s maritime aspirations and behavior increasingly reflect a coherent grand or national strategy for which its current supreme leader bears much
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personal responsibility. That strategy consciously combines “hard” and “soft” elements in a way that advances a long-term agenda of Chinese regional maritime
dominance (in effect, a Chinese “Monroe Doctrine”) yet does not provoke an
armed clash with its neighbors or the United States. Particularly important in this
connection are high-level organizational changes evidently intended to enhance
coordination among Chinese military and civilian agencies and thereby to enable
an (American-style) “crisis management” approach to consolidating the nation’s
position and claims in the East and South China Seas. Sukjoon Yoon, a former
captain in the Republic of Korea Navy, is a research fellow at the Korea Institute
of Maritime Strategy in Seoul.
The regional ambitions of the People’s Republic make it all the more necessary
for the United States to sustain and strengthen its long-standing security collaboration with Japan. In “The JMSDF’s Resilient Power for Civil Society: Lessons
from the Great East Japan Earthquake,” Captain Takuya Shimodaira provides an
eyewitness account of the massive humanitarian relief operation undertaken by
the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force together with elements of the U.S. Navy
and Marine Corps in the wake of the devastating earthquake and tsunami that
struck Japan in March 2011. He argues that the JMSDF should welcome a larger
role in such operations in the future. Captain Shimodaira is currently an International Fellow at the Naval War College.
As the Navy continues its service-wide effort to rethink the way it develops
leaders, it has become clear that the widest gap between reality and norms continues to be in the area of so-called personal development. In “Mentoring in the U.S.
Navy: Experiences and Attitudes of Senior Navy Personnel,” W. Brad Johnson
and Gene R. Andersen revisit one of the key tools of personal development. With
the aid of a carefully crafted opinion survey of both officer and senior enlisted
personnel at the Naval War College, the authors make the case for the value of
mentoring for developing Navy leaders, while cautioning against the temptation
to formalize mentoring relationships or to make them mandatory. Brad Johnson
is professor of psychology at the U.S. Naval Academy; Gene Andersen, a retired
naval aviator, is professor of leadership education at the Naval War College.
Two historical articles round out this issue. In “‘The Navy’s Success Speaks for
Itself ’? The German Navy’s Independent Energy Security Strategy, 1932–1940,”
Anand Toprani of the Naval War College faculty explores a little-known but
remarkable chapter in Nazi Germany’s run-up to World War II. This history
provides a salutary reminder of the strategic salience of military logistics requirements. The striking painting on our cover accompanies the final piece, “Frogmen against a Fleet: The Italian Attack on Alexandria 18/19 December 1941,” by
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Vincent P. O’Hara and Enrico Cernuschi, a fascinating case study in asymmetric
warfare at sea.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334,
335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401841-2236).
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Rear Admiral Howe became the fifty-fifth President
of the U.S. Naval War College on 8 July 2014. He is
a native of Jacksonville, Florida and was commissioned in 1984 following his graduation from the
U.S. Naval Academy.
Howe’s operational assignments have included a full
range of duties in the Naval Special Warfare and joint
Special Operations communities. He commanded
Naval Special Warfare Unit 3 in Bahrain, Naval
Special Warfare Group 3 in San Diego, and Special
Operations Command, Pacific in Hawaii. His service
overseas includes multiple deployments to the western Pacific and Southwest Asia and participation in
Operations EARNEST WILL , PROVIDE PROMISE , ENDURING FREEDOM , and IRAQI FREEDOM .
His key joint and staff assignments include current
operations officer at Special Operations Command,
Pacific; Chief Staff Officer, Naval Special Warfare
Development Group; Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Policy at Naval Special Warfare
Command; Director of Legislative Affairs for U.S.
Special Operations Command; and Assistant Commanding Officer, Joint Special Operations Command.
Howe graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School
in 1995 with a master of arts in national security affairs (special operations / low-intensity conflict), and
from the National War College in 2002 with a master
of arts in national security.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Education Engine

CONSIDER SOME RECENT HEADLINES:

“The Navy of the Future
Wants to Use Lasers and Superfast Electromagnetic Railguns
Instead of Shells and Gunpowder” (Aspen Institute, Five Best Ideas of the Day,
10 February 2015, aspen.us/); “Massive Computing Power and Better Tools Are
Making It Harder to Hide Submarines” (ibid., 19 February 2015); and “ISIS Ranks
Grow as Fast as U.S. Bombs Can Wipe Them Out” (Daily Beast, 3 February 2015,
www.thedailybeast.com/). Now imagine what headlines might read in the year
2025. What will technology bring to the battlefield? What will the enemy look
like? On how many dimensions will we have to fight? A recent CNN article claiming that “everything you know about the ‘future of war’ is wrong” (23 February
2015, www.cnn.com/) suggests there is no way to know.
At the Naval War College, we believe you train for the known and educate for
the unknown. Thus, we prepare our graduates for the unknown and the complex
with an intensive core educational program that fosters new habits of mind and
cultivates the ability to reason critically. The core is the “engine” of the Naval War
College, fueled by three dynamic departments and their world-class faculties of
officers, professional academics, and practitioners.
The College is unique in that the same faculty teaches two distinct accredited
graduate degrees. Intermediate Level Course (ILC) students earn MAs in Defense
and Strategic Studies through the Raymond A. Spruance program, and Senior
Level Course (SLC) students earn MAs in National Security and Strategic Studies
via the Chester W. Nimitz program. The two programs provide Joint Professional
Military Education phases I and II certification, respectively, and both integrate
U.S. and foreign officers and interagency civilians. The core curriculum of each
program is expertly delivered by the three departments.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24
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The Joint Military Operations Department investigates the theory and practice of operational art and design across the range of military operations and
familiarizes students with the Joint Operation Planning Process and the Navy
Planning Process. Students tackle unstructured, complex problems such as disaster relief after tsunamis and earthquakes, military responses to failed critical
states, and conflict with peer competitors. The department prepares students to
lead operational planning teams at the combatant-commander and joint-taskforce levels while also developing the joint attitudes and perspectives essential
to modern war.
The National Security Affairs Department offers an interdisciplinary approach to security studies, an approach in which students wrestle with the
dynamic challenges facing modern leaders and institutions. ILC students focus
on the theater-strategic challenges concerning combatant commands, while
SLC students engage with global and national strategic-level issues. All students
gain invaluable perspective on the complexities of the interagency and decisionmaking environment through three parallel subcourses: Security Strategies,
Policy Analysis, and Leadership Concepts. I recently attended the final exercises
and was highly impressed with how our students presented their original ideas
and analyses to panels of distinguished experts from combatant commands and
Washington—not to mention to their peers from across the services and the
interagency realm.
The Strategy and Policy Department educates strategically minded leaders
skilled at critical analysis in today’s complex security environment. This course
challenges students to master a wide range of classical and contemporary strategic concepts and includes various landmark thinkers on strategy and war—
among others, Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Clausewitz, and Mao. Students also absorb
classic works of sea power and assess modern concepts in the laboratory of history via numerous case studies. With intensive reading and writing requirements
in a small-seminar environment, students develop their own original and cogent
analyses of strategic decisions. The intermediate- and senior-level courses on
strategy are considered the very best of their kind and serve as models for programs at major universities, such as Yale.
The engine of the core curriculum is “supercharged” by an Electives Program
accounting for 20 percent of each student’s academic experience. Students select
from over a hundred course topics, such as modern China, cyber security, Winston Churchill, the literature of war, and other subjects capitalizing on the faculty’s diverse expertise. Students may also pursue group advanced research projects, including the Halsey Alfa and Bravo courses, which focus on tactical and
operational war-gaming scenarios important to the fleet. Two special programs
extend the College program from ten to thirteen months for some students: the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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recently expanded Maritime Advanced Warfighting School, which creates operational planners now in high demand in the fleet, and the new Advanced Studies
in Naval Strategy program, which offers a deep dive into critical principles of
strategy. All of these elements combine with the core curriculum to develop the
most important weapon system of all—the mind.
Our great gift to students is a new life of the mind. I receive direct and clear
evidence from our graduates, such as this comment from a recent survey: “[The
Naval War College] provided me with historical context and critical thinking
skills that have benefited me every day of my current assignment as senior advisor to a combatant commander.” Other graduates have reported, “For the first
time I find that I have had major shifts in my thinking,” and “I am now looking
at what is happening in the world through a different lens.” None of this happens
without a world-class faculty, one capable of transforming the minds—and thus
the lives—of the men and women who will chart our course into the future.
Since taking command last year, I have been particularly impressed with the
dedication and impact of our faculty. They commit long hours to students while
constantly revising and seamlessly orchestrating the fundamentally different
ILC and SLC curricula. Our active-duty professors come from all services and
from operational and joint assignments and thus offer compelling relevance.
Our civilian professors provide the deep expertise and continuity essential to
program development, and they make themselves extraordinarily relevant in
their respective fields. Just within the past few months, for example, Naval War
College professors have published books with such major academic presses as
the Oxford University Press and Stanford University Press, as well as articles in
key journals like Joint Force Quarterly and International Theory. They also enjoy
direct connections to senior leaders, including in-person briefings for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations on matters
involving Asian security strategy. Yet their first love is, and must be, teaching and
challenging our students.
Admiral James G. Stavridis has often observed that twenty-first-century warfare is “brain on brain.” He’s right. Well-educated leaders are the lone constant
we can create for an unknown future, and the Naval War College’s “engine”—our
core program fueled by outstanding faculty—is doing just that.

P. GARDNER HOWE III

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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Dr. Murphy is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University,
Halifax, Nova Scotia, as well as a Visiting Fellow at
the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at
King’s College London. He was previously a Senior
Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He has published three books on
piracy and unconventional warfare at sea, a monograph on the Littoral Combat Ship, and some fifty
articles and book chapters.
Professor Yoshihara, of the Strategy and Policy faculty at the Naval War College, holds the John A. van
Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and is an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute
at the College. Most recently, he is coauthor of Red
Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (2010) and coeditor
of Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (2012).
Naval War College Review, Summer 2015, Vol. 68, No. 3
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FIGHTING THE NAVAL HEGEMON
Evolution in French, Soviet, and Chinese Naval Thought
Martin N. Murphy and Toshi Yoshihara

G

eography gives strategy its context. Secure from land invasion, Great Britain and later the United States employed a distinctive form of sea power
to defeat their adversaries. Both used their navies to control sea-lanes and vital
choke points and to apply direct pressure along enemy coastlines. Through their
dominance of the oceans they were able to shape the political and economic order
of the world. It is fair to say that what amounts to the Anglo-American school of
naval power has demonstrated its efficacy time after time: over the past 250 years
these two powers have, singly or together, and always with other allies, defeated
every opponent that has attempted to change that order.
An alternative school of naval thought, one rooted in coastal defense, follows
an asymmetric path intended to enable the weak to take down the strong. This
approach to naval warfare has always sought to capitalize on leading-edge technology while drawing inspiration from French tactics of guerre de course (with
their origins in piracy and privateering), the Russian Revolution, and “people’s
war” in China. In contrast to the oceanic outlook of the Anglo-American tradition, this approach focuses on operations in the littorals and command of the sea
in those waters alone. It yokes the operational and tactical offense to the strategic
defense. It eschews fleet-on-fleet engagement and refuses frontal battle. Instead
it seeks to wear down the opponent while channeling enemy forces as they approach the shoreline, forcing them to attack coastal and inland positions from
unfamiliar seas. The aim is to make the intruder vulnerable to a counterattack
that shifts the initiative to the defender. It extracts advantage from geography. For
instance, China’s control over Asian waters and major shipping lanes would give
Beijing substantial global leverage.
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For over a century, this tradition of naval thought has evolved through various iterations in France, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China,
while retaining its essential features. However, the unique geopolitical contexts,
cultural attitudes, and economic circumstances produced variation in how these
three states employed sea power. This alternative approach to naval warfare
began life in late-nineteenth-century France, where, known as the Jeune École,
it arose as a counter to British naval strategy. It reemerged in the Soviet Union
during the 1920s, when the revolutionary government felt especially vulnerable
to foreign intervention and was in no position to build a battle fleet. There it
mutated on contact with revolutionary war experience, becoming known as the
“Young School” and emerging as an alternative to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s “command of the sea” theory. From there it was transmitted to the People’s Republic,
where several of its attributes have persisted in Chinese naval doctrine.
Breaking from the past, however, China today can compete economically with
the United States, the leading maritime power, even as it holds on to its preference
for waging asymmetric warfare at sea. By contrast, neither France nor the Soviet
Union possessed the wherewithal to challenge seriously the economic position of
the naval hegemons of their respective eras. The prospect in China of alignment
of economic prowess with unorthodox ideas about naval combat is a potentially
new phenomenon worthy of close attention by the United States. While China is
at the forefront of this alternative school in the twenty-first century, its ideas also
animate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy and exert a strong influence on the Russian navy. Notably, Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing are ambivalent
about, if not hostile to, American primacy at sea, and their navies have begun
to cooperate with each other.1 It is thus very likely that this alternative tradition
will live on and be felt across the littorals of Eurasia in the coming years, posing
multiple, yet varied, challenges to U.S. naval predominance.
The Soviet Young School and Mao’s “people’s war” virtually simultaneously
shaped the early development of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
While the two theories clearly overlapped, however, they represented separate
sources of influence on Chinese naval strategy and tactics.2 In both France and
the Soviet Union, doctrines that stressed the importance of the battle fleet eventually enveloped this alternative naval school of thought. In China, this tradition
remains energetic and influential alongside the growth of a more conventional
naval force. Whether such coexistence will continue remains unclear. Indeed,
Chinese strategists have debated the future course of naval doctrine for decades.
In an earlier manifestation of this discourse, one group argued that “people’s war”
theory was irrelevant at sea against technologically sophisticated enemies such as
the United States and Japan. Another view, while agreeing that the Chinese navy
should no longer serve exclusively as the guardian of the army’s coastal flank,
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insisted that people’s war at sea simply needed to be adapted to “new historical”
conditions.3
A similar debate now surrounds the PLAN’s recent ascent at sea and its future implications. Will the naval service follow the Anglo-American model of
sea power and develop a globe-straddling blue-water navy capable of waging
transoceanic campaigns? Or will the PLAN focus on homeland defense, staying
true to its longstanding core identity, even as it becomes more modern, lethal,
and expeditionary? Or will the Chinese navy chart a unique path that reflects the
imperatives peculiar to Beijing’s evolving circumstances? As the PLAN’s growth
continues to tilt the naval balance of power, these questions are gaining policy
urgency in Washington and across Asian capitals. The PLAN’s current naval
strategy, which enlarges China’s maritime defense perimeter farther out to open
waters, is an outgrowth of rather than a break with its formative period, when
the ideas of the alternative school took root. Consequently, the United States and
other seafaring regional powers must remain attentive to the continuing vibrancy
of this tradition in China and its implications for littoral warfare in Asia.
THE JEUNE ÉCOLE: HOW THE WEAK CAN DEFEAT THE STRONG
The Jeune École went through two evolutions. The first laid its primary emphasis on commerce war, linked secondarily to coastal defense; the second merged
these priorities. Both evolutions stressed the importance of technology, the use
of ship speed and numbers, and the redundancy of large battle fleets. Both were
responses to constrained naval budgets.
The theory as a whole is associated indelibly with Vice Admiral HyacintheLaurent-Théophile Aube, who first articulated the school’s basic ideas in the
1870s before serving as France’s minister of marine 1886–87.4 Aube was a man
of the colonies. When he returned to France in 1881 he brought with him the
adventurous colonial spirit and sided with a group of young, reform-minded
officers who favored his ideas. These were the Jeune École—the Young School.
The traditionalists who opposed them became known eventually as the “French
School.” Once Alfred Thayer Mahan in the United States began to publish, they
worked to adapt his thinking to France’s position as a secondary naval power.
Aube became the intellectual driving force behind the Jeune École, along
with a young journalist, Gabriel Charmes, with whom he worked closely until
Charmes’s death early in Aube’s term as minister. However, its basic features had
been delineated in the late 1860s by Captain Richild Grivel, who suggested that
France, as the inferior power with respect to Britain, should pursue commerce
war (guerre de course) and use its battle fleet (in guerre d’escadre) only against
enemies inferior to itself.5
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Military power derives directly from economic power. France’s economy during the years running up to World War I was not weak, but it was never as strong
as that of Great Britain or, eventually, Germany. France’s navy, consequently, always struggled to match those of its principal rivals, a situation that worsened in
the period between Grivel and Aube. In 1870–71 France lost the Franco-Prussian
War. The army of the newly created German Empire became France’s principal enemy and France’s army the recipient of the bulk of French state defense
expenditure. Consequently,
From its first days, an alternative school of
the French navy had to find
thought has emphasized innovation, new
another way to compete at sea
operational methods, deception, camouflage,
with Britain and, eventually,
joint operations, assaults on rear areas and
Germany; the result was a vigcommunications, and guerilla methods.
orous and, some have argued,
destructive and politicized de-
bate.6 Aube’s position was that while the naval high command might argue for a
traditional, battleship-heavy navy to meet Britain on the best affordable terms,
such fleet-on-fleet engagements were now rare and posed much greater risk to
the inferior power than to the superior. He argued that the weaker side must
search out alternative tactics, exploit new technology, and decline to engage the
superior enemy until it became no longer numerically inferior.
Strategies for dealing with a superior naval power have traditionally fallen into
two categories. One involves “risk fleets,” otherwise known as “fleets in being,”
forces structured similarly to the superior power’s but smaller. In the modern age,
the Imperial German Navy assembled by Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz is the classic
example. The second comprises “coastal-defense fleets,” bringing together landbased capabilities, such as forts and artillery, with minefields, patrol boats, and
submarines, as assembled in various periods by France, the Soviet Union, and
China. The Jeune École supported coastal-defense measures but never argued for
a risk fleet, which would aim eventually to confront the opponent’s main battle
fleet, if and when a favorable opportunity occurred.
Instead, the Jeune École took aim at the enemy’s economic power and social
stability, seeing trade as Britain’s greatest strategic weakness.7 British naval exercises suggested that this assessment was right—the nation’s trade had increased
massively since the Napoleonic Wars and was now heavily dependent on imports,
while the Royal Navy’s traditional policy of close blockade had been rendered
untenable by the advent of steam power and the threat to the fleet posed by small,
fast-moving torpedo boats.8 Charmes argued that commerce campaigns should
be pursued without pity; it was a tenet of the Jeune École that international law
had no place in modern war. Despite the ruthlessness of its means, however,
the Jeune École’s primary aim was to induce not starvation but economic panic,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

Summer2015Review.indb 16

21

4/21/15 1:50 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

M U R P H Y & YO S H I HA R A

17

leading to financial and social upheaval.9 Interestingly, the French navy was
never to pursue the Jeune École’s recommendations, but during World War I the
Imperial German Navy would, in addition to its risk-fleet strategy. There were
strategic differences but operational similarities between what the Jeune École
recommended and the Germans later implemented, and the latter’s experience
confirmed many of the Jeune École’s views.10
Alternative Tactics, New Technologies, and Numerical Superiority
The Jeune École’s first evolution ended when Aube left office in 1887, at which
time the school’s influence went into temporary decline. The second evolution
began in the 1890s, when his ideas were taken up by a new generation of young
naval officers. Underlying both evolutions was the need to deliver naval effect
with limited budgets. If commerce war and coastal defense—with the emphasis
on commerce war—were the Jeune École’s alternatives during the first phase,
its alternative technological focus was on the self-propelled torpedo, married
to specialized torpedo boats. The Jeune École argued consistently that numbers
matter and that therefore it was better to build larger numbers of smaller ships
than to rely on a smaller number of battleships and cruisers—better to replace
armor and large guns with speed and numerical superiority.11 It was this view that
led to adoption of the torpedo, because, though in Aube’s time it was still in its
technological infancy, it could be launched from fast-moving small craft.12 Small
meant cheap, which translated into large numbers.13 Camouflage and deception
too were always vital components of the Jeune École’s methods. There was nothing more demoralizing for a battle fleet, Charmes suggested, than to be attacked
by small, mixed flotillas of gunboats and torpedo boats flitting like “phantoms”
amidst the confusion of battle.14
Critically, numerical superiority would not be achieved by a single force operating from a single base. The total force would be distributed in flotilla-sized
packets across multiple, fortified bases coming together only long enough to
hit a target before scattering again to elude counterattack. Aube broke from accepted wisdom when he argued that small boats could be used offensively. An
exercise conducted while he was minister of marine showed that his confidence
was largely justified.15 Despite their limitations, small craft were demonstrably
capable of slipping past any blockade to attack shipping; consequently, commerce
war in “narrow seas” was a viable option.16
The tactical emphasis during the Jeune École’s second stage switched to coastal
defense. The torpedo was maturing as a weapon to a degree that the focus by the
1890s was on small, fast torpedo boats operating in and from the littorals.17 However, this did not mean commerce war was abandoned. The theory now was that
rather than attempting to dislocate British trade on the high seas, France could
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exploit its geographic position (including its position in the Mediterranean) so
as to fuse commerce war and coastal defense into a single, littoral-war concept.18
Ship numbers still mattered most, and speed remained important. Aube’s idea of
ship specialization was retained; the intention was to equip each flotilla with a
single ship type designated for a single mission.19
Jeune École: Its Effect and Its Legacy
As the nineteenth century merged into the twentieth, plans that were inspired by
Jeune École theories but at the same time retained cruisers and much of the traditional battle fleet, thereby once again making distant guerre de course possible,
were put forward. They were argued by two senior advocates: Admiral FrançoisErnest Fournier, head of the newly established Naval War College, and, later,
Jean-Louis de Lanessan, the minister of marine from 1899 to 1902. Both called
for the French navy to be based in multiple locations to force the British to divide
their blockading forces. Torpedo boats and submarines would harry isolated British units, pushing them farther out to sea. French battleships and cruisers would
then be able to evade the now-fragmented blockade line and hunt down British
trade in distant waters.
In the end, however, time caught up with both the Jeune École and the conglomerate strategy of Lanessan. In 1904, Britain and France signed the Entente
Cordiale.20 The effect on relations was not immediate, but the two countries were
put on a path that eventually made them allies against Germany, thus removing
the political and strategic context that had given the Jeune École its rationale.
Technical developments elsewhere also lessened the torpedo threat, including the
advent of wireless, steel armor, quick-firing artillery, searchlights, and torpedo
nets. In Britain, there was now a naval revival, including the building of torpedo
boat destroyers, specifically to defend the fleet; French morale was undermined
by its success, compared with France’s own poorly conceived building program.
Also in France, Aube’s dismissive attitude to international law and public opinion
was questioned, while the type of fleet the Jeune École concept demanded was
rejected as too specialized for orthodox conceptions of naval strategy.21
The Jeune École has been maligned by naval practitioners and historians—
often for partisan reasons—even though it changed contemporary strategy and
tactics, affected the development of new technologies, and left a tactical legacy
that remains influential today.22 Admiral Raoul Castex, the early-twentiethcentury French strategic theoretician, was caustic about the school’s ideas and
what he regarded as the confusion they spread, yet he agreed that its emphasis
on speed, specialization, and numbers was not misplaced.23 The distinguished
American historian Theodore Ropp, who also regarded the Jeune École unfavorably, conceded that its ideas represented a genuinely new school of naval
warfare.24 Technologically, it influenced the development of the torpedo, the
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submarine, the offensive employment of small craft, and the integration of
land- and sea-based coastal-defense forces. Tactically, it affected coastal warfare,
commerce warfare, the exploitation of modern communications to effect the
dispersal and rapid concentration of force, and the evolution toward what was
known in France as guerre industrielle and elsewhere as “total war.”
It had perhaps its greatest impact outside France, first and most obviously in
Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare campaigns of World Wars I and II.
But it was the British who, once they recognized that their trade was vulnerable
and their traditional blockade strategy unworkable, became, in the words of naval historian Geoffrey Till, “more worried about these ideas than they cared to
admit.”25
FISHER AND FLOTILLA WARFARE
Admiral of the Fleet Sir John “Jackie” Fisher, First Sea Lord 1904–10 and 1914–
15, thought much as Aube had. While his name is linked irrevocably with the
“dreadnought” capital ship revolution, he argued with all his renowned vigor
that the Royal Navy should rely on torpedo-equipped flotillas in home waters
and fast battle cruisers to protect the imperial shipping lanes, rather than on the
battle fleet as the main instrument of strategic deterrence.26 Fisher’s view in 1905
was that if torpedo boats were available in sufficient numbers they could make
the English Channel and the western Mediterranean basin impenetrable to warships within three or four years.27 Like Aube’s, Fisher’s conception depended on
mass, not individual superiority.28 His vision was one of sea denial, which aims
to prevent an opponent from using maritime space as it chooses.29 The historian
Nicholas Lambert suggests it was “a completely new way of thinking.”30
Sea denial has often been castigated as a strategy of negativity, but in Fisher’s
view it was the opposite. What made the concept so attractive to him was that he
could deploy large numbers of relatively cheap surface combatants in “flotillas”
to patrol the English Channel, the approach to the British Isles that concerned
him the most. Although access to this strip of water could be effectively denied
to both sides, as the French would act against British capital ships in the same
way, this flotilla-based defense would be to Britain’s advantage, because while the
capital ships and small combatants of both navies were busy holding or denying
the English Channel, the Royal Navy could deploy its armored cruisers much
more productively in defense of imperial possessions and trade routes overseas.31
Far from being tied down, they would be liberated to fulfill their most important
role. By the end of 1905 the Royal Navy’s Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain
Charles Ottley, was writing of employing “flotilla defense” from Brest in the west
to the mouth of the Elbe in the east, thereby also restricting the German navy,
which operated from bases in and around Wilhelmshaven.32
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Any suspicion that flotilla defense was for Fisher some sort of sideshow is dispelled by his own writings. He wrote that it was a strategy “peculiarly adapted” to
the defense of the narrow seas and that in terms of his own preparations, “some
vessels, such, for instance, as torpedo craft and submarines, are wanted sooner
than others,” because they constituted “the advanced guard and first striking
force of the whole fleet.”33 It was the submarine that Fisher lauded above all. In
Fisher’s view the submarine represented a true “revolution” in naval warfare.34
Many of Fisher’s predictions about the submarine’s effectiveness and the
threats presented by torpedoes were borne out. The battle of Jutland in 1916
confirmed what had been plain since 1914—that the High Seas Fleet, Germany’s
“risk fleet,” was strategically irrelevant unless it was able to sink an isolated
element of the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet of sufficient size to erode the latter’s
overall numerical superiority. The only way the German navy could influence
the outcome of the war was to use long-range submarines, not cruisers, to sink
British commerce. The commerce-war strategy that the Jeune École had advanced
forty years earlier was now brought to fruition, albeit at a technologically more
advanced level.35
THE SOVIET “YOUNG SCHOOL”
Like the Jeune École, the Soviet “Young School” (molodaia shkola) was driven
by the need to maintain a naval capability and capacity in an era of constrained
resources; in the Soviet case, naval budgets were restricted and shipbuilding
capability had been crippled by civil war. In France, state resources had been
directed to the army. In the Soviet Union, the overwhelming priority during the
interwar years was rapid industrialization, and the army was allocated most of
what was left. The naval focus accordingly switched to coastal defense, “using an
integrated system of minefields, coastal artillery, submarines and motor torpedo
boats,” with the aim of conducting its war at sea “on lines quite novel in maritime
strategy.”36 Traditionalists were vilified as utterly out of touch.37
Unlike the Jeune École, however, it was also driven by ideology: its advocates,
although influenced strongly by the Red Army, clearly worked under Communist
Party direction.38 The intention was to provide a theoretical underpinning for a
light and inexpensive naval defensive-deterrent force centered on submarines
and with only a small number of large ships retained to support them.39 Stripped
of its Marxist-Leninist terminology, the central tenets of what became known
(because of its conscious use of ideas drawn from the Jeune École) as the Soviet
Young School were that the navy existed to guard the army’s seaward flank, that
it should be refocused on “small war,” that smaller craft and submarines could
be manufactured quickly and losses could therefore be readily replaced, and that
the submarine had replaced the battleship as the main striking arm of the fleet.40
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The drive for a proletarian military doctrine that aimed to bring together all
the arms of state power had begun after the Russian civil war ended in 1921.41
Despite this political orientation, many members of the old tsarist navy retained
their positions because of their technical and operational experience. They
continued to argue that the ability to exert command of the sea as described by
Mahan was essential for defending the nation’s sea approaches and forcing the
straits that confined Soviet naval power. Their opponents branded them the “Old
School.”42 Few in the party understood what these men were talking about; most
thought they were unrealistic, given the Soviet Union’s parlous financial state.
Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, who was to be the commander in chief of the Soviet navy from 1956 to 1985, summed up in 1972–73 the changes that took place
in the 1920s in terms that could have described an updated version of the Jeune
École:
The small number of combatant ships available [at the time] necessitated research
on the strategy and tactics for carrying on defense of our maritime borders with the
forces of a “small navy” in cooperation with ground forces. . . . Its essence—the delivering of quick strikes on the main objective of the enemy without being separated
from one’s base, with all types of forces secretly concentrated and jointly operating
from opposite directions . . . [using] surface ships, torpedo boats, submarines, aviation, and coastal artillery organized on mine-artillery positions . . . [—amounted to
43
the best use of what resources were available].

The thrust of the Young School was blunted by Joseph Stalin. He never endorsed its thinking. In 1928 the Revolutionary Military Council decided to
create a fleet whose missions were largely coastal and in support of the army.44
On 27 May 1936 a decision to create a “large sea and ocean fleet” was approved
instead.45 Stalin’s initiative did not arise from a clear strategic assessment or
force-planning process. Whatever his reasons were—and the relevant documents have not emerged—during the second half of the 1930s measures were
put in hand to build a high-seas fleet.46 Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, appointed
commander in chief of the Soviet navy in April 1939, explained in 1965 that this
building plan coincided with the emergence of a new “Soviet School” that melded
Young School and Old School thinking, in a manner reminiscent of the changes
Lanessan had initiated in the French navy in the early 1900s.47 The project was
stymied, however, because despite successes achieved with tanks and aircraft,
the sheer size of the shipbuilding program Stalin proposed—which exceeded 1.3
million tons—was completely beyond what Soviet industry could accomplish.48
The program was suspended, and shipbuilding hastily focused on coastal vessels
and submarines once again as cooperation with Germany turned to fears of war
in the months prior to June 1941.
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The rhetorical impression given is that the large battleships and cruisers Stalin
wanted would have shifted the navy’s focus from defense to offense and from
coastal to oceanic waters; the stated strategic aim in 1939 was to achieve sea
supremacy in the four fleet areas. But there was no definition of why or to what
end. On one hand, the battleships were quite unsuited to shallow-water operations, and on the other, no plans have come to light showing how these ships
would have been deployed oceanically. Kuznetsov was to admit that after talking
to Stalin late in 1939 he was “not quite clear in [his own] head why they were being built at all.”49 In retrospect, it would seem that this huge effort—which was
Stalin’s and Stalin’s alone; no one dared oppose him—was a response to German
plans (and therefore consistent with interwar arms racing) but was also inspired
by ideas of Soviet imperium very similar to Hitler’s ambitions for Germany. It
amounted in the end to nothing more than a vainglorious political statement
intended to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was capable of building (or buying) a navy as good as that of any other major power.50 Because Stalin’s building
program was hastily abandoned, the Soviet navy actually fought World War II as
a coastal force, supporting the army’s flank.
After World War II Stalin threw naval planning into reverse; instead of returning to his obsession with size, he reined the navy in. In 1948 he said the Soviet
Union had no need “to protect ocean lines of communications. . . . We need to
guard the shores and coastal shipping”; in 1950 he criticized naval officers for
“blindly copying the Americans and the English. . . . We are not thinking about
conducting ocean battles, but will fight close to our shores.”51 Effectively, whatever large ships were available would dilute the navy’s dependence on submarines
and flotillas of small craft. Nonetheless, the latter would remain the backbone of
the navy, continuing to operate from fortified coastal bases defended by artillery,
mines, naval infantry, and fighter aircraft. The large ships would not operate
oceanically but at a “tactically favorable distance” to retain command of the sea
in specific areas to deny the enemy its strategic objectives.52 The overall implication was that the flotilla forces needed to be supplemented by heavier squadron
forces if the strategically defensive but tactically offensive concept known as “active defense” was to be realized.53
While Nikita Khrushchev, now the Soviet leader, implemented a massive submarine building program starting in 1956, his political weakness (which led to
his eventual fall from power in 1964) meant that sufficient elements of the Soviet
School fleet-in-being concept remained to pave the way for the gradual construction of a fleet capable of more than sea denial.54 But it was to be a fleet that was
built around the army’s territorially inspired doctrine of “deeply echeloned zones
of defense,” with three zones—near, far, and open-ocean—that theoretically extended to the coasts of the Soviet Union’s potential enemies.55
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CHINESE GUERILLA WARFARE GOES TO SEA
The Chinese navy that emerged following the communist triumph in 1949 had
much in common with that of the Soviets. Chinese naval developments in the
1950s were circumscribed by economic constraints similar to those experienced
by the Soviets in the 1920s and ’30s. As its formal title made clear, the People’s
Liberation Army Navy was subordinate to the army, as in the Soviet model. Geographically and ideologically, both China and the USSR were continental powers,
and both regimes advocated revolutionary war.56 Yet the notion that the Chinese
navy was essentially a replica of its Soviet counterpart obscures important homegrown influences.
Chinese strategists clearly possessed their own intellectual agency. Mao Zedong,
after all, was a towering military theorist in his own right, and his pervasive
influence reached naval affairs. The similarities between Mao’s strategic thought
and that of the Soviet Young School may have made some of the imported Soviet
naval concepts more digestible. But it seems unlikely that the Chinese would have
unquestioningly privileged foreign ideas over their own thinking.57 Moreover,
Chinese combat experiences at sea in the 1950s and 1960s produced enduring
lessons that were peculiar to China’s local circumstances. Similarly, doctrinal
developments and force modernization were products of thoughtful integration
of domestic and foreign ideas. The Chinese were by no means unthinking automatons who borrowed slavishly from their Soviet patrons.
Glorious History
The Chinese navy’s operational history, while sparse, has played an important
role in forming the service’s identity. Official accounts portray the navy’s early
combat experiences as defining moments. The historiography shows how the
PLAN beat the odds, prevailing against technologically and materially superior
adversaries. After the communists won the Chinese civil war, the new regime in
Beijing faced a grave security situation at sea. The Nationalists (Kuomintang, or
KMT) were now on Taiwan but still controlled the littorals and occupied numerous strategically located offshore islands. KMT naval units prowled the mainland
shores, harassing shipping and disrupting coastal communications. Despite
resource constraints, the Chinese navy improvised and made do with the woefully equipped forces at hand. The PLAN helped dislodge the Nationalists from
key islands while putting a stop to the KMT’s ability to act with impunity at sea.
Guerilla thinking, in fact, served the PLAN well during its early years, and Soviet
Young School ideas fitted in easily.58
The first objective was the Wanshan Islands, which lay astride critical sea lines
of communications at the mouth of the Pearl River, the epicenter of maritime
commerce in southern China. In May 1950, the Central Military Commission
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directed local commanders to “use the small to strike the big and conduct closein attack and night attack to bring into full play our forte.”59 In the first sea battle
of the People’s Republic, Chinese small craft snuck into the main harbor of the
offshore islands at night and ambushed an enemy flotilla at anchor. In the ensuing melee the communists sank a number of vessels, causing confusion and chaos
among the surprised Nationalists. In the most important and dramatic encounter of the attack, a twenty-eight-ton patrol boat severely damaged the 1,200-ton
KMT flagship. The communists managed to pull off a major upset, opening the
way for taking the islands.
China turned next to the Nationalist-occupied Yijiangshan Islands off the
Zhejiang coast. Prior to launching the famous 1955 Yijiangshan campaign, during which the People’s LiberaThe PLAN’s current naval strategy, which
tion Army (PLA) successfully
enlarges China’s maritime defense perimeter
conducted its first joint amfarther out to open waters, is an outgrowth of phibious operation, Chinese
rather than a break with its formative period. forces sought to wrest control
of the air and seas from the
KMT. To clear the approaches to Yijiangshan, the communists had to neutralize enemy naval forces, particularly the corvette Taiping, patrolling nearby
around Dachen Island. The PLAN secretly dispatched four torpedo boats—
using larger ships to screen their movement—to forward staging areas, where they
awaited orders for a surprise attack. In the meantime, aerial bombardment against
Dachen attempted to distract the KMT defenders. When Taiping was detected on
the night of 14 November 1954, shore-based radar guided the twenty-ton torpedo
boats to their 1,430-ton target. The hit-and-run torpedo attack sank the much
larger warship, tilting control of the local waters toward the communists.
The struggle against the Nationalists culminated in a series of sea battles in
1965. On 6 August six torpedo boats and four fast patrol craft from the PLAN’s
South Sea Fleet sprang a surprise on the 1,250-ton Jianmen and the 450-ton
Zhangjiang off the waters of Dongshan Island, near the Fujian–Guangdong provincial border. The night attack sank both vessels, killing 170 men, including a
rear admiral, and capturing thirty-three others. The “86 Sea Battle” remains a celebrated and carefully studied victory in the Chinese navy. Three months later, six
torpedo boats and six fast patrol craft engaged in another night battle, this time
against the KMT’s 945-ton Yongchang and 903-ton Yongtai just east of Quanzhou,
Fujian. After a fierce exchange, a severely damaged Yongtai fled the scene, and
Yongchang sank from two torpedo hits and follow-on gunfire.60
These early victories became integral parts of the PLAN’s institutional
memory. They resonate to this day. The Chinese navy’s handbook for officers
and enlisted, for example, recounts these feats in a section entitled the “Glorious
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History of the Navy.”61 Such a historical narrative conveys the service’s tradition
of resourcefulness in the face of adversity. It illustrates the importance of offensive spirit, stratagem, and surprise at sea. It casts China in the role of David
against the Nationalist Goliath. Chinese campaign histories go to great lengths
to show how the Nationalist ships vastly exceeded the PLAN’s in displacement.
But it also sends the message that China must still prepare for conflicts involving
superior adversaries. The problem of overcoming the power asymmetry between
weaker and stronger sides is as relevant today as it was six decades ago; it is as relevant for China then and now as it was for France in the late nineteenth century
and for Russia after the revolution.
Perhaps more importantly, the navy’s formative experiences highlight the
influence of the war-fighting traditions of the People’s Liberation Army, forged
in the brutal, decades-long civil war. The hit-and-run attacks that featured so
prominently at sea have their antecedents in Mao Zedong’s guerilla warfare. For
example, writing in Military History, a bimonthly journal of the Academy of
Military Science, Zhou Lingui praises the nascent Chinese navy for transposing
guerilla tactics to the maritime domain. “At the time,” Zhou observes, “the vast
majority of the naval troops and officers originated from the army, boasting rich
operational experiences on land. Consciously or unconsciously, they applied
those valuable lessons from guerilla warfare on land to combat at sea.”62 The authors of a study extolling the continuing relevance of Mao’s military theories in
the twenty-first century credit the chairman for inspiring the early naval actions
of the 1950s and ’60s. Mao’s people’s war concept, they contend, helped “create
such tactics as rely on islands and shores, close-in fighting and night fighting,
sea-air coordination, shore-ship coordination, near seas annihilation, and small
boats fighting large ships.”63
Sabotage Warfare at Sea
The pressing Nationalist threat in the first half of the 1950s compelled the PLAN
to take action. The operational principles behind the engagements at sea were
largely implicit. Formal operational guidance did not emerge until the mid1950s. Practice had to come before theory. At length, in March 1956, the Central
Military Commission issued military strategic guidance under the rubric of “active defense, defend the motherland.” “Active defense,” a concept that Mao developed and refined in the 1930s, called for the employment of offensive operations
and tactics to achieve strategically defensive goals. The navy’s role was to support
the army and the air force against the enemy on land. Under active defense, the
PLAN’s missions were to
conduct joint counter landing operations with ground and air forces; wreck the
enemy’s sea lines of communications, severing the supply of materiel and manpower;
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weaken and annihilate the enemy’s seaborne transport tools and combat vessels;
jointly operate with ground forces in contests over key points and locations along the
coast; guarantee the security of our coastal base system and strategic locations; support ground forces in littoral flanking operations; act in concert with ground forces to
64
recover offshore islands and all territories.

In 1957, Admiral Xiao Jinguang, the first commander of the PLAN (1950–79),
more systematically developed operational guidance for the Chinese navy. Xiao,
a Long March veteran and a corps commander of the Fourth Field Army during
the Chinese civil war, was an army officer, with no training or background in naval affairs. He and many of his comrades had to adapt quickly to an entirely new
operational domain in which China’s adversaries, the Nationalists aided by the
United States, seemed to hold an upper hand. It was therefore not surprising that
Xiao applied what he knew best to his new task of leading the PLAN.
After consulting Mao Zedong’s military writings from the 1920s and 1930s
and those of Soviet experts, Xiao articulated the operational concept of “sabotage
warfare at sea” (海上破袭战). Confronted with better-armed enemies, he understood that China was in no position to fight them head-on. Drawing on his own
battlefield experiences, the admiral reasoned that inferior Chinese forces had
to “use suddenness and sabotage and guerilla tactics to unceasingly attack and
destroy the enemy, accumulate small victories in place of big wins, fully leverage
and bring into play our advantageous conditions, exploit and create unfavorable
conditions for the enemy, and implement protracted war.”65 Mao would have
instantly recognized these ideas as his own.
Four key features characterized Xiao’s sabotage warfare at sea. First, it called
for the use of all available weaponry to deliver all possible types of attacks against
the enemy. Second, it emphasized covert action and sudden surprise attacks to
overpower unsuspecting or unprepared adversaries, so as to seize the initiative.
Third, it required offensive campaigns and tactics to assault unceasingly the effective strength of the enemy. Fourth, it demanded the agile use of troops and
combat styles to preserve one’s own forces while annihilating the opponent.
Xiao essentially codified what his forces had practiced out of sheer necessity in
previous years. In contrast to a “naval strategy” as such, seeking to align available means with larger political aims, the admiral furnished a concept that was
largely operational and tactical in nature. Xiao, in essence, identified methods
for winning battles.
Surprise, deception, unorthodox methods, offensive spirit, and small incremental victories were essential to Xiao’s conception of naval battle. According to
the PLAN’s encyclopedia, sabotage warfare at sea involved
offensive operations at sea in which naval forces employ destructive and surprise
attacks against the enemy. It is also known as guerrilla warfare or irregular warfare at
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sea. It is a combat style that relies on small groups of naval forces to carry out covert
surprise attacks. . . . To achieve the operational objectives, it uses unconventional
combat methods to attack the enemy’s critical targets. In coordination with conventional operations on the strategic and campaign levels, it seeks to annihilate, weaken,
deplete, tire out, and divide the enemy in order to pin down the enemy or throw into
66
confusion the enemy’s deployment of forces.

Opportunism suffused the concept. Sabotage warfare at sea sought to exploit China’s complex maritime geography, notably the convoluted eighteenthousand-kilometer (eleven-thousand-mile) coastline and the offshore islands
that dot the approaches to the mainland. Chinese naval forces could use the
shorelines and islands to disperse and hide, to await orders, to deploy and redeploy, to launch and coordinate attacks, and to operate under the cover of shorebased artillery and naval aviation.67 The intended targets of such sabotage were
vulnerable transport vessels, isolated warships, and poorly defended naval bases
and ports. The specific tactics to destroy such military objects included rapid
raids with high-speed vessels and aircraft, minelaying, hunter-killer submarine
operations, and sneak attacks after infiltration of enemy ports. In keeping with
Mao’s people’s war, conventional forces would be supported by fishermen and the
coastal population.
Xiao’s operational concept provided an important organizing principle around
which the Chinese navy could employ tactics and develop weaponry. To Zuo
Liping of the Naval Military Studies Research Institute, sabotage warfare at sea
was “a type of innovation in military theory.” “The navy,” Zuo claims, “not only
combined research with actual combat experience, but it also provided a naval
theory with Chinese characteristics. The development of sabotage warfare at sea
as operational guidance represented a type of naval thought that was highly strategic and comprehensive.”68 Note that Zuo describes the theory as an operational
framework rather than a strategic one. It is important to reemphasize, therefore,
that Xiao offered a tactical solution for the weaker side at sea. But his approach
left largely unanswered how the navy would serve China’s foreign-policy and
longer-term strategic objectives.
While China’s own theorizing and its hard-won lessons at sea informed the
PLAN’s operational doctrine, a major source of early communist naval thinking was undoubtedly the Soviet Union. In August 1950, Admiral Xiao convened
the first navy conference to discuss the future development and direction of
the PLAN. To Xiao, ideological kinship as well as access to technology and
know-how made the Soviet navy a logical, politically correct partner. As he later
observed, “Especially for our navy, which was starting from scratch, it was no
good to lean on our own experiences and to grope about by ourselves. Only by
learning well and borrowing from others’ advanced experiences could we quickly
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build up a powerful navy that was modern and conventional.”69 Attesting to the
importance attached to cooperation with the Soviet Union, Xiao in April 1952
led the first delegation to Moscow to negotiate the purchase of naval weaponry.
After several rounds of talks, the two sides agreed to a major transfer of warships
and submarines in June 1953. In the meantime, Soviet consultants and experts
rotated through the Dalian Naval Academy. Between 1949 and 1960, nearly 3,400
advisers visited the PLAN.
Even so, Xiao’s memoir acknowledges that considerable debate divided his
subordinates over the initial decision to depend on the Soviets. On one side,
former Nationalist naval officers who had defected to the communists during
the civil war argued that access to Western, particularly British and American,
technologies should not be written off. On the other side, doctrinaire adherents
of people’s war contended that they had more to learn from their own civil-war
experiences than from foreign powers. The resistance to Soviet technology and
naval ideas came from continentalist cadres who favored strong land forces and
whose faith in Mao’s people’s war doctrine was almost mystical. The argument
in China thus bore noticeable similarities to the debate that had raged between
the Old and Young Schools in the Soviet Union during the 1930s. The Chinese
continentalists, like the Soviet political leaders before them, applied their mindset to naval affairs.
Xiao himself opposed blind adoption of all things Soviet. He insisted that the
Chinese navy had to be selective, rejecting Soviet ways that were unsuited to
China’s unique, local conditions. To him it was plain that the PLAN could draw
technological and institutional lessons from the Soviets. But it was imperative for
the service to stick to its own traditions on such important matters as political
indoctrination.
“Naval Aviation, Submarines, Fast Attack Craft”
Xiao’s landmark meeting in August 1950 produced a lasting effect on the Chinese
navy’s force structure. The nation’s dismal economic, industrial, and technological conditions limited the navy’s ambitions and options, as had been the case for
the navies of France and the Soviet Union. Analogously, the PLAN clearly could
not stand up to the modern navies of the West on a symmetrical basis. Also, the
immediate Nationalist danger, much closer to home, dictated the scope of naval
modernization. In summarizing the findings of the conference, Xiao concluded,
“With an eye toward long-term development and departing from the current
situation, we will build light combat power at sea that is modern and offensive
in nature. We need to first organize and develop our current capabilities and, on
the foundation of those current capabilities, develop torpedo boats, submarines,
and naval aviation to gradually build a strong, national navy.”70

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

Summer2015Review.indb 28

33

4/21/15 1:50 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

M U R P H Y & YO S H I HA R A

29

Xiao’s call for surface, undersea, and air forces reflected an early appreciation of the character of naval warfare. “Modern sea battle,” he declared in 1950,
“is necessarily a kind of three-dimensional war and is a kind of composite war.
We must use the aircraft above the waves, the warships on the sea’s surface, the
submarines in the water, and artillery along the coast to form a synergy of integrated power. In war, the lack of any one of those capabilities could well spell
disaster.”71 The offshore engagements of the 1950s and 1960s amply validated the
importance of mutual support between surface forces and shore-based weaponry.
Xiao’s directive—commonly known as “kong [空], qian [潜], kuai [快],” Chinese
shorthand for “naval aviation, submarines, fast attack craft”—set the course for
the PLAN’s buildup over the next two decades.
Initially, torpedo boats were imported from the Soviet Union or constructed
in Chinese shipyards from Soviet designs and parts. In the 1960s, local industry
began to deliver more ship types, also of Soviet origin. Frigates, submarine chasers, minesweepers, guided-missile fast attack craft, torpedo boats, patrol boats,
diesel-electric submarines, and shore-based tactical bombers joined the fleet.
The PLAN fielded large numbers of small craft and submarines, particularly
the Type 021 Huangfeng guided-missile boats and the Type 033 Romeo-class
submarines, while slighting larger surface combatants and naval aviation. These
added capabilities constituted the light naval force that Xiao set forth in 1950.
They were well suited for coastal combat marked by speed, concealment, mobility, and offensive punch.
From the Lost Years to “Near-Seas Defense”
The Chinese navy’s early operational history, the doctrine of sabotage warfare
at sea, and the buildup that began in the 1950s produced legacies that proved
stubbornly resistant to change. Moreover, external shocks and strategic decisions
helped entrench the status quo. For one thing, the chaos of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s severely disrupted the modernization process. For
another, Mao’s determination to pursue an undersea nuclear deterrent strained
resources while diverting attention from conventional forces. China thus struggled to remake its light, coastal-force posture.
Despite some important developments for the Chinese navy in the 1970s,
including the introduction of the Type 051 Luda-class guided-missile destroyer
and the Type 091 Han-class nuclear attack submarine, obsolescent platforms
composed the bulk of the navy. The naval service overproduced outdated ships
and submarines and neglected new research and development projects. Singlemission platforms that lacked organic self-defense weapons and nonexistent
coordination between combat arms hobbled the PLAN. The limited range of
shore-based airpower, on which surface units depended for protection against air
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and submarine threats, confined naval operations to two hundred nautical miles
from mainland shores.72 In short, the Chinese navy lacked the ability to wage the
type of “three-dimensional war” that Xiao had envisioned two decades before.
Worse, the problems would persist for decades.
Naval doctrine too was stuck in the past. In the 1960s, ’70s, and early ’80s little
had changed since the 1950s. According to Shi Xiaoqin, a naval analyst at the
Academy of Military Science,
the main mission was to exploit the risks inherent to transiting straits to delay, to the
extent possible, the initial offensives of the enemy’s navy. Once the delaying phase
ended, there would be a transition to positional defensive warfare for holding actions along the coast together with guerilla warfare at sea in the enemy’s rear. [These
operations] all emphasized reliance on islands and shores, set-piece battlefields, and
reliance on support from all types of shore-based weaponry and firepower in order
to bring about bastion defense. Surprise attacks against the enemy’s rear communica73
tions constituted the main form of guerilla warfare at sea.

Outmoded doctrine and bloated force structure reinforced each other, in a vicious cycle. This state of affairs would persist until Admiral Liu Huaqing became
the PLAN’s commander (1982–87). Much has already been written in the West
about Liu’s central role in advancing the concept of “near-seas defense” (or “offshore defense”), and no reprise of the existing literature will be attempted here.74
It is worth noting, however, that the near-seas defense strategy remains the bedrock for the Chinese navy. It is therefore an important concept, one that bridges
the PLAN’s doctrinal past, present, and future. The PLAN encyclopedia states,
[Near-seas defense involves] the combined use of all kinds of methods to exercise the
overall effects of maritime power to preserve oneself to the maximum extent while
unceasingly exhausting and annihilating the attacking enemy. It requires a sufficient
grasp of mobile combat capabilities to search and destroy the enemy, gradually shift
the power balance, change the strategic situation, and thereby appropriately time the
75
transition to the strategic counter offensive and attack.

The concept of near-seas defense articulated a long-term, regionally oriented
strategy that enlarged China’s maritime defense perimeter, extending the Chinese
navy’s area of operations much farther from mainland shores in a series of echelons in a manner that reflected earlier Soviet thinking. Instead of fighting the
enemy in China’s coastal waters, the PLAN aimed to keep the opponent at arm’s
length while shielding from attack important political and economic centers on
the seaboard. In contrast to sabotage warfare at sea, which sought to tie up or
slow down enemy forces, near-seas defense would defeat and roll back the enemy
offensive. Instead of pinpricks and hit-and-run attacks with small forces, moresubstantial and organized formations would be involved in naval engagements.
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In contrast to its previous subordination to the army and role as an adjunct to
land operations, the navy would enjoy greater scope for action as an independent,
strategic service.
Yet the strategy did not grow out of a vacuum. It was (and remains) anchored
in long-standing strategic principles. For example, Liu insisted that near-seas
defense conformed to the strategic guidance of active defense. It would employ
offensive means for strategically defensive goals, including such core interests as
national unity, territorial integrity, and maritime rights. At the same time, nearseas defense continues to assume that China will fight from a position of material
weakness. To close the gap in naval power, offensive action would be employed
aggressively to grind down the enemy. Over time, an accumulation of such attacks would shift the naval balance, perhaps decisively, in China’s favor, affording
the PLAN the opportunity to go on the offensive. The sequence of events parallels the famous three phases in Mao’s protracted-war concept that envisioned a
similar reversal of fortunes between the enemy and the communists.
Moreover, sabotage warfare was not abandoned outright. Rather, it was subsumed into the new, larger strategic concept. In a retrospective of China’s naval
strategy during the era of “paramount leader” Deng Xiaoping, Liu Zhongmin of
the Ocean University of China explicitly points to positional, mobile, and guerilla
warfare in tracing the lineage of near-seas defense back to Mao’s revolutionary
era.76 To Liu, the strategy closely links naval operations farther from shore to
combat on land and near the coastline, tethering the navy to homeland defense.
With more symmetrical, conventional forces operating at the outer limits of
China’s maritime defense perimeter, sabotage warfare would presumably play a
subsidiary but no less important role in rear areas close to shore.
ECHOES OF THE PAST
Chinese analysts continue to look back to their strategic traditions for guidance
about future wars at sea. Quan Jinfu and Chen Ming, two professors from China’s
Naval Command College, call on the PLAN to prepare for “naval strategic operations,” which they define as “operations employing naval power to fulfill objectives of the war at sea that greatly influence the war as a whole.” To them, naval
combat would assume such familiar forms as mobile warfare at sea, positional
warfare at sea, and sabotage guerilla warfare at sea, concepts drawn directly from
Mao’s writings.77 Similarly, Wang Zheng at the Chinese National Defense University argues that future wars under “informatized conditions” would use methods
that would have been familiar to guerilla fighters in the 1930s. Wang declares
that the People’s Liberation Army must seek to “trap the enemy in the vast seas
of people’s war with special operations, sabotage warfare, and guerilla warfare at
sea using high-technology weapons deep behind enemy lines.”78
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Admiral Xiao’s early emphasis on aircraft, submarines, and fast attack craft is
still visible in the force structures of the PLAN and its sister services. Between
2000 and 2012, China’s fleet of attack submarines increased eightfold, from five
boats to forty.79 This modern undersea force can launch antiship cruise missiles
(ASCMs) while submerged, posing a potent threat to surface forces. Assuming
that the likely course of an oncoming enemy fleet could be anticipated, these
submarines would transit to
An alternative school of naval thought, one
firing positions in advance
rooted in coastal defense, follows an asymmet- and wait for the right time to
ric path intended to enable the weak to take
spring an ambush. With the
down the strong.
aid of off-board sensors and
targeting systems, dispersed
PLAN submarines could fire coordinated, multivector missile salvos to surprise
the adversary at a distance.80
The analogue to the PLAN’s light torpedo forces of the 1950s is the large fleet
of Type 022 Houbei fast attack craft. According to Nan Li of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, “The Type 022 . . . represents a continuation of
the PLAN’s historical ethos as a successful, small-ship navy that is able to take on
adversaries with potentially more substantial deployments.”81 Armed with longrange antiship cruise missiles, these wave-piercing catamarans pack a punch.82
The stealthy hull structure, high speed, and small size of the Houbeis make them
ideal platforms for evading enemies and launching surprise attacks in offshore
waters. With at least sixty boats in service, the PLAN may be well positioned to
launch coordinated saturation missile volleys to overpower fleet defenses.83 The
Type 022s could form wolf packs to conduct the hit-and-run tactics envisioned
in sabotage warfare at sea.
Notably, Chinese analysts continue to extol the value of the submarine and fast
attack craft as maritime guerilla forces. An extensive study on the twenty-firstcentury relevance of fast attack craft envisions large numbers of small modern
combatants in the near seas providing support to the larger surface fleet operating in the far seas.84 Three analysts from the Navy Engineering College propose
“maritime swarming warfare” in future wars at sea, a concept that would fit very
well with the Type 022. Surprise attacks, ambushes, concealment, and deception
would characterize swarming tactics.85 Similarly, two researchers at the Naval
Command College have invoked “guerilla warfare tactics” on numerous occasions
to illustrate how modern attack submarines could engage carrier strike groups.86
China’s land-based air and missile forces can potentially influence events at
sea independently or in conjunction with Chinese surface and undersea forces.
The PLAN’s air arm fields shore-based fixed-wing aircraft that could fire ASCMs.
Notably, the Su-30MKK multirole fighter and the H-6 medium-range bomber
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can threaten surface ships cruising well east of the “first island chain” (running
generally from Kamchatka through Japan, the Ryukyus, and the northern Philippines to Borneo). Massed formations of such maritime strike aircraft armed with
long-range ASCMs could conceivably deliver concentrated blows to overwhelm
enemy fleet defenses.
The antiship ballistic missile (ASBM)—a maneuverable ballistic weapon
capable of hitting moving targets at sea—of the Second Artillery Corps, China’s
strategic missile force, is perhaps the ultimate technical expression of shore-based
firepower. With a range reportedly exceeding eight hundred nautical miles, the
truck-mounted missile joins an extended family of ship-killing missiles that can
be fired from submarines, ships, and aircraft. Whether it will perform as advertised has been a subject of intense debate, but its existence is an unmistakable sign
that the Chinese are seeking to hold at risk an enemy’s surface fleet with as many
maritime strike options as possible.
A hypothetical Sino-U.S. war at sea perhaps best illustrates how the sabotage
warfare of the 1950s might still take place in the twenty-first century. Tactically,
China would seek to engage and interdict American naval forces at the maximum
effective ranges that its weaponry would permit. Antiship ballistic missiles and
long-range aircraft could deliver the first blows: ASBM raids and massed formations of maritime strike aircraft armed with long-range ASCMs could conceivably punch through a U.S. fleet’s defenses. Such shore-based firepower allows
China to deliver ordnance on an American carrier strike group directly from the
mainland well before it could get close enough to shore to retaliate in kind with
its combat aircraft. As the U.S. fleet approached the Chinese seaboard it would
then encounter lurking ASCM-armed submarines, stealthy fast attack craft, and
other units armed with shorter-range missiles. Resistance would become stiffest
and deadliest in this inner ring of China’s defense, where sabotage warfare involving high-tech guerilla tactics would most likely be employed.
DISCERNING CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
Yet there is no denying that change is afoot. The PLA Navy has grown rapidly
from a coastal-defense force composed of largely obsolescent Soviet-era technologies into a modern naval service. Over the past two decades, multiple classes of
China’s major surface combatants—notably the Type 052D Luyang III destroyer,
the Type 054A Jiangkai II frigate, and the Type 056 Jiangdao corvette—have
entered serial production, adding mass and balance to the fleet. The buildup of
such warships has accelerated since 2008. China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning,
joined the fleet in 2012. Only twenty years have elapsed since China began to
construct and import modern frontline fighting ships. This is an impressive feat
by any standard.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

Summer2015Review.indb 33

38

4/21/15 1:50 PM

34

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2015 Review

At the same time, the PLAN appears to be pursuing an even more outwardlooking naval strategy. While the most recent defense white papers insist that
the Chinese navy’s primary task remains near-seas defense, the 2009 and 2011
editions explicitly acknowledge the need for the PLAN to operate in the “far
seas.” The 2013 report calls on the Chinese navy to “enhance far seas mobile operations.” While the geographic scope of the far seas has been subject to varying
interpretations, actual Chinese naval operations in recent years suggest that the
term likely encompasses “a vast area that stretches from the northwest Pacific to
the east Indian Ocean.”87 It has become commonplace for Chinese naval flotillas to sail through the narrow seas of the Ryukyu island chain and cruise in the
open waters of the western Pacific. The PLAN has also dispatched naval escorts
on antipiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden on an uninterrupted basis since
December 2008.
The Chinese navy is thus at once posturing itself to conduct defense-in-depth
operations to protect the homeland from seaborne attack and moving toward
a more expeditionary, blue-water force. The Janus-faced character of Chinese
naval power at present suggests that critical decisions loom in the future. As Shi
Xiaoqin persuasively argues, the Chinese navy will soon have to reassess both its
strategic thinking and its force structure. Whether sabotage warfare at sea should
give way to symmetrical naval engagements and whether a carrier-centered fleet
should replace a submarine-oriented one are questions of growing urgency for
the PLAN. “Clearly,” Shi concludes, “the Chinese navy stands at a crossroad.”88
If Shi is right, the PLAN’s force structure, strategy, and institutional identity could follow any of several distinct pathways. First, China could, over time,
construct a navy that resembles the Anglo-American model of sea power. In
this case, the PLAN would gradually shed its small-ship ethos and capabilities.
Second, China could continue to focus on force modernization and doctrinal
development aimed at keeping hostile powers out of its backyard. Expeditionary
forces would be subordinated to this primary defensive task, while conducting
lesser included missions in distant waters during peacetime. Third, a two-tiered
force could coexist, perhaps uneasily, within the PLAN, though whether China
could afford or sustain a navy along two parallel tracks remains to be seen. As
the Chinese navy evolves in the coming years, it will have to grapple with these
fundamental choices on force structure and naval thought.
The purpose here is not to predict what the precise outcome will be. The foregoing analysis suggests that past may well be prologue. China’s formative experiences and guerilla ethos appear quite durable and applicable in the twenty-first
century. At the very least, China’s concept of sabotage warfare at sea provides
a baseline by which to measure the degree of continuity and change in future
Chinese naval strategy. At the same time, the evolution of various incarnations of
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the Young School impulse in the West points to a universal logic with respect to
the naval strategy of the weaker side. Owing to asymmetries in sea power, China
would have likely gravitated to Xiao’s war-fighting doctrines even in the absence
of Soviet and Maoist influences. It is also worth acknowledging that China’s naval
future will not likely follow in lockstep the French and Soviet experiences—the
political and economic conditions that shaped naval thought in France, the Soviet Union, and China were too different, notwithstanding clear similarities. The
impressive trajectory of China’s comprehensive national power could furnish Beijing options comparable in ambitiousness to the Anglo-American model of sea
power, options of which French and Soviet strategists could only have dreamed.
Despite these uncertainties, what is clear is that this alternative school of
thought stands quite apart from the British and American ways of naval warfare.
From its very first days, it has emphasized technological innovation, pursuit of
new operational methods, deception, camouflage, joint operations transcending
the land-sea divide, assaults on rear areas and lines of communications, and guerilla methods. It is a view of the sea that is essentially territorial and consequently
alien to the Anglo-American understanding of naval warfare. The Chinese thus
likely think differently from adherents of the Anglo-American tradition about
naval strategy and will likely fight differently at sea. Whereas French and Soviet
naval thought emerged as a response to austerity and then faded, in Chinese
hands the alternative approach to naval warfare has continued, and the innovation and technology it demands have been fully funded. It thus behooves Western
policy makers and strategists to keep a steady eye on China’s turn to the seas.
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IMPLIC ATIONS OF XI JINPING’S “TRUE
MARITIME POWER”
Its Context, Significance, and Impact on the Region
Captain Sukjoon Yoon, Republic of Korea Navy (Retired)

X

i Jinping’s declaration that China should strive to become a “true maritime
power” (海洋强國) has been much discussed in the context of China’s
“peaceful rise” (和平崛起) and the pursuit of the “Chinese dream” (中国夢).1
Although there is, at face value, nothing quite new about Xi’s exhortation to the
Chinese leadership, his remarks need to be understood against a rather complex
background of situations, policies, and aspirations if their full significance is to
be appreciated.
Xi’s policy is not just about geographic dispositions but needs to be seen in
terms of U.S. Navy captain Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea-power theory—the “neoMahanian standard,” as scholars of the U.S. Naval War College have termed it.2
This issue bridges the China of the past and modern China; as a central pillar of
Xi’s grand national strategy, China’s maritime power is a matter of extraordinary
importance for its future.
Captain Sukjoon Yoon is currently a senior research
fellow of the Korea Institute for Maritime StratWe need to examine a number of questions if we
egy and a visiting professor at Sejong University,
are really to grasp what it means for China to bein Seoul. Captain Yoon’s more than thirty years of
come a true maritime power. What is the history of
commissioned service in the Republic of Korea Navy
(ROKN) included thirteen years at sea, as well as
Chinese maritime power? Why has Xi Jinping sudcommand and staff appointments. He was direcdenly given such emphasis to China’s emergence as
tor of maritime strategy studies at the ROKN Naval
War College, a senior lecturer at the ROKN Naval a “true maritime power”? How does he understand
Academy, and commanding officer of ROK Station
this term—that is, what is the character of “true
Naval Modernization (2014). A chapter in Tran Trumaritime power”? What forces are driving the
ong Thuy and John Jenner, eds., South China Sea, is
forthcoming.
accomplishment of maritime-power status? How
are the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its
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navy (the PLAN) and the newly established China
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Coast Guard (CCG) involved in implementing China’s maritime aspirations?
What are the implications for, and the likely impacts on, the Asia-Pacific region?
THE IMPORTANCE OF A BALANCED NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
CHINA
China’s national strategy is undergoing a significant transformation. At both
the eighteenth Communist Party Congress in November 2012 and the first
plenary session of the twelfth National People’s Congress in March 2013, great
importance was placed on China’s becoming a true maritime power. Similar remarks had been made earlier; for instance, Hu Jintao (Xi Jinping’s predecessor)
proposed building up the power of the PLAN to adapt its historical mission to
the new century.3 This mission has now been expanded to include everyone in
China—the concept of true maritime power is being used to embolden China’s
political, ideological, and economic philosophy and, in conjunction with other
military, economic, and national-security goals, to project a vision of future national greatness.4
Throughout Chinese history, whenever undue emphasis has been given to land
power—as exemplified by China’s “Great Wall”—this lack of strategic balance has
always undermined the nation’s development and prosperity.5 During the hectic
Mao Zedong period, Chinese strategists regarded the maritime domain as an
imperialist and colonialist sphere, and anyone proposing alternative strategies to
the PLA’s continental approach was identified as an ideological enemy. Although
China has not itself often explicitly defined a national strategy that is definitively
“continental” or “maritime,” it has usually been characterized—owing to its vast
geographic extent and the fact that its predominant cultural interactions have
been by land (via the Silk Road) rather than by sea—as a continental power, and
this is the current reality.6
It would be untrue, however, to suggest that China was ever a “pseudomaritime power” (海洋貧國), such stereotypical descriptions of its land-oriented
national strategy entirely eclipsing its maritime interests.7 China has never ignored its maritime domain, and there are many historical examples of the Song,
Ming, and Yuan Dynasties pursuing maritime expansion rather enthusiastically,
going back to what has been called (see below) a “Maritime Silk Road.”
Actually, China’s national strategies have been mostly neutral in this regard,
and its emphasis has shifted between land and sea, as required to preserve peace
and stability. Indeed, throughout China’s general history the reconciliation of
disparities between coastal and inland regions has been a key strategic problem
for the Chinese leadership. For example, coastal cities have generally been more
crucial to the Chinese economy than those inland, even the various historical
capital cities, Chang’an (Xi’an), Luoyang, and Peking (Beijing). The wealthy
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coastal cities of today, such as Qingdao, Shanghai, Fuzhou, Dalian, Tianjin,
Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong, have played significant parts in China’s
prosperity since precolonial times, even though China never previously declared
a grand national strategy with so clear a maritime orientation as now.8 Certainly,
China’s maritime capabilities have always depended on its flourishing eastern cities, which have generally offered a much better life than have the inland cities. In
recent years, moreover, China has confronted a new strategic environment that
requires a national shift toward the maritime domain.
Thus, both the historical evidence and current strategic challenges indicate
that China needs to maintain a balanced linkage (均衡連結) between its geographic strengths and the needs of its economy. Its sea routes have been the principal medium through which China has interacted with the world at large: via the
Yellow Sea, the South China Sea (SCS), and the East China Sea (ECS). Whatever
the national strategy, the seas around the eastern coastal cities have remained the
normal avenues through which China’s political, military, economic, and cultural
power has been projected to influence weaker neighbors, chiefly Vietnam, Japan,
and Korea, though sometimes it has been extended to Middle Eastern and African countries.
During the chaotic Qing period, there were internecine feuds and wars, with
the unfortunate result that China failed to implement its comprehensive national
strategy (綜合國家大戰略). This meant that China’s maritime capacity was inadequate to protect its national security, and thus the Western countries, with their
superior maritime forces, dominated the region in the eighteenth, nineteenth,
and twentieth centuries.9 The Chinese leadership is still chewing on the bitter
memories of this imperial era, and now that it has become economically feasible
to do so, it is determined to overcome the consequences of earlier neglect of the
seas. China’s leaders are therefore now promulgating a grand national strategy
intended clearly to deter any further interference by Western “barbarians” and to
project boldly China’s power and influence abroad.
CHINA AND NEO-MAHANIAN STRATEGIC THEORIES
What evidence is there that China’s maritime strategy is indeed neo-Mahanian?
Xi Jinping’s concept of “true maritime power” as a means to future national prestige does in fact find some correspondence to traditional Mahanian theory, despite views arguing for the end of sea power.10 Many Chinese strategists, including Xi, have highlighted the role of China’s international trade, of its merchant
fleet, and of its naval task forces—especially China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning,
deployed in 2012.11 China’s economy relies on a steady flow of seaborne cargo: oil
and natural gas, soybeans and grains, and raw materials from the Middle East,
South America, and Africa. The Chinese merchant fleet is essential for these
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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imports and for exporting Chinese goods to foreign markets; the vulnerability
of such transport links, the “Malacca Dilemma,” is a fundamental consideration
driving China’s quest for true maritime power and for the naval strength that it
requires.12
In some ways, China is trying to straddle the neo- and post-Mahanian worlds,
and the complexity of this stance makes it increasingly likely that China will get
involved in armed conflicts at sea. Xi’s exhortation to the Chinese leadership, although not entirely new, should be understood against a rather complicated historical, political, and sociocultural background. For example, his “true maritime
power” message in the report of the twelfth National People’s Congress in 2013
focused on defense and military modernization (国防与軍队現代化), whereas
Hu Jintao’s conception of China’s maritime power in the eighteenth Communist
Party Congress report, in 2012, was relegated to the section on “ecological civilization construction” (生态文明建設).13 Xi Jinping has proposed for true maritime power a theoretical framework that appears to transcribe Mahanian theory
directly into PLAN strengths, apparently envisioning epic sea battles much like
those fought in Mahan’s time by Western sea powers and also Japan.
There are many interpretations of the ongoing changes in Chinese national
strategy, but all agree that Xi Jinping’s recent declaration about true maritime
power is highly significant. China clearly wants to be seen as a great power, at
least regionally, but should this aim be understood as a restoration of the traditional Middle Kingdom order or in Mahanian terms? To that point, Xi Jinping’s
recent acknowledgment that China’s maritime power is founded on three strands
(production, merchant and naval shipping, and overseas markets and bases)
is entirely consistent with Mahan’s most influential book, The Influence of Sea
Power upon History, 1660–1783.14 Admittedly, Xi’s approach is more concerned
with confronting the strategic challenges of the U.S. “pivot to Asia” than with
pounding away at enemy fleets. Yet he is beguiled by the Mahanian concept that
national greatness derives from maritime power, so he is calling on Chinese citizens to raise their collective consciousness of the seas as an essential aspect of a
great revitalization of the nation—the “Chinese dream.”
Many Western analysts of maritime security affairs have drawn stark comparisons between growing Chinese and declining American maritime power, some
suggesting that Europeans hold a “postmodern,” “post-Mahanian” perspective,
whereas Asia is entering a “modern,” “neo-Mahanian” world.15 This situation is
seen as an opportunity for China to explore the application of Mahan’s maritimepower theory. For Chinese analysts, however, Xi Jinping’s concept of true maritime power presents China as chief custodian of the regional (in practice, global)
sea lines of communication, as the upholder of freedom of navigation and good
order at sea.16
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The actual sources of Xi Jinping’s strategic vision of true maritime power appear to be briefings from his advisers, together with such writings as Liu Mingfu’s Chinese Dream (中国夢), published in 2010, and Henry Kissinger’s On China, published in 2012.17 For Xi, then, the Chinese Dream depends on trade and
commerce, mercantile and naval power, and geographic expansion—by which is
meant command of the sea (制海权) rather than any sort of colonial imposition.
But China is the leading international trade power, and the PLAN sees the United
States as an overbearing naval power to be vehemently resisted; so, given China’s
naval buildup, command of the sea seems likely to be ultimately determined by
armed encounter rather than by economic, cultural, or environmental issues.18
Chinese strategists speak of pursuing maritime power “with Chinese characteristics,” a formulation of Mahanian theory that Western strategists may find difficult
to recognize. Following Mahan, the Chinese see naval preparedness as the sharp
edge of maritime strategy, but aside from fulfillment of the PLAN’s historical mission, they also see maritime power as a path to national prosperity and greatness.
THE CONTEXT OF XI’S PLAN TO TRANSFORM CHINA INTO A
TRUE MARITIME POWER
The Chinese apply a long perspective; the consequences of the failure in recent
centuries to maintain a balanced national strategy have surely influenced Xi
Jinping in formulating his current national strategy. Xi took over responsibility for
diplomatic affairs in late 2012, and he has since declared four national objectives:
safeguarding China’s core national interests, continuing to pursue a “new type
of great-power relationship” (新型大國關係), boosting China’s maritime power
(海洋强國), and identifying a new foundation for military strength.19 Thus the
undertaking to enhance Chinese maritime power is central to Xi’s foreign policy,
and we can list, bearing in mind the strategic challenges faced by his predecessors, several likely reasons why Xi Jinping wants true maritime power, linking
and balancing the land and the sea, for China.
First, Xi sees the projection of national power beyond the Chinese continental
territory as essential. The term “G2” (i.e., the “Group of Two,” the United States
and China) is widely used in East Asia to imply a kind of parity between China
and the United States, but Xi understands that if China is truly to stand tall beside
the United States, much more is required. China feels strongly that within the
defense perimeters known as the first and second “island chains” (島連) it should
be China that calls the shots.20 Hence, the desire to establish a new type of greatpower relationship with the United States, despite claims to support a harmonious relationship as partners (伙伴) with smaller and weaker neighbors: until
China becomes a true maritime power, it will remain entangled in territorial and
jurisdictional disputes in the surrounding seas. Once China has the capacity to
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project the necessary maritime power, it will be possible to set aside the humiliating insults of the European empires—most notably those of the United Kingdom,
Portugal, France, and Germany, which crushed the Qing Dynasty during the late
nineteenth century—and the more recent domination by the United States. A
confident China could then reconstitute its “natural” maritime regional preeminence. The Chinese fondly recall a time when the peaceful expeditionary voyages
of Zheng He (鄭和) explored the Indian Ocean and the east coast of Africa (and,
by some speculative accounts, even North America and Europe).21 Naturally,
this attitude troubles China’s neighbors. Vietnam has objected to China’s recent
infiltration of oil rigs into the Vietnamese exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the
Philippines is currently objecting to China’s building of airstrips on Johnson
South Reef (now Island) in the SCS, and several countries were upset by China’s
unilateral declaration of an air-defense identification zone in the ECS in 2013.
Second, for Xi Jinping, “China’s seas” represent, just as much as does the
continental territory within the Great Wall, a fundamental interest of the Chinese people. China’s vast population and ever-growing economy depend on
correspondingly huge quantities of raw materials, energy, and foodstuffs, much
of which is imported; without securing its lines of supply, China cannot make
progress with the many urgent challenges it faces at home and abroad. Since the
mid-1990s China has been a net importer of energy, and more than 40 percent of
its domestic demand now passes through strategic choke points, such as the SCS
and the Strait of Malacca, the latter of which Beijing regards as being subject to
U.S. influence and essentially under U.S. control.22 Moreover, China will continue
to need these imports despite projects intended to diversify its sources of supply,
among the most ambitious of which is the “Myanmar Corridor” connecting Kolkata in India via Bangladesh and Burma (Myanmar) to Kunming and thence to
the major cities of China. China’s vulnerability to disruption of its essential supply chains surely underlies its determination to be seen as a strong adversary in
its maritime disputes with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and Japan in the East and South China Seas (ESCS).
These same seas also play vital roles in feeding the Chinese people; for example, China is now becoming a major importer of wheat.23 Some of the demand
arises from the ability of newly wealthy Chinese to afford a better diet, but also
there are a hundred million or more unregistered workers in central China who
need to be fed.24 China imports more than four-fifths of its soybeans, or about
60 percent of world production.25 Besides the issue of import security, China sees
its surrounding seas as a vast potential food-producing resource, where fishfarming and similar technologies could provide protein to replace the pigs,
sheep, chickens, and geese that are collectively a major cause of desertification—
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a recent destructive sandstorm extended as far as South Korea and parts of Japan. Since the turn of the century food imports have been increasing steadily,
because yields of rice and corn have stagnated or diminished in most parts of
China.26 Thus China grows ever more dependent on the ESCS to feed its population, and hence the underlying significance of the slogan “A Strong China and
the Chinese Dream.”
Third, this fifth generation of leaders of the People’s Republic of China, if they
are facing internal dissent, may be adopting an ambitious maritime strategy in
an attempt to legitimize the continuing rule of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). Since 1989 there has been a worrisome trend of increasing opaqueness in
the CCP, and Xi Jinping may be inclined to use the concept of maritime power to
boost popular support for the regime. Certainly, there are signs of manipulation
to that end. An example is the emphatic campaign of the Chinese media in support of China’s claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the ECS; here it is clear
that China’s pledge to build maritime power is exploiting nationalistic fervor to
buttress the popularity of the CCP.27
Xi Jinping’s declaration of a new type of great-power relationship with the
United States should be seen in a similar light. Rather surprisingly, the concept
of reshaping China as a maritime power has been put forward not only by the
Chinese government but by the CCP as well. In November 2012, at the eighteenth
Communist Party Congress, Xi was eager to send a strong message, under the rubric of the Chinese Dream, on the issue of disputed waters, about which the CCP
has grown increasingly outspoken. Becoming a true maritime power, as noted
above, is closely linked with overcoming the humiliations inflicted on China by
the West, and the associated surge in Chinese pride facilitates the declaration of
a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine. It can be plausibly argued that the
party’s slogans of “Strong China” and “Chinese Dream” are ultimately directed at
squeezing the U.S. Navy out of East Asian seas.28
Fourth, since the reforms and 1978 “open door” policy of Deng Xiaoping
(“paramount leader” 1978–92), China has learned some useful lessons from the
West, especially from the United States. From the perspective of the Chinese
leadership, the “hundreds of humiliations” suffered by the Qing Dynasty resulted from the “salami tactics” of Western imperialism.29 China is now turning
the tables, intending to slice off parts of the East Asian seas, bit by bit, until its
neighbors have entirely accepted its naval power and influence. Still, Xi seems to
be wondering whether China’s antiaccess and area-denial tactics are adequate to
the task; the salami strategy will now be implemented through the application
of a modern national maritime-security policy “one island chain at a time.”30 In
fact, after all that China has learned from the United States, it is hardly surprising
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that Xi should declare the intention of developing maritime capacity to become
a “true” maritime power commensurate with China’s geostrategic understanding
and experience.
THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF XI’S TRUE MARITIME
POWER
What Xi Jinping understands as “true maritime power” is intertwined with several complex issues, both internal factors about the legitimacy of Xi’s regime and
external factors like territorial disputes in the ESCS that impact the sovereignty
of the state.31
First, Xi Jinping wants China to be recognized as a responsible maritime
stakeholder. To Western analysts Chinese maritime policy has long seemed disingenuous, intended primarily to disrupt the status quo in the East Asian seas,
and during recent years Beijing’s assertive steps to pursue its historical maritime
claims have generated alarm throughout Asia. Xi would very much like to change
these perceptions of China, and since taking political and diplomatic charge in
2012 he has repeatedly suggested to President Barack Obama that a new type of
great-power relationship should be established between their nations. The United
States, he urges, should be more relaxed about the expression of Chinese sea
power, at least in East Asia, and accept China as a true maritime power, perhaps
as an emerging great power.32
During the last couple of decades, China has criticized U.S. forward deployment as reminiscent of the Cold War and designed to maintain American
maritime hegemony through absolute sea control. Beijing perceives Washington’s policy as intended to contain China as a continental power and to prevent
it from expanding its political and military influence to neighboring littoral
countries. Such sentiments have apparently generated strong political support
for the PLAN’s intention to build more aircraft carriers; Liaoning, a refurbished
ex-Soviet vessel, has attracted some criticism for its limited functionality. But the
fact that Chinese-built aircraft carriers are now an imminent reality reinforces
Xi Jinping’s declaration that China should become a true maritime power and, at
least in Chinese eyes, heralds the restoration of a traditional regional order that
should be consolidated through a new type of great-power relationship with the
United States.
In 2008 the PLAN dispatched its first-ever naval task force—comprising a
Luyang II–class destroyer, Jiangkai II frigates, and a Fuji-class auxiliary—to the
Indian Ocean to conduct antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. This, as well
as other contributions that China is starting to make to more general maritime
cooperation, should be understood as demonstrating nonconfrontational intentions and as part of a quest to acquire status as a responsible maritime power. A
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third of the world’s trade passes through the Indian Ocean, and Chinese naval
task units have twice conducted bilateral antipiracy naval operations with U.S.
naval units in the Indian Ocean, in 2008 and 2013.33 More significantly, the
PLAN has overcome its long-standing reluctance to be involved in American-led
multilateral naval exercises, sending four vessels to participate in the RIMPAC
2014 naval exercises, not to mention a spy vessel (which was allowed to operate
unmolested in Hawaii’s EEZ).34
Second, Xi Jinping wants to protect China’s maritime security interests by all
means available, and he is ready to apply whatever notions or frameworks suit
his purpose, whatever their origin (for example, from Western imperial states)
and whatever their international legal status. From Xi’s perspective, China’s
maritime core national interests can be secured through exercising true maritime power in support of state sovereignty. China has categorically laid claim to
several small islands in the East Asian seas that other countries—such as Japan,
the Philippines, and Vietnam—have also claimed. It has provocatively cited its
maritime territorial claims as “core national interests” and as an issue of territorial integrity comparable to its irredentist claims to Taiwan and Tibet.35 Tension
continues to increase in the ongoing maritime disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei over territories in the SCS that Beijing referred
to as of “core national interest” in March 2010. China is also confronting Japan
(and potentially the United States) over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the ECS,
which China officially declared as representing a “core national interest” in April
2013. The external threats being risked may be much smaller in scale than China
faced during the Korean War and the 1979 Vietnam war, or even the Sino-Soviet
border conflicts, but they have supplied a useful justification for developing an
integrated defense capability.36
Third, Xi Jinping is trying to exploit constructive ambiguity to bolster China’s
historically based claims in disputed waters. Admiral Zheng He’s fleet more than
six centuries ago was the most magnificent the world had ever witnessed, but the
current Chinese leadership would have us take two distinct messages from that
story. The first and foremost of these messages is that the Middle Kingdom sea
boundaries established during the Ming Dynasty should be seen as relevant for
delineating modern-day boundaries. But it would also have us appreciate that
Zheng He’s voyages were economic and cultural, that he refrained from colonizing any of the weaker nations he visited, instead benignly establishing “harmonious seas” under the enlightened guidance of the Yongle emperor, Zhu Di. That is,
China intends this historical narrative to remind its neighbors of China’s overwhelming strength and historical presence throughout the regional seas, to assert
China’s rights to all the East Asian seas, and to propose an essentially new rule
of law based on historical precedence—all considerably beyond what modern
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international law and legal principles prescribe. This attitude is currently being
energetically displayed in China’s dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands. But the same historical narrative is also adduced as evidence of Chinese
restraint and implicit goodwill toward smaller, weaker nations that are content to
go along with China’s (supposedly benevolent) restoration of the Middle Kingdom maritime order.
In 1984, Deng Xiaoping suggested that all parties “set aside matters of sovereignty, implement joint development for mutual maritime interests, and leave
other issues for subsequent generations.” Xi Jinping is now doing his best to
advance China’s unilateral maritime claims while simultaneously preserving
enough ambiguity to allow China’s neighbors and other disputants to accept
Deng’s suggestion.37 Each of these countries should carefully consider the implications of the China Coast Guard’s present-day maritime law-enforcement
operations, which are intended to establish a new methodology for defining
sea boundaries before the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) has been implemented in the region.
Fourth, Xi Jinping is taking more care than his predecessors to avoid any
expression of China’s true maritime power that might be interpreted as a preemptive military strike and give rise to serious regional military escalation. He is
anxious to avoid any direct U.S. involvement, as happened in the 1995–96 Taiwan
Strait crisis. In line with Xi’s desire that China be seen as an honest and responsible maritime power, Chinese forces seem to be adhering to several self-imposed
principles—that is, rules of engagement—that appear in turn to be based on a
“reactively assertive” maritime posture. Thus, China’s historical maritime territorial claims are being protected by civilian maritime-security agencies rather
than by military forces, which helps in keeping matters below the threshold of
military confrontation.
So far, Xi Jinping has been careful in his management of regional maritime
standoffs; in times of open tension, CCG vessels hold the first line of defense,
with PLAN vessels staying in the background, and while the CCG may target
adversary vessels in an asymmetric manner, it has done so in ways proportionate to the circumstances. Additionally, China also has other effective tools with
which it can confront rival claimants to disputed maritime territories, including
economic pressure and diplomatic leverage. Overall, Xi is playing a shrewdly
judged game, hoping to avoid either, as noted, direct U.S. intervention or collective ASEAN opposition. At the strategic level, China denies any intention to
use its naval forces to expel rival claimants, and its stance has been essentially
defensive, without offensive or provocatively assertive measures.38 In fact, China’s
insistence on becoming a true maritime power can be seen as a form of crisis
management; the possibility of armed conflict in the ESCS cannot be discounted,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

Summer2015Review.indb 49

54

4/21/15 1:50 PM

50

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2015 Review

and the Chinese assessment of Asian maritime security recognizes the continuing instabilities. Nevertheless, if any of China’s rivals were to act unilaterally in
ways that proactively disrupted the status quo, especially were the United States
to become involved as a consequence of its security alliances, China would likely
retaliate in a disproportionately assertive manner.39
IMPLEMENTING XI’S VISION OF CHINA AS A TRUE MARITIME
POWER
The implementation of Xi Jinping’s vision is very much a work in progress, but
there seem to be four main thrusts: establishing new high-profile organizations
dealing with maritime policy and strategy; upgrading naval capabilities to counter the U.S. pivot to Asia; enhancing maritime law-enforcement instruments to
reframe the issues in East Asian seas away, as noted, from prevailing international
law and toward China’s view of rights as derived from historical precedent; and
ostensibly demonstrating China’s goodwill through participation in various regional forums, seminars, and exercises.
First, Xi Jinping appears to have obtained the general support from the party,
the military, and the state necessary to consolidate his diplomatic and security
authority. Diplomatically, his responsibility is to bring to fruition the existing
policy of “peaceful rise,” which means maintaining good relations with neighbors, including Japan, and the United States. In this context, China wants to be
an active and competent stakeholder, and Xi has variously set up or taken charge
of several authorities to deal with China’s maritime issues. These include a small
central policy body overseeing maritime interests, which has operated since 2012
but has not been formally activated. There is also the State Security Committee
(國家安全委員會), which in 2013 became China’s paramount national command authority, comprising civil servants and officers from the State Council
(國務院) and the National Oceanic Council (國家海洋委員會), which in turn
was established by the first plenary session of the twelfth National Party Congress
in March 2013. The State Security Committee is particularly significant in that
it is made up of China’s highest military and civilian leaders, including senior
generals and admirals, and councillors from the State Council, all of them party
members. It seems to be the highest body dealing with maritime security issues
that has ever reported directly to the Politburo Standing Committee, and it has
taken over the function of the PLA-based Central Military Commission (中央
軍事委員會) in dealing with theater crises and conflicts.40 In July 2013 Xi also
presided over a “Third Group Study” (集體) for the Political Bureau of the CCP,
discussing the implementation of China’s maritime power (就海洋强國硏究).
Also, in October 2013, he convened a high-level working conference on “peripheral diplomacy” (週邊外交工作座談會), to promote “good neighborliness
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and friendship” to create a peaceful and stable regional environment. All of these
bodies appear to be firmly under Xi’s control, but for some reason the National
Oceanic Council has not yet been activated formally.41
Second, Xi is seeking much more than just the buttressing of Chinese power
and influence around the Yellow Sea and the ESCS; he wants China’s naval capabilities to match or exceed those of its rivals in the region, the U.S. Navy and
the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. During the Cold War, Beijing often worried that American naval forces would intervene militarily in Chinese affairs, as
Western forces had during the late nineteenth century and as, for example, powerful aircraft-carrier battle groups from the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet did in the
Taiwan crises of the 1950s and 1990s. This fear caused the PLAN to adopt a very
defensive posture against the U.S. Navy’s forward-deployed forces based in Japan.
Indeed, the PLAN assumed only a supporting role in strategic coastal defense,
which was led by ground forces; it was generally understood during the Cold War
that any response the PLAN might make to an intervention by the Seventh Fleet
would be counterproductive and would simply expose its own weakness. The
PLA was quite unable to come up with any viable solution to this problem, so the
Chinese navy was limited to coastal-defense ships and conventional submarines,
ceding to the U.S. Navy control over all the East Asian seas.
These days, however, the PLAN is no longer a mere theoretical power limited
to the continental littoral, for China’s economic growth has supported the development of a considerable offensive oceangoing capacity with far-seas operational
capabilities sustainable for long periods of time, with significant implications for
China’s diplomatic and political stance. A process of reorganization is ongoing
that seems to have resulted from Xi Jinping’s autumn 2013 directive to improve
operational “agility” and develop combat “synergies” to deter new external
threats on land and at sea.42 It is for this reason that the refurbished Liaoning was
commissioned in 2012, and indigenous carriers, which will surely be far more
capable, are believed to be under construction.43 Over the last few years, the
PLAN has impressively expanded its naval fighting capabilities, with many new
ship classes, great improvements in overall design, and much better sensors and
weapons.
One of the newest surface combatant classes to enter service is the Luyang III
(Type 052D) destroyer. On 21 March 2014 the first of ten, Kunming, was commissioned by the PLAN, with a multipurpose sixty-four-cell vertical-launch
system that provides increased weapons stores and potential payload flexibility.44
Such innovations are coming thick and fast these days. For example, the Jiangdao
(Type 056)–class light frigate, at 1,440 tons, can be seen as the PLAN’s version
of the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship, for use in regional waters and for export
to countries that do not have or cannot afford full-size frigates.45 A mock-up
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seen at the Wuhan University of Science and Technology has been reported as
evidence that the PLAN is building a missile cruiser larger than any U.S. or Japanese analogue. Such a warship might be an air-defense ship intended to address
the PLAN’s weakness in sea-based missile capabilities and would be a significant
addition to a Chinese carrier battle group.46
China’s economic growth has driven four decades of progress, lately marked
by seventeen straight years in which defense spending has increased by about
10 percent annually.47 Successive PLAN task forces in the Indian Ocean, each
comprising two large and sophisticated combat vessels and a large logistics vessel
for replenishment at sea, have been deployed since December 2009, and in 2011
there was a successful evacuation of noncombatants during the Libyan crisis. For
the Chinese this recalls Zheng He’s fifteenth-century peaceful missions to the
Gulf of Aden. Other significant deployments include scientific survey missions
undertaken by Liaoning in the SCS in December 2013, during which its organic
air wings demonstrated the ability to control the first island chain domain. More
remarkably, PLAN marines deployed from their tropical bases in southern China
for cold-weather training in the Chinese autonomous region of Inner Mongolia.
This is an indication that the PLAN is getting ready for complex, composite naval
warfare that might call for wider integration with the rest of the PLA to improve
operational agility and develop combat synergies. It reflects the new roles and
functions envisaged for the PLAN and its marines—they are preparing for a
potential crisis in the ESCS and taking the opportunity to get practice with new
doctrines and warfare manuals.48
There are other clear signs as well that the PLAN is successfully developing
new missions and operational concepts. It conducted its largest joint fleet exercise ever in October 2013 in the Yellow Sea. This was a campaign-level scenario
involving more than a hundred surface combatants and submarines from the
North and East Sea Fleets, along with more than thirty aircraft, coastal missile,
and other units. The exercise was designated by the PLAN as “an experiment in
joint warfare with Chinese characteristics,” designed to enhance commanders’
joint warfare capabilities and prepare them to implement Xi Jinping’s new naval
doctrines.49
Third, Xi has restructured China’s unwieldy civilian maritime law-enforcement
apparatus to offer more options in territorial disputes with neighboring countries. The reputation of these civilian agencies has improved markedly; the CCG,
for instance, has attracted media attention for playing a leading role in protecting
China’s legitimate maritime rights and interests. After the establishment of the
central policy group already mentioned, which oversees maritime interests, and
following the Third Group Study of the CCP, but before convening the National
Party Congress session in March 2013, Xi Jinping revealed a plan to merge the
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main maritime law-enforcement agencies. Four entities—the China Marine
Surveillance, the old Coast Guard of the Ministry of Public Security, the Fishery
Administration Service of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Maritime Antismuggling Police, under the General Administrative Service of the Ministry of
Customs—are being united to form a unified maritime law-enforcement agency,
the China Coast Guard, with a function and mission similar to those of the U.S.
Coast Guard.
There has been some international skepticism about this regrouping process,
noting interagency friction and internal resistance to being merged into the
CCG. Nevertheless, this reform appears to reflect Xi Jinping’s desire to strengthen
China’s maritime capabilities at every level as part of the transformation of China
into a true maritime power.50 Guided by Xi’s slogan of building a “Strong Nation”
with a “Strong Navy,” the ambitious structural reorganization that the CCG will
require to be effective will deliver a single, unified maritime law-enforcement
command-and-control structure capable of providing strong support for China’s
rights and interests in disputed waters.51
The CCG is an important tool in China’s quest to establish sea boundaries on
the basis of its historical presence in the East Asian seas.52 The roles and missions
of the CCG will assist China in asserting its territorial claims independently of
the prevailing international law and legal principles, notably those of UNCLOS,
which has been used to adjudicate a variety of other maritime disputes even
though the United States has not ratified this convention, supposedly for nationalsecurity reasons. (In practice, the United States has so far abided by UNCLOS
principles, but obviously this could become hostage to domestic politics at any
time.) The capabilities and scalable force sizes of the CCG will constitute a significant challenge for China’s neighbors, and perhaps some may reconsider the
idea of a single principle to justify the legality of sea boundaries.53
Fourth, Xi Jinping is keen for China to engage actively in all kinds of international maritime interactions, including joint development projects, forums,
seminars, and bilateral or multilateral naval exercises, and he will take advantage
of every opportunity to represent China as an honest and responsible maritime
stakeholder in East Asian seas. Its policy of peaceful rise attempts to project a
peaceable and nonthreatening image while seeking to secure status as a great
power under the slogan of “Strong Nation, Maritime Power, and the Chinese
Dream.” Zheng He has been a useful propaganda weapon in advancing maritime
interests through “soft power.” For instance, Xi Jinping promoted the concept of a
“Maritime Silk Road for the 21st Century” as the Chinese vision for a networked
relationship between China and ASEAN when visiting five of its member countries in October 2013. Just as Zheng He had a lasting impact on the countries
he visited, Xi is seeking to build lasting connections between China and the
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Southeast Asia nations, and he proposed extensive maritime cooperation with
them. The Maritime Silk Road, a trade corridor extending from China to India
via the SCS, was first introduced in a speech to the Indonesian parliament in
2013. In that speech Xi suggested improvements in maritime and port infrastructure along the sea route, such as upgrades to Malaysia’s eastern port of Kuantan,
for which two billion U.S. dollars in Chinese funds had been earmarked.54 In a
similar vein, at the fourteenth ASEAN-China Summit, in November 2011, China
suggested setting up an ASEAN-China Maritime Cooperation Fund, amounting
to three billion RMB (about U.S.$473 million), to commemorate Zheng He’s contributions to China’s neighbors and partners, again an effort to enhance maritime
connectivity with ASEAN.55 Underlying Xi Jinping’s charm offensive are some
lessons rooted in the past; the burgeoning economic interaction between China
and ASEAN is certainly one aspect of the restoration of China’s great-power status, but it is also a means for Beijing to extend its political influence and expand
trade volumes.56
In April 2014 there was another opportunity for China to show itself in a more
positive light and encourage other nations to focus less on China as a threatening
bully—the hosting of the 2014 International Fleet Review (IFR) and Western
Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), at Qingdao. A two-day multinational naval
exercise, MARITIME COOPERATION 2014, held in the waters off Qingdao was
mainly focused on joint search-and-rescue operations.57 China had hosted the
same events four years earlier, but the 2014 IFR commemorated the sixty-fifth
anniversary of the PLAN’s foundation, and the WPNS, a biennial forum for
naval staff chiefs that now attracts representatives from twenty-five regional
nations, had the theme of “Cooperation, Trust, and the Win-Win Spirit.” These
events comprised a multilateral workshop, symposium, and program of exercises
that offered a chance for the crews of ships and aircraft from many navies, both
friends and potential adversaries, to interact.
In hosting this IFR and the fourteenth WPNS, China was surely aiming to promote peace and stability in the western Pacific, but it was also seeking to improve
its public image, damaged by the PLAN’s calculated assertiveness toward smaller,
weaker neighbors. For example, the events in Qingdao, oriented toward crisis
management, provided a valuable opportunity for the Chinese to demonstrate
their willingness to work for peace and cooperation and to present themselves as
reasonable, rational actors in the context of these forums—even as China continues to ratchet up tension in the ESCS. The chiefs of naval staff at the WPNS
endorsed a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), a protocol of safety
procedures, communications, and maneuvering instructions that naval ships and
aircraft should follow. CUES is not legally binding, but all participants were urged
to implement its provisions in their operational manuals.58
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The PLAN has submitted a preliminary application to host the 2024 WPNS
meeting.59 Multilateral forums like WPNS, which has twenty-one member
countries and four observers, offer a useful political platform for China. Such
extended diplomatic leverage allows Beijing to spread its influence and work to
restore China’s Middle Kingdom maritime prominence and simultaneously to
reassure neighbors of its benign intentions.
XI JINPING’S COMMITMENT TO TRUE MARITIME POWER:
IMPLICATIONS AND IMPACTS
True maritime power, in Xi Jinping’s conception and implementation, is clearly
a multifaceted phenomenon. Much of the analysis from commentators outside
China has been primarily concerned with negative interpretations and consequences: schizophrenic qualities, reactive assertiveness, tailored coercion, disproportionate retaliation. They also point out implications for crisis prevention
in maritime territorial disputes and the delicate balance China is seeking between
attaining declared core national interests in disputed waters and avoiding unacceptable diplomatic cost with respect to the United States.60
Implications
Xi Jinping appears more committed to a long-term maritime strategy than were
his predecessors, but his current priority is the consolidation of true maritimepower status. As long as China’s capabilities remain inferior to those of Japan
(technologically) and the United States, it will be essential to avoid any serious military confrontation with these powers; similarly, it would be best not to
provoke collective action by ASEAN, which might draw direct intervention by
Washington.
Despite these constraints on broad unilateral actions, time is on China’s side.
China continues to modernize its naval forces. Meanwhile, although the U.S. military is attempting to rebalance its naval power to the Asia-Pacific, given financial
sequestration it lacks the resources to do this quickly or effectively. In addition,
U.S. forces are still engaged in other regions, like the chaotic Middle East, as well
as lately in Europe, where Washington is acquiring new commitments to check
Russia’s westward advance through Ukraine. Thus, the American rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific may be some time in coming and hard to implement, and in the
meantime China can lean on its rivals in ESCS disputes as opportunity allows and
slice the salami whenever it becomes possible.61
Since the informal summit meeting between Barack Obama and Xi Jinping
in June 2013, and with the Chinese proposal for a new great-power relationship
with the United States in the background, the two countries have gained clearer
perspectives on what each requires of the other and what may and may not be
possible. This clarity has effectively widened Xi Jinping’s choices for unilateral
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action on ESCS issues, and it helps make sense of his policy on maritime power—
he expects U.S. influence in the region to continue to weaken.
The modernization of the PLAN, the restructured CCG, and the essentialist
ideological stance China has adopted to validate its claims—for China’s neighbors, things have already gone too far. The U.S. security commitment that has
shielded them since 1945 is clearly becoming less effective. But even more seriously, the Chinese economy is so intimately integrated with the economies of all
its neighbors, and also of the United States, that none of them can now afford to
stand up to China—not even the United States can offer anything beyond token
resistance. The reality is that China has already become too powerful militarily
and too influential economically to be “dealt with” in any meaningful sense. The
countries of the region, especially some of those with maritime disputes with
China, are beginning to acknowledge this truth and to realize that in the longer
term their only option may be to accommodate the wishes of the big boy on the
block.
Impacts on the Region
Xi Jinping’s policy for China to establish itself as a true maritime power will likely
have a serious impact on China’s neighbors. Those nations that most cherish
their ability to act independently will feel the greatest effect. Any that attempt to
obstruct Xi Jinping’s intentions will surely meet even sharper reactions than have
been seen recently. China’s ambition to become a true maritime power should
not be seen in narrow terms, as simply an issue of a continental or a maritime
perspective; the nations of the region must understand its real purpose, which is
nothing less than the restoration of China’s traditional maritime order. When the
Middle Kingdom was the hegemon of East Asia, the surrounding seas constituted
a medium through which its overwhelming power and influence were propagated throughout the region, together with Chinese attitudes and values. Xi Jinping
will not be satisfied until this system has been re-created around modern China.
The true maritime power to which the Chinese aspire involves the strategic
interconnection of land and sea power and the balance of short-term crisis management with long-term interest. In practical terms, it can be readily understood
as a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine, which the United States declared in
1823 to deter the European great powers from interfering in seas that the United
States construed as in its natural sphere of influence. Certainly, the current
maritime policies being pursued by China are intended as warnings, especially
to the United States and Japan, not to intervene in Chinese affairs in any part of
the ESCS. They represent an implicit challenge to the collective defense posture
encouraged by Washington, the self-appointed guardian of the Indo-Pacific region. It is easy to sympathize with the concerns of China’s weak and vulnerable
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neighbors, like South Korea and Vietnam, that well remember the bitter historical
experience of living as tributary nations under the Middle Kingdom umbrella.62
Let us then examine some specific ways in which China’s maritime ambitions
are likely to affect the region significantly. First, Xi Jinping’s attitude toward his
less powerful neighbors seems to be hardening considerably. The region may
face more unilaterally imposed restrictions and obstacles designed to establish,
as “facts on the ground,” legal and administrative structures inspired by China’s
historical presence in the East Asian seas. Examples include China’s November
2013 declaration of an air-defense identification zone over the ECS and the announcement in January 2014 of new fishing regulations whereby the Chinese
government, acting in the name of the province of Hainan, obliged all foreign
fishing vessels to apply for permission before entering a vast swath of the SCS,
including areas contested by Vietnam and the Philippines.63
Second, Xi Jinping is finding it harder to reconcile China’s maritime interests
harmoniously with those of other claimants in the ESCS. The Chinese are growing less willing to enter into substantive negotiations to resolve such differences
and disagreements. The Chinese have refused to take part in the proceedings
resulting from a four-thousand-page submission by the Philippines to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on 30 March 2014. The Philippines
is seeking a definitive ruling on Chinese claims and activities in the South China
Sea, China having asserted a historical right to over 90 percent of the SCS by its
so-called nine-dashed line, which overlaps with about 80 percent of the Vietnamese claims.64 On 1 May 2014 an oil-drilling rig belonging to the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation was moved unilaterally into the Vietnamese EEZ, and
the Chinese have expressed their determination to put it in operation, despite
widespread rioting in Vietnam targeting Chinese-owned factories.65 There is also
an active dispute between China and the Philippines over the Second Thomas
Shoal in the Spratly Islands, which is 105 nautical miles from the Philippines.
Chinese actions there conflict with the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which calls for the maintenance of the status quo, and
they are hindering efforts to draw up a binding Code of Conduct.66
Indeed, recent developments in the ESCS disputes have clearly demonstrated
that China, ASEAN, and Japan are unable to agree on mechanisms to apply
international law in the maritime domain. There is a little good news, however.
China responded helpfully to the Typhoon Haiyan disaster in the Philippines
in November 2013, though its initial pledge of only U.S.$100,000 in aid to the
Philippines attracted international criticism (in contrast, China had pledged
U.S.$1.5 million to its close ally Pakistan when an earthquake killed five hundred
people there in September of that year).67 China also proved willing to cooperate
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with many other nations in the response to the mysterious disappearance of the
Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 in March 2014.68
Third, Xi Jinping is making very clear that the United States can no longer
continue to behave as if it were the only player in the game—those days are past.
China is deliberately setting up confrontations by asserting “traditional historical
rights,” and of course, the United States is resisting, but the U.S. commitment to
allies and partners in the region has become ambiguous. As the struggle in the region between the two great powers becomes ever more open and obvious, the other regional powers, especially those that can be characterized as “middle powers”
—ASEAN, Australia, Canada, India, Japan, and South Korea—are seeking to
establish strategic cooperative partnerships and networks with one another.
Fourth, and relatedly, the other countries of the region are very sensibly fearful about Xi Jinping’s commitment to make China a true maritime power, since
none has forces on the scale of the PLAN or much military leverage to resist expressions of Chinese will. The nations of the Indo-Pacific region can only band
together, and of course, they have long been doing this through bilateral security
arrangements with the United States, the guarantor of regional peace and stability since the Cold War ended. But times are changing, and although the United
States has always tried to bind China to the maritime interests of its allies in the
Indo-Pacific region, the lesser powers are now feeling much more exposed.
Fifth, despite all the talk of China’s core national interests, Xi Jinping has yet
to issue any grand doctrine describing how the People’s Liberation Army should
protect them. The PLA has had very little experience of conducting expeditionary joint campaigns, so some kind of guidance is needed, and of course, the rest
of the world is concerned about the content of such a doctrine as well. The U.S.
“Weinberger Doctrine” of the 1980s and the later “Powell Doctrine” are the best
examples of such protocols. But until the Chinese issue such an explicit declaration, we will be left with the ambiguities of Xi Jinping’s salami slicing and what
appears to be a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine.
A MIDDLE KINGDOM REGIONAL ORDER?
Xi Jinping’s declared intention that China become a “true maritime power” is
meant to secure China’s maritime domain, but it is also part of a balanced national strategy in which inherently military affairs are interwoven with strategic
issues of sovereignty, regime legitimacy, and major-power politics. Xi’s commitments on maritime policy go substantially beyond any of his predecessors’, and
an impressive modernization and reorganization of the PLAN and the CCG is
under way. China, then, is preparing for conflict, should conflict come, but it is
also pursuing a shrewdly balanced strategy that maximizes ambiguity. It is maneuvering stealthily to realize its objectives incrementally in the disputed waters
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

Summer2015Review.indb 58

63

4/21/15 1:50 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

S U K J O O N YO O N

59

of the East and South China Seas without provoking effective reaction from the
United States.
None of China’s neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region can match its maritime
capabilities on an individual basis, but the United States continues to argue that
by acting together they can form a credible counterweight against China. One
of the principal aims of President Obama’s April/May 2014 visit to Japan, South
Korea, and the Philippines was to shore up support for the U.S.-led maritime
security coalition. The United States continues to urge China’s neighbors to work
together to respond to China’s long-term strategy and to do everything possible,
without escalating maritime tensions, to prevent China from establishing a fait
accompli by which the Middle Kingdom regional order would be restored.
But time and circumstance are on China’s side, and a war-weary United States
is unwilling to chance any serious maritime confrontation with it. From an East
Asian perspective, the U.S. security umbrella is starting to leak. The only practical
alternative for China’s neighbors is to reorganize their collective security in terms
of a cooperative enterprise among particular emerging middle powers, for which
South Korea, Australia, India, and ASEAN are the most plausible candidates. Of
course, the Chinese would surely try to use their economic leverage to discourage
such cooperation, and the very idea that China can be influenced by any kind of
collective pressure may underestimate its resolve.
So where does this leave us? Throughout the region there is an earnest desire
to believe that China really does want to be a responsible player, that it wishes
to maintain maritime peace and stability. We can only hope for greater Chinese
restraint in the use of “tailored coercion” and “forceful persuasion.” Xi Jinping’s
control of several high-profile maritime committees can be seen as a strategy of
crisis management, and there is now at least a policy to avoid the use of naval
warships for law enforcement in disputed waters. Nevertheless, and unpalatable
as it seems, accommodation of China’s aspirations may ultimately be the lesser
evil.
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THE JMSDF’S RESILIENT POWER FOR
CIVIL SOCIET Y
Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake
Captain Takuya Shimodaira, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

T

he Asia-Pacific is a disaster-prone region. In humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, it is crucial to save lives at the outset.
Success in the initial phase will produce trustful relationships among civil and
military actors and will influence subsequent relief operations.
Soon after Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) struck the central Philippines on 8
November 2013, the United States dispatched an aircraft carrier and conducted
Operation DAMAYAN.1 Dr. Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, wrote, “The response
to Haiyan could be a turning point for the United States in Asia, an opportunity
to re-up the pivot.”2
Captain Shimodaira is the first Japan Maritime SelfJapan too sent a relief force to the devastated
Defense Force (JMSDF) Liaison Officer assigned as
area, marking Japan’s largest international disasteran International Fellow in the International Prorelief mission to date. It readily brings to mind
grams Department at the Naval War College. He
graduated from the National Defense Academy in
Operation TOMODACHI, after the Great East Japan
1989 and was commissioned as a Surface Warfare
Earthquake (GEJE) of 11 March 2011. The reOfficer, subsequently serving on board a number
sponse to the GEJE showed the utility of integratof destroyers, including command of JS Ishikari
(DE 226). He took part in RIMPAC 2010, when the
ing diverse coalitions. The deep alliance between
JMSDF joined that multilateral exercise for the first
the United States and Japan was the main pillar
time, and served as Chief of Staff, Escort Flotilla 1
during Operation TOMODACHI. He earned an MA in
of this coalition. Tomodachi means “close friends,
area studies (East Asia, China) from the University
trusting each other”; Japan and the United States
of Tsukuba and a PhD in political science from the
can shape a more peaceful future and maintain
Kokushikan University, in Tokyo, where his research
interests included nontraditional security.
peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region as the
strongest possible allies and tomodachi. President
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Union address his intention to continue to focus on the Asia-Pacific, support
American allies, and work toward a future of greater security and prosperity.3
What kind of power should the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) exercise to shoulder an assertive role in shaping such a future alongside the United
States?
One of the most important lessons learned from the GEJE is the importance
of smooth coordination with local people to judge needs onsite.4 To deal with an
unprecedented disaster, governmental and nongovernmental actors must make
good use of their own and each other’s strengths. For the JMSDF, it is necessary to
establish a trustful relationship with the local people if it is to meet onsite needs
in an appropriate and timely manner.
In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateral cooperation in dealing with frequent
major natural disasters is indispensable. One of the most important kinds of security operations that the JMSDF can perform now is HA/DR, in which saving
lives from the sea in the initial phase is critical. The JMSDF can contribute to the
establishment of trust among the nations of the Asia-Pacific region through the
manner in which it makes available its knowledge and capabilities.5
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the roles that they are expected to play have attracted new attention. A large number of the volunteers
who worked vigorously to rescue and support disaster victims immediately in
the wake of the GEJE were from NGOs. In fact, the total number of volunteers
registered at volunteer centers exceeded 767,000 in the six months following the
disaster.6 In addition to sending volunteers, NGOs provided a wide range of services, from delivering relief supplies to providing health care.
Although humanitarian assistance has traditionally been carried out by civilian organizations, in recent years military organizations have placed more
weight on HA/DR. As a result, the activities of military and civilian organizations now often overlap or compete with each other during HA/DR, causing
confusion about who is responsible for coordination. Professor Peter D. Feaver
of Duke University argues that there is a latent gap between civil and military
organizations, one that is difficult to fill even by building a good civil-military
relationship.7 Nevertheless, a large-scale HA/DR operation necessarily requires
unified effort and a whole-of-government approach; this gap must somehow be
overcome.
First, this article analyzes onsite coordination during Operation TOMODACHI
among the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and the JMSDF and describes the
strengths provided by the JMSDF. Next, it reviews the activities of NGOs in
the response to the GEJE. Last, it explores the resilience and robustness of the
JMSDF’s power for connecting civil and military organizations in the Asia-Pacific
region.
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The author joined Operation TOMODACHI on board the state-of-the-art helicopter destroyer JS Hyuga (DDH 181) as chief of staff of JMSDF Escort Flotilla
1 and was responsible for coordinating Japanese-U.S. joint operations in the afflicted areas. These observations and recommendations are based on successes
and difficulties experienced during the operation onsite.
OVERVIEW OF OPERATION TOMODACHI
An enormous earthquake and tsunami devastated the Tohoku region of northeastern Japan on 11 March 2011, a combined disaster since referred to as the
“Great East Japan Earthquake.” In response to the GEJE, Japan’s Self-Defense
Force (SDF) quickly went into action, deploying forty naval vessels and approximately three hundred aircraft. Early the following morning, JMSDF units reached
a position off Miyagi Prefecture and started search-and-rescue operations. On 14
March Joint Task Force–Tohoku (JTF-TH) was formed; the SDF provided more
than a hundred thousand personnel until the task force’s dissolution on 1 July.
JTF-TH controlled at the maximum five divisions and four brigades (about fortyfive thousand ground personnel); fifty vessels and 172 naval aircraft (about fourteen thousand maritime personnel); and 240 other aircraft (about twenty-one
thousand air personnel). The results of its activities over three months were that
19,286 lives were saved, 9,500 remains were found, 23,370 were provided medical assistance, 4,709,019 meals were served, 32,985 tons of water were supplied,
bathing assistance was rendered to 966,436 people, and other support, including
debris removal from public facilities, bridge reconstruction, and temporary housing, was provided.8
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy promptly responded to a request of assistance,
deploying eight naval vessels, including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan
(CVN 76). They arrived off Miyagi Prefecture before dawn on 13 March, and
started Operation TOMODACHI. At its peak the United States deployed approximately twenty naval vessels, about 160 aircraft, and over twenty thousand personnel.9 Helicopters of both the JMSDF and U.S. Navy transported water, food,
and blankets from JS Hyuga and the supply vessel JS Tokiwa (AOE 423) to playgrounds and other places in Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures. By 20 March, ten days
since the earthquake, the needs of the afflicted areas were shifting to livelihood
support. The USS Essex (LHD 2) Amphibious Ready Group, with the 31st Marine
Expeditionary Unit, arrived off Aomori Prefecture and began to provide relief
supplies in support of Operation TOMODACHI in cooperation with the SDF, the
Japan Coast Guard, the National Police Agency, and fire authorities. U.S. forces
assigned to Operation TOMODACHI shipped approximately 280 tons of food, 7.7
million liters of water, forty-five thousand liters of fuel, and approximately 3,100
tons of other items.10 On 1 May, after making this enormous contribution, the
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United States terminated the operation, although maintaining a quick-reaction
capability. The significance of this deployment and its unprecedented scale are
particularly worthy of discussion.
JMSDF and U.S. forces expeditiously deployed to the disaster site in full
strength almost immediately after the disaster and displayed to the world a high
level of interoperability. Then–Defense Minister Yoshimi Kitazawa evaluated
their interaction as a symbol of the “deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance.” 11 In
addition to the support received from the United States, Japan received help in
the form of supplies and relief funds from various other nations. In return for
the help that was given to Japan in a time of critical need, the JMSDF must do
whatever it can in future disasters elsewhere.
THE JMSDF’S STRONG HA/DR CAPABILITIES
What is required immediately after any disaster is devotion of all efforts to search
and rescue. Next, it becomes necessary to understand in detail the situation in the
afflicted area to plan the transportation of relief supplies. In view of the characteristics of naval power, access from the sea can be expected to achieve great results.
Sea Base
The main characteristic of the GEJE was that the devastation was spread along an
extensive coastline, the degree of damage suffered and type of support required
varying according to the area. A large volume of floating debris made it difficult
to approach the coast and caused great confusion. Particularly at first, helicopters
and landing craft offer highly effective ways to reach isolated coastal areas, such
as the tips of peninsulas and isolated islands.
The response to such a situation must be comprehensive. The JMSDF can
provide an effective sea base for onsite, well-coordinated operations involving the
Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and effective utilization of the capabilities of U.S. forces. This coordination can take into
account the relationship with the Japan Coast Guard, the police, and prefectural
headquarters for disaster countermeasures.
JS Hyuga, with its extensive command-and-control (C2) and air-base capabilities, was fully utilized on the scene. Naval forces have good capabilities for
searching isolated afflicted areas in detail, collecting information, searching for
and rescuing castaways at sea, transporting relief supplies to a wide area, and
analyzing and evaluating the extent of damage. In selecting the types of support
required in specific locations, it is necessary to grasp accurately the people’s needs
in the afflicted areas, always keeping in mind the need to maintain the effectiveness of forces and discern the content of support required. As the necessity of
the civil-military cooperation in peacetime tends to increase, the JMSDF, which
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operates at the frontline in noncombat operations, must focus deliberately on
coordination with local governments, international organizations, and NGOs.
Command and Control
Because the initial actions after any disaster are most important, the JMSDF and
U.S. Navy exploited their characteristics for swiftness and mobility when the
GEJE occurred. They made preparations rapidly for collecting information and
responded at full power. In the HA/DR operations that followed it was necessary
to maximize C2.
The needs in afflicted areas change. Search and rescue for the missing is
prioritized for about three days after a disaster, at which point transportation
of relief supplies is prioritized until about one week after the occurrence; then
the priority shifts particularly to the restoration of lifelines and life support for
isolated victims. Moreover, reconstruction assistance begins about one week after
the disaster and becomes full-blown when about two weeks have passed. It is of
utmost importance to discern the timing of changes in needs.
It is also essential for the JMSDF to utilize the capabilities of JS Hyuga—and
also JS Ise, of the same class—in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, to the maximum
extent. It is necessary to consider not only efficient operations of forces but also
smooth coordination for supply and repair. In addition, it is necessary to design
a cycle in which forces may be added and changed continuously, with timing that
meets the needs in the afflicted areas. It is indispensable for the JMSDF and U.S.
Navy to devise a concept, based on common background and high C2 capability,
that maintains a common operational picture.
It is also important to hold video teleconferences and exchange liaison officers
to enhance the effectiveness of the operational cycle. Such a coordination process
has been established through exercises in the past few years, and communications on-scene have been sufficient. However, there has been no opportunity to
practice interactions among the whole of government.
In the end, the principal arena of HA/DR is on the land. The characteristics of
ground, maritime, and air forces and of their operating environments are different. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct exercises in advance.
Onsite-centricity: Information Superiority
Humanitarian assistance / disaster relief has basically the same operational cycle
as combat operations. “Victims’ needs on the scene” is equivalent to “movement
of the enemy” and is a core factor of the operational cycle.
For the U.S. Navy, information is always the center of the operation cycle.
U.S. personnel first transported water and emergency food to the afflicted areas,
and every time they did so they directly asked victims for input or conducted
questionnaire surveys. Then they addressed these needs in their next assistance
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actions. This process is equivalent to the analysis of information on the enemy.
The JMSDF also conducted search and rescue of the missing immediately after
the disaster, as well as the provision of water, food, and blankets, and it coordinated with the U.S. Navy activities such as assistance in bathing.
In such activity it is important to distribute appropriate information to alleviate the anxiety not only of victims but of the entire nation and to minimize confusion, taking into account the almost total lack of information in the afflicted areas
immediately after the occurrence of a disaster. It is also necessary to consider the
points for distributing and replenishing accumulated relief supplies and replacing
perishable items that become outdated. It is important to share and coordinate
such information and activities to respond to the people’s needs in the afflicted
areas swiftly and accurately.
The cooperation between the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy is becoming more
and more important, in ways depending on the characteristics of areas where
they operate. Each individual SDF and U.S. unit needs to coordinate in a way that
contributes to the overall objective by taking advantage of their characteristics
and maximizing their capabilities. Using the lessons learned from the past, the
JMSDF has been aware that disaster response has three steps: initial search-andrescue stage, life assistance, and reconstruction assistance stage. Although it is
difficult to define standards for transitioning to each next step, decision to take
specific actions can always be made onsite in the afflicted areas.
NGO ACTIVITIES DURING THE GEJE AND THE JMSDF
Japan Platform (JPF), an international humanitarian-assistance organization
founded jointly by a number of NGOs, the government of Japan, and the Japanese
business community, played a significant role in making up for the loss of local
government functions during the GEJE.12 It created a mechanism that allowed for
the prompt and effective delivery of assistance to disaster victims by connecting
local governments, administrative agencies, private corporations, NGOs, and
other entities with the needs of the people in the disaster-affected areas. NGOs
played a big role in this mechanism, acting as the coordinating authority.
The day after the disaster occurred, JPF immediately activated a partnership
with other NGOs. Civic Force, a professional and leading disaster-relief organization, sent helicopters to the disaster-affected areas for situational awareness.
Thereafter NGOs, led by JPF, jointly undertook a great many relief tasks, such as
distributing supplies, preparing meals, and managing volunteer centers.13
What follows is a review of the major activities that were carried out by NGOs
in response to the GEJE in the categories of relief supplies, volunteers, and health
care. The article will then propose a possible relationship between the JMSDF
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and NGOs, a concept based on the interview with the chairman and founder of
Civic Force, Kensuke Onishi.
Delivering Relief Supplies
ADRA Japan, a “specified nonprofit corporation” (as defined in Japanese law)
based on the Christian faith, carries out its activities cooperatively on an international basis with the aim of restoring and maintaining human dignity around
the world.14
ADRA Japan implemented six projects totaling about ¥954 million in the
response to the GEJE, which was its largest undertaking since its founding. In
its initial response ADRA supported the provision of meals for about a hundred
persons in Yamamoto-cho, Miyagi Prefecture, including the personnel of the
disaster-response office. It thereafter supplied daily necessities to 4,320 affected
households in Matsuyama City, Miyagi Prefecture, and 26,683 households in nine
municipalities that included Tamura City, Fukushima Prefecture. It also supplied
necessities to elementary, junior high, and senior high schools in Fukushima
Prefecture, including bicycles and school uniforms. For 1,030 households accommodated in temporary dwellings in Yamamoto-cho the organization ascertained
and monitored needs to help build a framework and community for mutual
assistance.
Transportation is essential for accomplishing the delivery of these supplies.
A private company, Takahashi Helicopter Service K.K., joined hands with Civic
Force to build a transportation system through a public-private partnership that
would directly respond to calls for help from disaster sites. Some local governments suffered damage and temporarily lost their ability to function; NGOs
provided support for them, as well as supplying what was needed in the affected
areas. The use of private helicopter-service companies like Takahashi K.K. was a
significant example of flexibility by the local government and businesses.
Parties that are supposed to provide disaster relief—the central government,
local governments, large corporations, small and medium-sized enterprises, and
NGOs—have different tasks that they perform depending on circumstances. It is
therefore important to build relationships among all these parties in advance to
share their knowledge and experiences for future disaster response.
Kensuke Onishi argues that Civic Force can be used as a main resource to
gather emergency supplies instead of the JMSDF, because Civic Force has the
knowledge, experience, and platforms to gather information, manpower, funds,
and resources in an organized manner. Civic Force has contracted with the business community—almost a thousand corporations in Japan that can provide various kinds of goods, clothes, and shelters—and puts its skills into practice almost
every year.15 As one of the most recognized and professional NGOs, Civic Force
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has a profound and unique knowledge base and extensive experience and capability. The JMSDF should recognize the professionalism of NGOs, especially their
knowledge about the gemba (“at the site”), and produce more plans to coordinate
with private entities to maximize the capabilities of both.
Sending Volunteers
Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of January 1995, the Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteer Center (PBV), a “general incorporated association” (again,
a category defined by Japan’s legal framework), has been engaged in carrying
out emergency relief activities in areas affected by natural disasters. PBV has
provided assistance all around the world: after earthquakes in Turkey, Taiwan,
Pakistan, Niigata, and China (the province of Sichuan); the large tsunami that
hit Sri Lanka in 2004; and Hurricane Katrina, which struck the United States.16
On the basis of the experience that it has accumulated sending disaster-relief
volunteers and engaging in international relief operations, PBV was able to organize a large volunteer group immediately after the occurrence of the GEJE. PBV
sent volunteers to Ishinomaki City, in Miyagi Prefecture, and other affected areas
to perform such relief activities as preparing meals, removing dirt, distributing
supplies, and supporting evacuation centers. As PBV accepted volunteers from
foreign countries and businesses in addition to Japanese citizens, it was able to
assign about two hundred volunteers per day to carry out a variety of assistance
tasks according to ever-changing local needs. As an organization that participates
in cross-border disaster-relief operations, PBV has accepted and organized more
than four hundred volunteers from about fifty countries around the world.
Civic Force too, Kensuke Onishi has pointed out, can send emergencyresponse teams, led by professionals trained for and accustomed to disaster
environments, assess relief needs, and, drawing on its wealth of knowledge and
experience, conduct effective and prompt disaster relief.17
The JMSDF should cooperate with NGOs in ways that make the most of each
organization’s capability in order to focus on the people’s needs. To do this, the
JMSDF should use professional NGOs to acquire immediate situational awareness by sending emergency-response teams who know the environment.
Providing Health Care
SHARE—Services for the Health in Asian & African Regions—was founded as a
specified nonprofit corporation in 1983 by physicians, nurses, and students who
started with grassroots activities.18 With the goal of creating a society where everybody can live a healthy life in both mind and body, SHARE has been offering
health care in Thailand, Cambodia, East Timor, South Africa, and Japan.
After the GEJE, SHARE provided emergency assistance in Natori City, Miyagi
Prefecture, and then carried out health-care support activities in Kesennuma
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City, mainly by visiting disaster-affected residences, evacuation centers, and temporary dwellings, and providing health consultations to victims.
In late March, the Kesennuma Traveling Care Support Team was formed, with
the cooperation of local doctors and nursing staff, as well as medical support staff
from outside Miyagi Prefecture. SHARE participated in its health-consultation
section and engaged in various activities such as visiting disaster victims still in
their homes, especially elderly people and mothers with little children, to confirm
their safety and condition and to provide health consultations, notify them that
they could receive medical checkups for infants, and support home-based care. In
June, the team started visiting disaster victims in temporary dwellings and small
evacuation centers. The team recorded the information obtained through such
visits and shared data regarding safety and health problems with local government officials and health-care providers in Kesennuma City.
Charity Platform, a specified nonprofit corporation, is headed by Ms. Hiroe
Murakami, who has been engaged in clinical psychology as her lifework and
who has provided mental-care support in relation to child rearing since becoming a representative of a nonprofit organization, the Mental Support Network, in
March 2008.19 When the GEJE occurred, Charity Platform supported mental care
for mothers raising children in Fukushima Prefecture, provided a communication network connecting more than six thousand NGOs nationwide, and served
as a bridge between more than 250 corporations and the NGOs that receive
donations from them.
Kensuke Onishi is convinced that cooperation between the JMSDF and NGOs
can produce good results. By leaving the private sector to lead the relief response
to the people, the JMSDF will escape from unnecessary burdens, connect with
other parts of the private sector, and receive international official-developmentassistance funding through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the future, Civic
Force will pursue the idea of using temporary hospital ships, as a cooperative
effort involving merchant ships and the JMSDF.20
THE JMSDF’S RESILIENT POWER IN CONJUNCTION WITH NGOS
The damage caused by the GEJE was unprecedented for Japan, but looking outside that country we can see that emergencies of the same magnitude happen in
many places around the world. At the same time, since experiencing the GEJE,
international Japanese NGOs that once focused on developing countries have
been directing their attention to domestic needs. Thus, NGO activities have
become more multidirectional. The foundation of Japan Platform has produced
a framework for united emergency assistance whereby NGOs, the business community, and the government of Japan work in close cooperation, making the most
of the respective sectors’ characteristics and resources.
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The JMSDF should give serious consideration to building a partnership with
NGOs that play important roles in emergency assistance and have strong capabilities for HA/DR so as to gain a public understanding with and among them. The
most critical issue is how to coordinate all these entities. Further, a question is
being raised that affects the very raison d’être of the JMSDF: How will the JMSDF
be able to exercise and use its capabilities in an emergency in which central or
local governments are unable to function? It will do so by means of its resilient
power with respect to civil society.
Its first task is to enhance trust. It is important to make the most of the
JMSDF’s strong capabilities at scenes of devastation. Its capabilities and achievements have for almost seventy years produced trust among the Japanese people.
It is expected to fill the gap between the civil and military sectors. Both civil and
military organizations answer to the same code—that is, saving people comes
first. Civil-military cooperation is an essential factor for coordinating each kind
of power to save more lives. There are both possibilities and limitations with respect to civil-military cooperation. It is easy for civil and military organizations
to cooperate for a limited time and in a specific place, especially in the initial
phase, but such cooperation is usually more complex if it must be ongoing and
widespread.
An example of good civil-military coordination was seen after the Sumatra
earthquake in 2004.21 As the disaster area where HA/DR operations needed to
be performed was difficult to reach, civil organizations had to rely on military
transportation. At such a time a cooperative relationship can be established
easily between civil and military organizations. Furthermore, if the operational
framework is simple, it is relatively easy to build a structure that is beneficial to
both civil and military organizations. Training and exercises that include civil
and military organizations will enhance trust.
Second, the JMSDF must revitalize “multi-actors.” The JMSDF has an excellent
command-and-control capability for smooth HA/DR operations. It is necessary,
however, for the JMSDF, the U.S. Navy, and NGOs to aim at improving their efficiency when available resources are limited. One important lesson learned from
the GEJE is that Japan should be prepared for unexpected or unintended events.
For its part, the JMSDF must posture itself to take on tasks and issues that are
outside initial planning or beyond the scope of available capabilities. Therefore, it
is important for the JMSDF to join in as soon as it can, dispatch wherever it can,
and do whatever it can on a voluntary basis, especially in the initial phase. Once
the initial quick response has been provided, a coordinating system should be
established immediately. Specifically, by putting “multi-actors” together to build
a powerful C2 center capable of coordinating HA/DR operations, it is possible to
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make more organizations available than needed and thereby to pursue extensive
and multilevel response measures.
UNPRECEDENTED DISASTERS, UNPRECEDENTED RESPONSES
When an unprecedentedly large-scale disaster occurs, a response should be made
with the united efforts of the whole country. Should a disaster more devastating
than the Great East Japan Earthquake ever happen, even more assistance would
be needed than was available then. The basic principle of humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief is to “provide the necessary assistance to those who need it”;22
obviously, this cannot be achieved solely by the JMSDF, and it is not a task that
is imposed solely on the JMSDF. In the future, NGOs and private corporations,
which have unlimited potential, are expected to introduce new possibilities in
the field of HA/DR; NGOs, thanks to their diversity, will play significant roles in
interconnecting organizations involved in HA/DR.
A relationship among the JMSDF, the U.S. Navy, and NGOs in HA/DR is beneficial in the sense that NGOs overcome a gap between the private sector and the
military sector and work together in the disaster area. It is essential for civil and
military organizations to share their roles flexibly, depending on the time, place,
and capabilities, so as to ascertain the changing needs onsite accurately and bring
to bear efficiently the maximum effect of the united efforts of the whole of the
government.
The primary task expected of the JMSDF is to exercise the full power that it
has cultivated over a long period. In essence, it is an offshore platform. For the
future, it is necessary to pursue a collaboration with the Asia Pacific Alliance for
Disaster Management, an organization aimed at building frameworks wherein,
when large-scale disasters take place within the Asia-Pacific region, private
corporations, NGOs, and government agencies of the countries and territories concerned collaborate beyond organizational boundaries to share and use
resources—personnel, goods, money, and information—to provide assistance
quickly and effectively.23 The keys to increasing the effectiveness of humanitarian
assistance and disaster reliefs are training and exercising in a real environment.
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MENTORING IN THE U.S. NAV Y
Experiences and Attitudes of Senior Navy Personnel
W. Brad Johnson and Gene R. Andersen

T

he first operational definition of mentoring in organizations—offered by
Kathy Kram in 1985—proposed that mentoring relationships facilitate an individual’s professional development through two distinct categories of “mentoring functions.”1 Career functions included sponsorship, exposure and visibility,
coaching, protection, and provision of challenging assignments. Psychosocial
functions included role modeling, acceptance and confirmation, counseling,
and friendship. Considerable empirical evidence
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development Navy-wide.5 The strategy recognizes that people constitute the Navy’s most valuable strategic asset and that deliberate development of individual
sailors and officers must become a top priority. Although mentoring is infused
throughout the four core elements of the strategy (experience, education, training,
and personal development), it is most explicit in the fourth element: “Personal
development . . . includes performance evaluation, coaching, counseling, and
mentoring.”6 The architects of this Leader Development Strategy make it clear
that effective mentor-leaders focus attention on the individual development of
junior personnel.
In a 2010 article in the Naval War College Review, we summarized the empirical evidence lending strong support to the benefits of mentoring relationships
for junior persons fortunate enough to experience them in any organizational
context.7 An updated review confirms that mentoring matters. Hundreds of
rigorous studies, meta-analyses, and other quantitative reviews make it clear that
those who report having been mentored accrue a number of reliable benefits
in comparison with those not mentored.8 Across disciplines and organizations,
mentoring is consistently associated with greater work satisfaction and performance, higher retention, better physical health and self-esteem, positive work
relationships, stronger organizational commitment, career motivation, professional competence, and career recognition and success.9
Mentoring in the military is no exception.10 The few existing studies on the
prevalence and efficacy of mentorship among active-duty personnel reveal that
having a mentor while in uniform tends to bolster satisfaction with one’s military
career, provides a range of important career and psychosocial advantages, and
heightens the probability that mentored service members will in turn mentor
others themselves. In spite of these findings, the term “mentoring” tends to evoke
a range of reactions among service members today. There are many factors at
play here. These include miscommunications caused by conflicting definitions of
mentoring, formal mentoring programs that are sometimes perceived as onerous
administrative burdens (versus culturally accepted and integrated mechanisms
for developing junior personnel), and lingering perceptions among some that
mentoring connotes favoritism and unfair advantage.11 There is also some evidence that although military personnel want and value mentorships, they resist
any program that attempts to legislate or formalize relationships.12
It is easy to appreciate the Navy’s quandary with regard to formal mentoring
programs. On one hand, there is considerable evidence that informal mentorships
(those that emerge naturally through mutual initiation and ongoing interaction,
free of external intervention or planning) result in stronger outcomes for mentees
than are found for mentees formally assigned to mentors.13 In most organizational
contexts, both mentors and mentees appear to seek out mentorship matches on
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the basis of similarities, shared interests, and frequent positive interactions. Two
scholars in this field, Belle Ragins and John Cotton, have nicely described the
sometimes-unconscious process at work in senior personnel as they gravitate
toward junior members of the organization: “Informal mentoring relationships
develop on the basis of mutual identification and the fulfillment of career needs.
Mentors select protégés who are viewed as younger versions of themselves, and the
relationship provides mentors with a sense of generativity or contribution to future generations.”14 Nonetheless, there appear to be problems associated with compelling people to participate in mentorships. In light of the well-documented success of informal mentoring in the business world, many organizations—including
the U.S. military—have moved to formalize the process. Planned and instigated by
organizations, formal mentoring programs involve some process for matching or
assigning dyads as well as some level of subsequent oversight and evaluation.15 In
contrast to informal mentorships, formalized relationships tend to be somewhat
less emotionally intense, more visible within the organization, focused on specific
developmental goals, and confined to predetermined periods of time.16
From these findings, it is easy to conclude that organizations should let nature
take its course when it comes to mentoring, hoping that enough informal mentorships will evolve to meet the needs of junior personnel. But here is the rub:
when an organization relies exclusively on chemistry and the informal connections that may develop between junior and senior personnel, fewer mentorships
develop. That is, organizations that create some structure for facilitating mentormentee matches have more junior members of the community getting mentored.
Of course, the best structure for a specific organization may not include a broad
mandatory program; at times, voluntary programs and initiatives to stimulate
and reward good mentoring are the best fit.
In an earlier article, we highlighted several lingering questions about mentoring in the military. One of these is the question of the perceived value of both
mentoring generally and formalized mentoring programs specifically among
leaders in the fleet. Although the recent Leader Development Strategy indicates
attention to mentorship at the highest levels of Navy leadership, we wondered
how “deck plate” officers and senior enlisted perceive mentoring in the Navy.17
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE MENTORING STUDY
In light of the relatively sparse evidence illuminating mentoring in the U.S. Navy,
and in an effort to assess the attitudes of officers and senior enlisted regarding
formal mentoring programs, we conducted a multimethod study of mentoring
among 149 Navy personnel attending senior leadership courses at the Naval
War College (fifty-five officers, ninety-four senior enlisted). All study participants consented to taking part. Participants were enrolled, variously, in four
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professional development courses: the Command Master Chief / Chief of the
Boat Course (CMC/COB, n = 9); the Senior Enlisted Academy course (SEA, n
= 85); Command Leadership School (CLS, n = 32); or the Maritime Staff Operators Course (MSOC, n = 23). Participants responded to a brief, four-page
survey requesting demographic data, experience relative to mentoring in the
fleet, and perspectives on mentoring programs in the Navy. A smaller sample of
participants was randomly selected for participation in four course-specific focus
groups on the topic of mentoring in the Navy.
Among the 149 participants, twelve were women. The mean age was forty
years, and the average length of naval service was twenty years. Self-reported ethnicities were 110 white (75.3 percent), nineteen black (13 percent), ten Hispanic
(6.8 percent), and five Native American / Pacific Islander (3.4 percent). Eightyfive percent of enlisted participants were either E-8 or E-9 (that is, senior chief
or master chief petty officer), while 89 percent of officers were of the pay grades
O-4 to O-6 (lieutenant commander to captain). Using a five-point scale (1 = Extremely Dissatisfied, 5 = Extremely Satisfied), we asked the participants to rate
their overall level of satisfaction with their Navy careers. The mean satisfaction
rating was 4.6 (enlisted = 4.7, officer = 4.5).
A full 91 percent of our sample reported having had at least one significant
mentor during their Navy careers (enlisted = 94.7 percent, officer = 85.5 percent).
On average, participants reported 3.5 important mentors during their naval careers. By and large, mentors had been men (95 percent) and in nearly all cases
had been older than participants (91.2 percent), by an average of nine years.
Ninety-three percent of mentors had been senior naval officers, and a full 81
percent had been in participants’ chains of command. Strikingly, a full 55 percent
of officer participants reported that their primary mentors had been their commanding officers; this was true for only 1.2 percent of enlisted participants. On
average, participants reported that their primary mentorships in the Navy had
lasted for 4.7 years.
One section of the survey inquired about who had initiated the mentorship,
followed by a narrative question asking those participants who had had primary mentors to “describe how the mentor relationship began.” On the issue of
relationship initiation, most indicated that the relationship had been initiated
by the mentors (49.3 percent). Representative narrative responses include the
following: “My mentor identified me as someone with potential and engaged in
providing me advice and counseling. Once initiated, I felt comfortable seeking
advice as I faced challenges”; “He asked me about my goals, gave me direction
on a daily basis, let me know my strengths and weaknesses”; “My mentor took
an interest in me. He saw potential and helped me to see it”; and “I was required
to return to a different career field and this person took an interest in me. He
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formally trained me, took ownership, and followed up with calls and emails on
a regular basis.”
In other cases, the relationship was mutually initiated (32.8 percent): “Ours
was a senior/subordinate relationship involving mutual interests, career and personal goals”; and “I was the Captain’s aide and after a few weeks in that capacity,
a mentorship developed. I still seek his advice 6 years after that job ended.”
In a smaller proportion of cases, mentorships were initiated primarily by the
mentee (14.2 percent): “I recognized this person as an example of what I wanted
to become. He displayed my goals. All I had to do at that point was ask him to
be my mentor”; “I asked for guidance on how to broaden my horizons. I kept going to him when I no longer felt challenged and needed something new”; and “I
sought him out through informal talking and asking selection board questions.”
Only 3.7 percent of our participants indicated that the mentor-mentee match
had been formed in the context of a formal mentoring program. These findings
suggest that in 82 percent of all mentorships reported by participants, the relationships had been initiated primarily as a result of the mentors’ interest in and
attention to the mentees.
We asked our participants to rate their level of agreement (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree) with the proposition that several specific mentoring
functions had been evident in their primary mentorships. We list the functions
in the table by strength of participant endorsement:
Mentor Function

Mean

Advocated on my behalf

4.57

Developed my military skills

4.55

Enhanced my military career development

4.46

Offered me acceptance, support, and encouragement

4.45

Provided direct training or instruction

4.17

Increased my self-esteem

4.15

Increased my visibility/exposure within the Navy

4.14

Enhanced my creativity and problem-solving skills

3.96

Developed my personal ethics and professional values

3.83

Provided emotional support/counseling

3.82

Assisted in establishing professional networks

3.77

Served to protect me

3.64

Provided me opportunities (choice assignments)

3.50

Helped me bypass bureaucracy

3.03
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These results indicate that excellent mentors in the fleet are active and deliberate in the roles of advocate, teacher/trainer, and career adviser. Moreover, mentors are consistently viewed as providing the personal acceptance, support, and
encouragement that bolster the professional self-esteem of mentees. The fact that
helping mentees bypass bureaucracy or obtain choice assignments are the mentor
functions least frequently endorsed suggests that the perception of mentoring as
mere favoritism, creating unfair privilege for a few, is not prevalent in the Navy.
To amplify further the behaviors of effective mentors, we asked mentored
participants to respond to the following question: “Please describe an event or
experience from the mentoring relationship which best illustrates how you benefitted from being mentored.” Responses fell into several consistent categories,
including imparting wisdom/perspective, career advocacy / exposure / challenge,
personal counsel, support during adversity, and provision of a model/exemplar.
Responses illustrating the value of a mentor imparting wisdom in the form of a
long-term view of one’s naval career included these: “My mentor helped me learn
to think strategically regarding the development of my career. She guided me into
a course of instruction to help ensure future success in the Navy”; “My mentor
gave me a glimpse of the road or path that I needed to take to achieve my personal
and professional goals”; “He discussed a future job that I was not interested in
but my community had offered me. His long term view helped direct my course”;
“My mentor took an active role in ensuring that I chose a follow-on assignment
that was conducive to career development”; and “He assisted me by guiding me
to college and definitely changed my decision-making process.”
One of the most prevalent response categories highlighted the value of mentor
advocacy, exposure, and challenge: “I didn’t fully understand what I was capable
of. My mentor assigned me to a job that was out of my area of expertise and
challenged me to get out of my comfort zone. Through this experience I learned
another critical component of my duties and it made me an expert outside my
field—I still have that confidence to tackle the jobs that I haven’t already mastered”; “My mentor gave me a chance to demonstrate what I could do, then put
his money where his mouth was by writing a strong recommendation letter to
the screening board that got me selected”; “He pushed me to take challenging
job assignments. Some of the assignments were given to me without me having to ask for them”; “He recognized my abilities, pushed for recognition of my
achievements and was instrumental in getting me the jobs I needed for career
progression”; “Multiple times, when a high visibility problem came up, he would
pick me to go with him to fix it. The amount of experience and recognition he
provided is unmeasurable”; and “My mentor exposed me to a network of senior
leaders and encouraged me to pursue more senior positions and get out of my
normal comfort zone.”
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Personal counseling and support constituted a third category of participants’
reflection regarding their mentors’ most salient mentoring behaviors: “I had a
hard time adjusting to the Navy because I had been discriminated against on a
constant basis. He showed me how to adapt”; “My mentor spent numerous hours
guiding me on handling personal issues, keeping perspective, and problemsolving work relationship issues”; “She offered me acceptance, support, and encouragement”; “When I was going through a personal crisis about my career, he
took the time to listen and give me honest and thorough advice”; “He was there
for me personally when I went through a tough divorce”; “He has a way of helping
me work through an issue and eventually lead me to the answers I already had for
myself ”; and “My mentor taught me to control my emotions and self-reflect to be
more aware of my surroundings and how to be a professional.”
Related to personal counsel was a category of responses specifically reflecting
on the value of the mentor’s support and encouragement during moments of
great professional difficulty: “I was passed over for promotion. Interaction with
my mentor provided the support and recommendations needed to improve my
chances for the next look, resulting in promotion”; and “When I wasn’t selected
for O-5, my mentor provided the coaching and visibility needed to successfully
select in the next cycle.”
A final category of participants’ responses to our query about salient examples
of their mentors’ behavior in the mentoring role had to do with the value of a
powerful role model and professional exemplar: “My mentor (the CO [commanding officer]) led by example. His work ethic and leadership were worthy
of emulation”; “He used his prior mistakes and experiences to give me food for
thought”; “I had the opportunity to accompany this officer as part of a small team
conducting an investigation, during which I had an opportunity to observe and
learn about his approach to leadership, ethics, and professionalism in a very concentrated manner”; “He taught me how to be a better sailor, I wanted to emulate
him”; and “I was always yelling at subordinates. He sat me down and told me how
to treat people, but more than that, he showed me by his example.”
When we asked our officers and senior enlisted personnel to provide overall
assessments of how important their primary mentor relationships had been to
them both professionally and personally, the results were striking. Using the same
five-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree), mean ratings for professionally important (4.7) and personally important (4.4) were quite high and
similar for officers and enlisted. Moreover, our participants strongly endorsed the
value of mentoring for the Navy. When asked, “Overall, how important is effective mentoring to the development of future Navy leaders?” (1 = Not Important, 5
= Extremely Important), the mean rating for enlisted was 4.8 and for officers, 4.5.
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We also asked our participants whether they had served as mentors to junior
members of the naval service. A full 95 percent indicated they had mentored, on
average, twenty individual mentees during their naval careers.
A final item included on our survey was this: “Many Navy commands now
have formal mentor-protégé matching programs. In your experience, how successful are these programs?” On a five-point scale ranging from 1 (Not Successful) to 5 (Extremely Successful), the mean rating was 2.5 (enlisted = 2.33, officer
= 2.8), indicating that formal matching efforts tended to be viewed as somewhat
unsuccessful. The survey then solicited narrative responses regarding why formal
mentoring programs should or should not be incorporated into the Navy’s plan
for the development and training of future leaders. Among officers, twenty-eight
of fifty-two narrative responses were negative regarding the value of formal programs, while thirteen responses were positive; the rest were neutral in valence.
Among enlisted participants, fifty-four of eighty-six narrative responses were
negative, fifteen were positive, and the remainder were neutral. In light of the
similarity of the comments, we combined the groups in the following categorization of narrative themes. Among the comparatively small number of positive
comments, the following themes were salient.
Mentoring Prevents Junior Personnel from Getting Overlooked. “There are a lot
of lost sailors, too many of them fall through the cracks because they did not get
the proper mentoring”; “With today’s new recruits, they need to have the guidance to ensure they are directed in their careers; Sailors need a ‘sea daddy’ to
keep them on track and let them know when they have gone off it!”; and “Formal
programs are especially useful for junior enlisted personnel who might otherwise
be overlooked or forgotten.”
Mentoring Is Critical for Career Development. “A formal program could ensure
that others receive the same benefit that I received, I can honestly say that I would
not be where I am today without the mentorship I received”; “These programs
help sailors understand the long-term consequences of actions and inactions”;
and “Formal programs will mostly help convince those who would not ordinarily seek out mentoring that they can benefit from it. A mentor can teach a sailor
from his/her experiences therefore eliminating the trial and error aspect, allowing fewer mistakes and more efficient learning.”
Formal Programs Hold Leaders Accountable. “I think formal programs should
be incorporated because it will hold senior leaders accountable for actions or lack
thereof ”; “Formal programs are necessary to jump start mentoring throughout
the various Navy communities”; “It is probably good to have formal programs,
but if leaders were doing their jobs well, mentoring would be inherent in the
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current process”; and “This should be force fed because some people won’t take
care of their sailors.”
Mentoring Is Crucial for Retention. “One word, ‘retention’!”; “These programs
offer a sound basis for developing better sailors for the future of the Navy”; “In order for us to maintain, sustain, and continue to be the best, we must invest wisely
in our future”; and “Mentorship is important for development of future leaders.”
The majority of narrative comments expressed strong concern about the rationale, utility, and long-term value of formally assigned mentorships. As in the case
of the positive themes, we identified four salient negative themes in participants’
responses. We list the four themes below with a representative sample of participant comments.
Not All Senior Personnel Make Effective Mentors. “Quite frankly, some people
should not be mentors and to force them into a mentorship is absolutely ludicrous”; “Formal programs would force officers unsuited for mentorship into that
job”; “Mentoring programs are promising but not everyone is qualified to be a
mentor”; and “Not everyone is or could be a mentor and they should be identified through a vetting process. Formal programs will make people mentors who
do not even care. Assigning the wrong person deters sailors from seeking good
mentoring matches in the future.”
Forcing Matches Undermines the Value of Mentoring. “A formal program is not
required, if people aren’t inclined to mentor on their own, the value of the mentorship won’t be that high”; “The chain of command—when functioning properly
—already provides formal mentoring”; “Like a forced marriage (formal) versus a
traditional marriage (couple decides)”; “To force something on someone is rarely
effective”; “You cannot fabricate a relationship between two people”; “If you make
it an instruction, it loses the spirit and value of old fashioned mentoring”; “Forcing mentorship in any organization will result in poor quality”; and “Mentorship
should be encouraged by leadership, initiated by seniors, but never forced on juniors. Some individuals do not want and will not benefit from a formal program.”
Quality Mentoring Hinges on the Perception of Choice. “A mentor chooses you or
you choose a mentor, if you assign them you end up with pairs that have nothing
in common or don’t even like each other”; “I should choose who I want to emulate, don’t choose for me!”; “Formal programs fail because it is difficult to match
mentors and protégés of similar mind and temperament—often the relationship
is more meaningful and lasts longer if they find each other naturally”; “Nothing
beats finding a mentor you connect with personally”; “If there is a specific formula that successfully promotes mentoring, I don’t think it has been discovered
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—mentoring involves chemistry, not a formal assignment”; and “A mentor needs
to be someone a particular sailor looks up to, respects, and admires.”
Formalizing Mentorship Creates an Onerous Administrative Burden. “Formal
programs translate into more busy work without achieving the goal”; “I believe
formal programs are disingenuous and often only a paper chase”; “A formal program would add an administrative burden and create a ‘not my job’ scenario because some senior people would then have the excuse, ‘I’m not his assigned mentor’ and blow off their jobs as leaders, educators, and mentors”; “This program
will be a paper tiger”; “Just because it’s on paper doesn’t mean that real mentoring
is occurring”; “I am skeptical of a big Navy program to enforce something as
personal as mentoring”; “Formal program = check-in-the-box mentality”; “Now,
the program will be inspected during inspection visits and lead to gundecking
[falsifying results]”; and “Two words—paper drill.”
To understand more fully the experiences of participants with formal mentoring programs in the Navy, we conducted four focus groups with volunteers from
the four leadership training courses mentioned earlier. Focus groups ranged in
size from eight to twenty-three, and the duration of sessions ranged from forty
minutes to one hour. The primary question posed to each group was: “Are formal
mentoring programs (programs that involve matching mentors with mentees) a
good idea for the Navy? Why or why not?” In most cases, our participants reflected on this question through the prisms of their own experiences with formal
mentoring programs in the fleet. One member of the interview team took verbatim notes of the interviews. Participant responses were later grouped according
to theme. Once again, negative comments tended to outnumber by far comments
affirming a formal program.
On the positive side, focus-group participants emphasized that they highly
value the concept of mentorship (“The concept of mentoring is as popular and
patriotic as motherhood and apple pie. Everyone likes it and understands in
a fundamental way what it is”) and many believed that the Navy already has a
culture that values mentorship (“We already do have some culture of mentoring
. . . why not just improve that culture without coming up with an instruction?”).
Some recommended that merely reinforcing excellent mentoring might be preferable to legislating it (“Drive it into the culture by rewarding and reinforcing
it. Mention it on the fitrep [fitness report], ‘is a good mentor.’ Reemphasize it at
various training and education waypoints along the way in one’s career”). Several
were adamant that mentorship should be nested under the umbrella of leadership and the general leadership expectations of all officers and senior enlisted
personnel. (“Chiefs have been mentoring for years—it’s leadership, not mentoring. When you make mentoring management and not leadership, you have
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problems”; “Mentoring is good, but mandatory mentoring is a crutch for commands with weak cultures of development”; “In my last command, we scrapped
the formal mentorship program and made it the responsibility of the chiefs and
division officers to get the deck plate leadership done”).
Finally, there was a perception by a few participants that formal mentoring
programs were intended specifically for minority-group sailors: “The proposed
instruction makes it sound like we should focus on minority groups, which suggests that this is another equal opportunity program”; and “This is never clearly
addressed by any instruction but there is a strong implication that you should be
mentoring minority sailors or women to enhance diversity.”
The majority of our focus-group participants acknowledged that any formalized mentoring program is likely to meet with resistance (“As soon as you say
‘mentoring’ you get a big sigh and resistance”; “If the Navy program is purely
programmatic, not authentic, and if you force pairings, that is a recipe for disaster”; “Don’t create something that 95% of leadership disagrees with!”; “Nobody
thinks mentoring should be formalized”). They further emphasized that any
formal program is quickly perceived as onerous in the fleet (“When folks in the
fleet hear they are going to be held accountable for mentoring then it gets oppressive and people don’t do it for the right reasons”; “Oh gee whiz, another program,
another three-ring binder, another report to generate that someone may or may
not read”; “I was mentorship coordinator on a carrier, we had an actual form that
both [mentor and mentee] had to sign that included the date and time we met
each week. Nobody liked the mechanistic, mandatory aspect”).
As in the narrative survey responses, our focus-group participants were
cognizant of the problem inherent in the assumption that anyone can mentor
effectively (“Some make good mentors and some don’t have what it takes to be
effective in this role. It’s the same with selecting sponsors in a command. You
want your best reps to do that. We need to do the same with mentors, pick your
very best people and put them in the mentor role”; “I’m sorry, but there are some
folks I don’t want talking to our junior guys”). Several indicated that mentor
training should be a paramount concern (“Lack of training for mentors is a real
problem. People need to be prepared for mentoring, this is a barrier to effectiveness”; “We don’t understand the complexity of mentorship. We don’t take time to
train people”). One area in which training deficits created problems was failure
to balance one’s mentoring and gatekeeping or enforcement roles with mentees
appropriately (“These programs can undermine trust when a ‘mentor’ reports
significant concerns about a mentee up the chain of command. In my command,
this resulted in separation from the Navy for one sailor”). Balancing multiple
roles with mentees may require a specific skill set and training for competence
in the mentor role.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

Summer2015Review.indb 86

91

4/21/15 1:50 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

JOHNSON & ANDERSEN

87

Focus-group participants also identified the need for “big Navy” flexibility and
tolerance for the unique incarnations of mentoring programs in specific communities: “The cookie-cutter approach won’t work with the different communities
and ranks. Tailor the program so that each command can use its structure and
strengths”; “The question is how can various commands go about mentoring
informally so that everyone has the opportunity for mentoring.”
A final theme had to do with concerns about assessing mentoring in the fleet.
Some participants were concerned that the “need” for mentoring programs had
not been established (“Why are we doing this? Is it really needed? Did anyone
check to find out how much mentoring is going on without a formal program?”).
Others noted the difficulty inherent in evaluating unique outcomes associated
with mentoring programs (“Mentoring outcomes are hard to measure. Many
things contribute to success, mentoring is just one element”).
INTENTIONAL AND PROACTIVE MENTORS
This is the first empirical snapshot of mentoring in the U.S. Navy since the proliferation of compulsory matching programs nearly a decade ago. Within our
sample of senior enlisted and midgrade officers, 91 percent reported having
had at least one significant mentor during their careers in the Navy. On average,
participants reported three significant mentorships. These numbers are consistent with data from retired flag officers.18 As in previous studies of mentoring
in the Navy, participants in our study reported that their primary mentors had
been crucial for them both personally and professionally; they overwhelmingly
endorsed quality mentoring as of critical importance for the future of the Navy.
A full 95 percent of our participants were already active mentors themselves,
counting on average twenty mentees during their careers thus far.
In the vast majority of mentor relationships, the mentor himself or herself
had been instrumental in initiating the relationship. In approximately half of
cases, the mentor had been the primary initiator, while an additional one-third
of relationships had resulted from mutual interest and initiation. The fact that
senior enlisted and commissioned mentors had been instrumental in launching
82 percent of the mentoring relationships reported by our participants is striking. With only 3.7 percent of mentorships born of formal mentoring programs,
these data suggest that Navy leaders are intentional and proactive when it comes
to reaching out to junior personnel and instigating meaningful mentoring relationships. It is particularly noteworthy that more than half of the officers in our
sample reported that their own commanding officers had become their most
significant career mentors.
What do effective mentors “do”? Participants in this study reported that strong
advocacy, direct instruction and development of military skills, career guidance,
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acceptance, support, and encouragement all loomed large among the most important mentor functions. Reports of salient mentoring experiences confirmed
these ratings. Participants recalled examples illustrating the value of imparting
real-world wisdom, career advocacy, exposure and visibility within the community, personal counsel, challenge, and deliberate role modeling. In contrast, our
mentees were least likely to report that protection, help in bypassing the normal
channels, or preference for choice assignments had been important elements
of the mentorship. This evidence seems to refute concerns that mentoring is
equated with special privilege and unfair advantage in the military.19
The most important contribution of this study was a multimethod exploration of participants’ perceptions of the value of formalized mentoring programs
in the fleet. Overall, both officers and senior enlisted participants were between
neutral and somewhat negative in their assessments of formal mentor-mentee
programs—particularly those that are mandatory. Both survey and focus-group
responses consistently raised concerns about the practice of requiring all senior
personnel to mentor. Experience suggests that not everyone has the interpersonal
and technical competence to serve effectively in the mentor role. Moreover, our
participants expressed concern that marginal or incompetent mentorship may
do more harm than good. Forcing sailors to participate in assigned mentorships
—particularly in the absence of a thoughtful and participatory matching process
—was seen as quite misguided. Because perceptions of choice loom large in
determining whether any relationship is likely to succeed, participants were
concerned about haphazard or superficial approaches to the pairing of mentors
and mentees. Finally, study participants were loud and clear in their objections to
any directive that burdened commands with yet another paper chase to be scrutinized during inspections. As others have warned, mandatory formal programs
run the risk of undermining the joy and motivation associated with giving to the
next generation, through the art of mentorship.20
On the basis of the foregoing results, we offer the following recommendations
for consideration by Navy leaders. First, it is imperative that the Navy fully implement its Leader Development Strategy, specifically core element number four,
personal development. This element focuses attention on individual strengths
and weaknesses, personal reflection, evaluation, and growth in the context of
competent coaching and mentoring relationships with senior personnel. Judging
from the results of this study, mentoring is already taking place in the fleet for
many officers and enlisted personnel, and our sample rated mentoring as exceptionally important for the future of the Navy. The challenge in the future will be
to increase attention to mentoring as a salient leader competence.
Second, we recommend that local commanding officers approach formal
mentoring programs thoughtfully, always with attention to the desired outcomes
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and structures that best align with the current command culture. In our previous
explorations of mentorship in the military, we have cautioned against programs
for programs’ sakes and instead have encouraged leaders to enhance the culture
of mentoring and the preparedness and commitment of personnel to mentor.21
So, rather than formal programs with mandatory matching of mentors and protégés, leaders might explore voluntary traditional one-to-one matching programs,
“team mentoring” structures in which a “master mentor” meets routinely with a
small cohort of protégés, and “mentoring constellations” in which personnel are
coached and mentored to create effective networks of career helpers—both inside
and external to the command. The key is that some vision for what mentoring
can and should achieve drive the development of a mentoring structure.
Third, members of our sample were quite clear in their assessment that not
all senior Navy personnel are likely to be effective in the mentor role. This finding highlights the critical importance of preparation and training in the art and
science of mentoring as Navy personnel progress through the leader pipeline.
Because not all service members have positive mentor role models, and because
relationship skills do not come easily for some, leaders must provide consistent
and high-quality training for mentorship and, when formal mentoring programs
exist, thoughtfully recruit master mentors with track records of excellence in the
mentor role.
Finally, it is imperative that the Navy find ways to highlight and reinforce
mentoring so that it is perceived as a crucial and valued leader activity. Such reinforcement should include ongoing attention to mentorship in communications
from top leaders, local commanders, and warfare communities. Reinforcement
strategies might also incorporate fleet-wide mentoring awards and the development of special designations (“master mentor”) to recognize specialized training
and exceptional performance in this role.
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“THE NAV Y’S SUCCESS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF”?
The German Navy’s Independent Energy Security Strategy,
1932–1940
Anand Toprani

[The] Naval High Command has from the very beginning operated from
the conviction—especially in view of the lessons Italy had to learn during the Abyssinian War—that in any military conflict, particularly one
in which England is in any way involved, economic warfare will play a
considerable role alongside military operations. In view of the fact that
England has at its disposal connections around the world, it is only possible for the navy to secure oil supplies from overseas through long and
exhaustive preparation.
ADMIRAL ERICH RAEDER TO ECONOMICS MINISTER WALTHER FUNK, 6 MAY 1940

[You claim] that only the Naval High Command has failed to show any
appreciation for your efforts with regard to petroleum supplies. This is
correct. The Naval High Command recognized from the start that, by
pursuing a wartime petroleum supply policy under the influence of the
major oil companies, your department was following a path that must
eventually lead to calamity.

T

RAEDER TO FUNK, 27 JUNE 1940

he National Socialists’ primary foreign policy objective after taking office
was to rearm Germany so that it might reverse the verdict of the First World
War and acquire the “living space” necessary to becoming a world power on par
with Britain or the United States. For the German armed services, the Third
Reich’s ambitious plans meant that they were
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versity. He is a specialist in energy geopolitics, greatpower relations, and military history.
challenge the Royal Navy for command of the seas.
But this would be impossible without sufficient
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raw materials, most importantly petroleum to fuel
Naval War College Review, Summer 2015, Vol. 68, No. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

Summer2015Review.indb 91

96

4/21/15 1:50 PM

92

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2015 Review

the navy’s surface ships and submarines. As an oil-poor nation vulnerable to
blockade and short of foreign exchange to pay for imports, Germany had to make
hard choices about how to allocate its limited supplies of petroleum—not just
between the military and civilian consumers but also among the armed services.
Since the Third Reich required continental hegemony before it could aspire
to global supremacy, German leaders devoted their limited economic resources
to satisfying the petroleum requirements of their army and air force (gasoline
and aviation fuel) before those of the navy (fuel oil and diesel fuel). The German navy resented its subordinate status and—as befits a budding maritime
force with global aspirations—pursued an independent energy-security strategy
that featured acquiring in Iraq and Mexico oil concessions that would allow it to
stockpile large quantities of petroleum in peacetime. But the navy’s long-term oil
ambitions—and bureaucratic manipulations—conflicted with the overall energysecurity strategy of the Third Reich, which was focused on the short-term goal of
fueling a land and air struggle for the mastery of Europe. Although Adolf Hitler
expected the navy to play a much larger role in achieving German objectives
than even the naval leadership initially expected, other agencies with competing
ideas about how to guarantee Germany’s energy security joined forces to quash
the navy’s plans in Iraq and Mexico in 1936 and 1938 before they did irreparable
damage to Germany’s relations with the major U.S. and British oil companies,
which were the Third Reich’s most important foreign suppliers of oil prior to the
outbreak of the Second World War.
THE PROBLEM OF NAVAL FUEL SUPPLIES IN THE THIRD REICH
In the years between the National Socialist “seizure of power” in 1933 and the
outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the Third Reich made impressive
strides in increasing Germany’s supply of petroleum (see table 1). The centerpiece of Germany’s energy-security strategy to increase domestic production
of petroleum was the development of a synthetic-fuel industry. Since before the
First World War German scientists had been perfecting methods of synthesizing
various petroleum products from coal—first the Bergius process (1913), which
yielded gasoline, then the Fischer-Tropsch process (1926), which could produce
heavier fuels, such as diesel, but was more expensive than the Bergius process.
The National Socialists did not stop at synthetic fuel; they embraced what we
would today call an “all of the above” approach, including incentivizing domestic
crude-oil production and curtailing civilian consumption (0.312 barrels of gasoline per capita in Germany, compared with 0.98 in Great Britain and 3.99 in the
United States by 1938).1
Nevertheless, total consumption within Germany still rose as the economy
recovered from the Great Depression, and although domestic synthetic- and
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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TABLE 1
GERMANY’S PETROLEUM SUPPLY, 1933–1939
(THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS)
Refined Petroleum
(natural & synthetic)

Year

Crude Oil

Imports

1933

230

291

2,685

1934

318

N/A

3,155

1935

427

N/A

3,826

1936

445

N/A

4,229

1937

453

620

4,313

Synthetic Fuel Only
1938

552

1,600

4,957

1939

888

2,200

5,165

Note: Crude oil statistics for 1938–39 includes Austrian output. Figures drawn from Reichs-KreditGesellschaft AG, “Treibstoffwirtschaft in der Welt und in Deutschland”; and USSBS, Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy, p. 75.
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crude-oil production
managed to keep pace,
the share of imports
within Germany’s overall supply of petroleum
d i d n ot d e c l i n e ( 7 0
percent by 1938). Nor,
for that matter, were the
armed services able to
make significant progress in accumulating
stockpiles, even though
they knew full well from
their experience during
the Great War that they
could not expect to im
port much from over-

seas in the event of a British blockade.2
The most pressing challenge was, however, the cost of importing petroleum
to meet rising domestic consumption—from 2,478,000 tons in 1932 to 5,165,000
tons in 1939. Importing large quantities of petroleum in peacetime was not a
straightforward matter, since the U.S. and British oil companies that dominated
the global oil industry demanded at least partial repayment in hard currency.3 As
a result, German expenditures of foreign exchange for petroleum imports almost
doubled during the first half of the Third Reich, from 129,800,000 Reichsmarks
(RM) in 1933 to 230,000,000 RM in 1939.4 Under normal circumstances this
would not pose an insurmountable challenge, since a modern industrial nation
can simply boost its exports to balance its current account. Germany was not,
however, operating under normal economic conditions after the National Socialists took power. The Great Depression and the collapse in global trade had
wiped out most of Germany’s foreign-exchange reserves before 1933, after which
rearmament soaked up German industrial and domestic raw materials (e.g., coal)
production, leaving only small quantities available for export. The need to import
food and strategic raw materials and to service the German foreign debt, as well
as fears of unleashing inflation, convinced Hitler and Hjalmar Schacht (then
president of the Reichsbank and later minister of economics) to reject the path
taken by Britain and the United States and devalue the Reichsmark.5 This meant
that German exports were overvalued by as much as 40 percent compared with
those priced in dollars or sterling.6 Although this eased Germany’s import bill,
reduced exports meant lower earnings of foreign exchange, which (along with the
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overall rise in commodity prices as the global economy recovered from the Great
Depression) impaired the Third Reich’s ability to cover the gap between its consumption and production of most key strategic raw materials through imports.7
Even Romania, which became Germany’s most important source of oil after
1939 and later joined the Axis, was not a reliable supplier. Production there
peaked in 1936 at 8,700,000 tons—good for fourth place among world oil producers but only 5 percent of the output of the United States. Six of the seven largest oil companies in Romania before the war, accounting for roughly 80 percent
of that nation’s production, were owned by American, British, Dutch, French,
and Belgian oil companies or banks, while Romanian, Italian, and German firms
controlled the remaining production. The Romanian government meanwhile
received royalties from the foreign oil companies in the form of crude oil (11–12
percent of total production). The major obstacle from Germany’s perspective was
that it could not import oil at will. Starting in 1935, Bucharest limited the amount
of oil it exported to Germany that could be paid for through clearing agreements
(see below) to 25 percent of the total value of all exports.8
During the Third Reich, Germany used a variety of methods to finance international trade, including “clearing agreements,” “barter agreements,” and payment in “blocked currency.” Clearing agreements are basically pools of money
into which a nation’s exporters deposit the hard-currency proceeds of their sales;
importers thereafter draw from these pools to finance their purchases. Barter
agreements are transactions denominated in finished or unfinished goods. Finally, the Reich created “blocked currency” known as “Askimarks” (a German
portmanteau word for Foreigners’ Special Accounts for Domestic Payment) to
finance trade with Latin America. These “Askimarks” were nonconvertible and
could only be used to purchase specified German goods.9 In all three instances,
the guiding principle was to keep the amount of money that changed hands to a
minimum. This included both foreign exchange (e.g., dollars and sterling) and
the Reichsmark, whose value would drop if foreigners exchanged it for other currencies. The Third Reich was happy to allow foreign firms to accumulate their
earnings within Germany, provided that they did not repatriate them. This was
of course unacceptable to the U.S. and British oil companies, which had to remit
at least some of their earnings back home.10
One method of meeting Germany’s oil requirements at minimal cost to the
country’s dwindling reserves of foreign exchange was importing crude oil directly
from Iraq through the British Oil Development Company (BOD), a multinational combine that won the oil concession for all of Iraq west of the Tigris River in
1932. Even though supplies from Iraq would be unavailable in the event of a British blockade, many German officials—especially the navy leadership—hoped the
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BOD would facilitate the stockpiling of oil in peacetime and reduce Germany’s
dependence on the U.S. and British major oil companies.11 Another alternative
was to take advantage of Mexico’s nationalization of its oil industry in 1938 to
purchase the now-discounted Mexican oil with minimal expenditure of foreign
exchange.12 The story of German participation in the BOD and of subsequent
efforts in Mexico therefore offers a valuable perspective on the role of one relatively autonomous agency—the German navy—in defining and implementing an
independent energy-security strategy within the framework of Germany’s overall
preparations to wage another world war.13
German naval policy during the early years of the Third Reich was relatively modest in scope and objectives. Building on the lessons of the First World War, Admiral Erich Raeder (commander in chief of the German navy) ruled out building a
fleet capable of challenging the Royal Navy, preferring a smaller fleet composed
of “pocket battleships,” cruisers, aircraft carriers, and submarines. Moreover, he
considered France, rather than Britain, both the quantitative benchmark and the
expected opponent.14 Consequently, when it came to petroleum requirements the
navy was a minor player by comparison with its sister services.15 In 1935, a year
before Germany embraced a policy of self-sufficiency in petroleum through the
Four-Year Plan (mainly by boosting production of synthetic fuel), the German
navy imported roughly 75 percent of its requirements.16 The following year, the
Naval High Command projected its annual wartime needs as of 1939 at only
1,400,000 tons of fuel oil and 400,000 tons of diesel fuel, all of which it expected
would be supplied from domestic production and reserves.17 By 1938, however,
as the process of rearmament gathered steam, the German navy was estimating
it would require as much as 4,500,000 tons of fuel oil per year in wartime. Since
domestic production of fuel oil was well behind expectations (only 130,000 tons
per annum), the navy had no option but to import most of its requirements.18
The navy’s requirements continued to balloon as Germany’s aggressive foreign policy increased the probability of a great-power conflict. Starting in 1933,
Raeder had sought to manipulate Hitler into granting the navy a larger slice of
the resource pie by framing the desired naval construction program in terms designed to appeal to Hitler’s stated policy preferences. Hitler had, since his earliest
days in politics and explicitly in Mein Kampf and his unpublished “Second Book,”
spoken in favor of an alliance with Britain and Italy directed against France, then
the Soviet Union, and finally the United States. Following Hitler’s cues, rather
than demanding a fleet equal to that of the Royal Navy the navy asked for one
equal to that of France, which it hoped would enhance Germany’s value as an ally
to Britain (i.e., in accord with Hitler’s grand strategy).19
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Raeder (second from left), General Werner von Blomberg (minister of war; third from left), and Hitler on board the battleship Deutschland in April 1934
Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1987-0703-514 / CC-BY-SA

Raeder, then, was caught flat-footed when Hitler abruptly abandoned his efforts to woo Britain and instead sought to use the German navy as a deterrent
against it. As relations with Britain deteriorated in the wake of the Anschluss with
Austria and the onset of the Sudeten crisis in the summer of 1938, Hitler pushed
the navy to adopt more and more expansive construction programs. Raeder still
preferred a balanced fleet designed to wage a guerre de course against Britain, but
Hitler overruled him and demanded additional capital ships. This process culminated in the “Z-Plan” of January 1939, which envisaged the creation by 1946
of a fleet of superbattleships capable of challenging the Royal Navy for maritime
dominance.20 As a result of the Z-Plan the navy’s annual requirements of fuel
oil and diesel fuel in wartime would skyrocket to eight million tons by 1947–48,
whereas the entire German domestic production of all petroleum products
in 1938 totaled a mere 6,150,000 tons. Even assuming sufficient oil could be
found—which was unlikely, since the air force had also received permission to
quintuple its frontline and reserve strength—the navy would need to construct
ten million tons of fuel-storage capacity at a time when there was insufficient
coal, iron, or steel available to meet existing armaments or economic programs
(including the expansion of synthetic-fuel production).21
As early as 1937, in fact, the navy had begun to express doubts about whether
Germany would soon be self-sufficient in petroleum and to worry that domestic production of fuel oil and diesel was lagging behind that of the gasoline and
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aviation fuel critical for combined-arms operations on land (i.e., supplies for the
army and air force).22 The fact that the man responsible for Germany’s economic
mobilization, Hermann Göring, was also commander in chief of the air force and
privileged the expansion of synthetic gasoline production (including aviation
fuel) over that of fuel oil and diesel fuel did not go unnoticed within the navy.23
Although Germany had poured resources into its burgeoning synthetic-fuel
industry, future production would, according to one naval assessment, likely
only suffice “to absorb” increases in military and civilian consumption. The navy
therefore could not afford to be cut off from the international oil market. Rather
than chase “oil autarky” in Europe, the navy’s position by 1938 was that it ought
“to maintain and forcefully expand connections with foreign oil companies.”24
By September 1939 imported oil accounted for roughly a quarter of the German navy’s diesel supply and a third of its fuel oil supply. For the year as a whole,
228,105 tons of fuel and 125,042 tons of diesel fuel came from overseas.25 The
navy considered this inadequate and wished to accumulate a reserve equivalent
to at least a year’s consumption, after which time anticipated higher domestic
production could pick up the slack. There was no shortage of oil on the international market; the problem, rather, was financial, since Germany lacked the
foreign exchange to pay for imports of sufficient quantities of petroleum from the
major U.S. and British oil companies. The Office of the Four-Year Plan (which
oversaw Germany’s policy of autarky) and the Armed Forces High Command
(theoretically responsible for coordinating all the services but in practice serving as Hitler’s personal military staff with little authority over the other services)
continued to purchase whatever they could from abroad (mainly diesel and fuel
oil) while producing the most expensive products, especially aviation fuel and
lubricants, domestically through either conventional drilling and refining or synthesis. The German navy, by contrast, pursued three separate paths to securing
cheap petroleum from abroad without going through the major oil companies:
Estonian oil shale and crude oil from Iraq and from Mexico.26
GERMANY AND THE SEARCH FOR OIL IN IRAQ, 1932–1936
Estonian oil shale was attractive in spite of its uncompetitive price since Estonia
(an independent republic until 1940) could be a reliable source of supply even
in wartime, because Germany thought it likely that it would still control access
through the Baltic even during a conflict against Britain or the Soviet Union. Exports of petroleum extracted from shale to Germany began in 1937 and reached
110,000 tons in 1939. But oil shale yielded only trivial amounts of naval fuel—the
navy’s prewar contracts guaranteed deliveries of only three thousand tons of fuel
oil a month (at well above the world market price) against a total consumption of
44,300 tons. In any case, deliveries ended in 1940 after the Soviet Union annexed
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Estonia; also, in August 1941 retreating Red Army troops destroyed the shaleprocessing installations before the Wehrmacht could occupy them.27
With regard to Iraq, the impetus came from a German industrial consortium
comprising four major steel companies—Ferrostaal, Otto Wolff, Mannesmann,
and Stahlunion (although Ferrostaal was the dominant member). This consortium was a partner in the British Oil Development Company in Iraq.28 In fact,
the German navy was a relative latecomer to this story—various civilian agencies
had been considering the consequences of German participation in the BOD
since 1930, when the newly formed company was still negotiating with the Iraqi
government for a concession.29 BOD representatives had assured the German
legation in Baghdad that their aim was to promote the “Open Door” in Iraq and
break the “preferential position” enjoyed by the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC),
a multinational conglomerate composed of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
(after 1935 the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company), Royal Dutch/Shell, the Compagnie
Française des Pétroles, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and the Standard Oil Company of New York.30 The IPC had secured a formal concession in
1925, initially for the entire country but in 1931, when the company renegotiated the concession, limited to thirty-two thousand square miles—that is, all of
Iraq east of the Tigris River. The company discovered a massive oil field (Baba
Gurgar) in 1927 near Kirkuk but had made little progress in developing it since
then.31 In frustration, the Iraqi government turned in 1932 to the BOD, which
received a concession covering forty-six thousand square miles west of the Tigris
River.32 (The online version of this article reproduces period maps of crude oil
concessions in the Middle East.)
From the start, there was considerable interest in the prospect of German
firms earning tens of millions of Reichsmarks in industrial orders and Germany
finding a cheap source of oil imports.33 There was also some trepidation—the
German Foreign Office warned that if the BOD was too successful, it could spark
a price war in Germany should the major oil companies decide to drive it from
that market. While German consumers would benefit, such domestic petroleum
producers as the chemical cartel IG Farben, which had made massive investments in synthetic-fuel production since 1925, would suffer heavy losses. This
would have a ripple effect throughout the German economy, since expansion
of synthetic-fuel production stimulated demand for labor, coal, and steel.34 Although they were supportive of the ambitions of the BOD, senior Foreign Office
officials suggested that the German government maintain its distance by reining
in German diplomats in Iraq and refraining from extending official support to
the company.35
Initially, most German officials were skeptical of the strategic value of Iraqi
oil, especially in wartime, since it was vulnerable to blockade. But they were
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impressed by the economic benefits for depression-ridden German industry
and hoped that French and Italian participation in the BOD would improve the
company’s prospects.36 Over the objections of IG Farben, the government agreed
in 1932 to guarantee up to 50 percent of a million-Reichsmark investment made
by the German industrial consortium to acquire half the shares in the BOD held
by one of the founders of the company, Thomas Brown. Although a Scottish
businessman, Brown enjoyed close ties to the German government through his
efforts to promote closer economic relations between Germany and Persia during the 1920s.37 By virtue of these special “founders’ rights,” the German firms
could supply 38 percent of the BOD’s materiel requirements (with a total value
of perhaps 100,000,000 RM) and receive 12 percent of the oil produced by the
company.38
The question of official German support for the BOD had initially been a
purely civilian matter, with the ministries of economics, finance, and foreign affairs taking responsibility. This changed between 1934 and 1936, when the German consortium (in concert with its Italian partners) tried to acquire majority
control of the BOD and of the holding company, Mosul Oil Fields, established to
exploit the BOD’s concession rights.39 The armed services, the German navy in
particular, now evinced considerable interest in the outcome of events in Iraq, as
the rise of the Third Reich—and Hitler’s explicit commitment to a crash rearmament program no matter what the cost—portended a significant rise in military
oil consumption within the coming decade.40
The German consortium within the BOD sought to acquire control of the
company by subscribing to private share offerings to raise capital now unavailable on London financial markets because of the machinations of the rival IPC
to fund the BOD’s exploration efforts and cover the
TABLE 2
“dead rent” (i.e., royalties to be paid before any oil
IRAQI OIL PRODUCTION
(THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)
production had started—starting at £100,000 in gold
in 1933 and rising to £200,000 by 1937) owed to the
1932
836
Iraqi government. Although the BOD had yet to
1933
917
produce oil on a commercial scale (see table 2), the
1934
7,689
industrial consortium and its supporters within the
German government were encouraged by favorable
1935
27,408
geological assessments by Alfred Bentz, Germany’s
1936
30,406
premier petroleum geologist and head of the oil divi1937
31,836
sion of the Prussian Geological Survey. In 1935, he
1938
32,643
estimated that the BOD concession had twenty-three
million tons of proven reserves and another hundred
Source note: Figures drawn from DeGolyer and MacNaughton, Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics (Dallas: DeGolyer
and MacNaughton, 2004).
million tons of probable reserves.41
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Because of Germany’s balance-of-payments difficulties, the German consortium had to pay for most of these new shares with industrial goods required
for the construction of oil production infrastructure, including a railway to the
Mediterranean through Syria. A rail line was necessary because the oil discovered
in the BOD’s concession was too “heavy” (50 percent asphalt content) to pump—
although a pipeline was not out of the question in the future if the Germans
resolved the technical obstacles. (Ferrostaal had, in the interim, also worked out
an agreement with independent German and British refiners to sell them up to a
million tons of heavy oil per year.)42 Total expenditures would have reached over
20,000,000 RM by 1936, but the consortium was willing to move forward if the
Reich put forward a 70 percent financial guarantee (although German bureaucrats speculated it would have settled for 50 percent).43
The question whether to support the push for a greater German stake in the
BOD united military and civilian policy makers. The War Ministry supported
any plan that could increase its supply of petroleum, especially since peacetime
naval diesel and fuel-oil consumption was expected to rise 2.5 times between
1935 and 1938. The navy’s supply/demand position was in fact so tight that it
could only sustain current operations and had nothing left over to stockpile.
Economics Minister Schacht, the man who had stabilized the Reichsmark in 1934
without resorting to devaluation by embracing a rigid system of capital controls
and bilateral trade agreements, liked the idea of taking control of the BOD. For
him, it offered an easy means to reconcile the competing demands of rearming
and of improving Germany’s balance of payments while reducing the country’s
dependence on the U.S. and British major oil companies.44 The Foreign Office
believed that both the British and the Iraqis would welcome a German “counterweight” to the Italians and the Soviets in the Middle East, while the German
minister to Iraq (Fritz Grobba) argued that building a railway to carry oil of the
British Oil Development Company to the Mediterranean would earn Germany
significant goodwill across the Middle East.45 Time was of the essence—the
military and Economics Ministry had to start making preparations immediately
to ensure that there were enough tankers to move the oil from Iraq to Germany
and sufficient independent domestic refining capacity to process it, as most of
the existing refineries were owned by the major oil companies, which would not
process crude oil from rival firms.46
The only consistent opposition came from the Finance Ministry. After initially
backing down in the face of unified support for additional financial support for
the German industrial consortium in August 1935, the ministry dug in its heels
when Ferrostaal requested guarantees a few months later for a further 15,000,000
RM of expenditures (including royalty payments to the Iraqi government,
which the Italians could no longer cover following the outbreak of the Second
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Italo-Abyssinian War).47 As Finance Minister Johann Ludwig von Krosigk explained to Schacht in December 1935, expanding the Third Reich’s financial
exposure in Iraq made economic sense only if the German group within the
BOD achieved majority control of the company, whereas the plan proposed by
Ferrostaal left the German industrial consortium with only a 33 percent stake.
The low quality of the oil discovered in the BOD’s concession was another impediment. Even assuming it was possible to build a thousand-kilometer railway
capable of transporting sufficient quantities of oil to the Mediterranean coast,
the BOD’s higher operating costs would put it at a disadvantage compared with
the capital-rich IPC, which would redouble its efforts to throttle its competitor,
especially if the BOD tried to move excess oil to the Persian Gulf to compete for
markets beyond Europe.48
A meeting of key officials at the Economics Ministry in December 1935 failed
to reach a consensus.49 The Finance Ministry remained skeptical, while the Economics Ministry, the Naval High Command, and the Foreign Office continued
to support a German takeover of the BOD in spite of the mounting costs.50 In any
event, a decision had to be made soon. The Germans had the option to acquire a
controlling interest in the company along with 50 percent of its future oil production in concert with British and American partners, including the independent
oilman William Rhodes Davis, who would subsequently play a major role in
promoting the German-Mexican oil trade.51
In January 1936, Raeder tried one last time to make the case for both the
strategic and commercial viability of the BOD to Krosigk. The admiral claimed
that the BOD’s concession could produce up to three million tons of crude oil per
year, one-third of which would go to Germany, at a cost of only a pound per ton,
quickly amortizing the costs of building the necessary tankers and storage facilities. Also, recent technological advances meant that the heavy oil from the BOD
concession could be refined into expensive fuels and lubricants. Raeder advised
that at the very least Germany hold on to its shares in the BOD for a while longer,
if only to bargain them for rights to “oil territories in Central or South America,
which could after examination prove to be more advantageous in terms of supplying Germany in either war or peace in view of their geographical situation.”52
During a meeting with Krosigk on 25 March 1936, according to naval records,
Wilhelm Keppler (one of Hitler’s primary economic advisers) apparently dismissed the navy’s plans as “superfluous, since the German Reich would within
a short amount of time cover its entire demand for oil internally.” Keppler was
more concerned, Raeder perceived, by the possibility that the navy might no
longer be a customer for the vast quantities of expensive synthetic fuel to be
produced domestically.53 Keppler later disputed the navy’s characterization of
his position.54 He insisted that he had broached the matter of German control
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

Summer2015Review.indb 101

106

4/21/15 1:50 PM

102

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2015 Review

of the BOD with no less an authority than the Führer. Hitler had been skeptical
of supporting a German takeover of the BOD two years before, and nothing had
changed since then. As far as Hitler was concerned, Germany lacked the necessary foreign exchange, and anything short of majority control of the company was
useless. Most importantly, the scheme would “incur for us the enmity of powerful
international oil interests.”55 Finally, Hitler had little incentive to goad the British,
so soon after the remilitarization of the Rhineland.56
Ultimately, the navy’s arguments proved unconvincing, and the Third Reich
opted against issuing financial guarantees large enough to allow the German
industrial consortium to take over the BOD.57 The Italians had already given up
in 1935. The state-owned Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli, which controlled the
Italian stake in the BOD, had reassessed its position due to the threat of League
of Nations oil sanctions following the invasion of Abyssinia. Italy could hardly
depend on oil deliveries from Iraq when they traveled by pipeline through the
French League of Nations mandate of Syria or the British mandates of Transjordan and Palestine. The Italians therefore sold their stake in the BOD to the AngloIranian Oil Company and chose instead to concentrate their efforts in Albania.58
With the Italians out of the way, there was nothing stopping the IPC from taking control of the BOD, initially by covering the “dead rent” for 1936. The Iraqi
prime minister complained to Grobba that the Italians had been paid off by the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (then 51 percent owned by the British government)
with promises to continue oil deliveries during the Abyssinian War. In other
words, he charged, the British government, in collusion with the oil companies,
had rejected the use of oil sanctions over Italy’s brutal invasion of Abyssinia in
order to facilitate Rome’s capitulation in the struggle for control of Middle Eastern oil.59 There is no evidence to support Grobba’s claims (repeated uncritically
by several historians) that the British government had been reluctant to push for
sanctions less out of fear of driving Italy into an alliance with Germany than out of
a desire to take control of the BOD.60 Nevertheless, it is difficult to take issue with
the verdict that the Reich abandoned the BOD less out of narrow concerns over
the economic viability of the project than for broader strategic considerations.61
Ferrostaal eventually (at the end of 1936) sold off its interest in the BOD for
£1,250,000 in foreign exchange and future orders to the IPC, which in turn created a subsidiary (Mosul Holdings Ltd., renamed the Mosul Petroleum Company
in 1941) that acquired control of the BOD in 1937.62 The Naval High Command
was naturally disappointed by this turn of events. The one consolation was that it
might be able to use the proceeds of the sale of the German shares in the BOD for
“Mexican oil rights.”63 But after the sale of Ferrostaal’s shares went through, the
only pledge the navy could secure from the Economics Ministry was a vague assurance that it could use the earnings to hunt for other overseas oil concessions.64
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THE SHIFT TO MEXICO, 1936–1940
German interest in acquiring an oil concession in Mexico predated the First
World War. German geologists had surveyed the country as early as 1912, and the
Deutsche Bank (which controlled the major independent German oil company,
Deutsche Petroleum), the German Foreign Office, and the Imperial German
Navy all expressed interest in securing a concession in Mexico as an alternative
oil source that would allow Germany to break the Standard Oil Company’s domination of the European market. In May 1914, the Mexican dictator Victoriano
Huerta even offered the German ambassador a 150,000-square-kilometer concession in Tampico, which would be expropriated from its American owners, in
a vain attempt to solicit German support to prop up his regime, which collapsed
in July under pressure from the U.S. government.65 (See the online version of this
article for a reproduction of a period map of Mexican oil fields.)
After the BOD fiasco, the German government, even though Germany lacked
the spare refinery capacity to process any crude oil besides that imported by the
major oil companies, gave the navy permission in 1937 to pursue opportunities
to purchase oil concessions in Latin America. This was the German navy’s third
and final attempt to secure its own independent source of supply before 1939.
There were two provisos: the navy’s efforts could “in no way disrupt the internal
petroleum economy,” and the Third Reich would not consider providing support
to any endeavor involving “politically unreliable countries.”66 The Spanish Civil
War, which began the year before, lent additional urgency to the search for new
suppliers. Naval fuel consumption increased after the Germans joined “nonintervention” patrols with the British and French while supporting operations by
Nationalist forces and the Condor Legion of German volunteers. Just as importantly, and also in 1937, Shell and Standard Oil of New Jersey began demanding
full payment in hard currency.67
The navy moved quickly. As early as September 1936 it had asked the German
commercial attaché in Mexico City to query the Mexicans about whether they
were interested in establishing a partnership between Germany and Mexico’s
state-owned company, Petromex, to start production on land within Mexico’s national petroleum reserve.68 The Mexicans initially appeared receptive, but negotiations had stalled by 1938, owing to skepticism on the part of the German Foreign
Office and German oil companies (which worried about antagonizing their U.S.
and British counterparts), as well as the reluctance of the Mexican government
to conclude an intergovernmental accord with the Third Reich when domestic
nationalist hostility against foreign control of Mexico’s oil was running high.69
The Mexican government’s nationalization of its oil industry in March 1938—
and with it the expropriation of the properties owned by U.S., British, and Dutch
oil companies—afforded the Germans an unparalleled opportunity to corner
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

Summer2015Review.indb 103

108

4/21/15 1:50 PM

104

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2015 Review

the market for Mexican oil.70 The major oil companies had retaliated against
nationalization by launching a boycott of expropriated Mexican oil, and Mexico
was desperate for new customers as well as technical and financial support to
continue increasing output (see table 3).71 Whatever Mexico’s misgivings about
the Third Reich, there were no other customers for its oil (besides independent
companies that were themselves planning to sell to Germany), especially after
negotiations with Italy and Japan failed. The Mexicans were in such desperate
straits that they were willing to accept payment through barter. The German
navy had meanwhile established a partnership with the Dresdner Bank, which
was being used for “camouflage” and handled negotiations with the Mexicans
through a subsidiary.72
In April 1938 the Naval High Command asked the Economics Ministry to
release £600,000 of the foreign exchange earned from the sale of the German
shares in the BOD to purchase an oil concession in Mexico.73 The German navy
played fast and loose with the truth to get its way. According to the German minister in Mexico City, the Mexicans were not nearly as eager to grant a concession
as the Naval High Command claimed; their problem was disposing of excess oil
they already had on hand.74 But even if a concession agreement went through,
production would not start, according to the geologist Bentz, until “the end of
1941 at the earliest.”75 Most importantly, the navy failed to convince its critics that
Germany had more to gain than it would lose through closer ties with Mexico.
The Economics Ministry had no objection to the navy continuing to buy Mexican
oil, but it opposed any intergovernmental accord and rejected the navy’s request
for foreign exchange. Instead, it tried to convince the navy that oil autarky was
within sight, while also confessing its reluctance to incur the wrath of the major
oil companies by defying their boycott of Mexico.76
TABLE 3
The Third Reich was dependent on the U.S. and BritMEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION
ish companies to sell them petroleum that could then
(THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)
be stockpiled, and for that reason Germany could not
1933
34,000
afford “to annoy” them just yet.77
1934
38,172
Raeder tried again in September and December
1938 through personal appeals to Göring to release
1935
40,241
the requested £600,000 to begin preparatory work.
1936
41,028
The Mexican offer was almost too good to be true.
1937
46,907
Unlike in Iraq, where the logistical challenges of
1938
38,506
moving oil from the interior to the coast were formi1939
42,898
dable, Mexico was offering participation in a stateowned concession only sixty kilometers from ports
1940
44,036
on the Atlantic coast.78 From geological estimates
Source note: Figures drawn from DeGolyer and MacNaughcompleted by Bentz in 1936 and 1937, Raeder was
ton, Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics.
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convinced that the concession in question could yield up to ten million tons of
oil per year (with 20 percent going to the Mexican government), with shipments
to Germany beginning a year after the start of operations.79 All of this could be
had for an expenditure of only £600,000 in foreign exchange, which on the open
market would pay for a mere 150,000 tons of petroleum. Plus, Germany could sell
any surplus from its operations in Mexico for hard currency. As long as Germany
took the “necessary precautions,” its Mexican oil concession might even serve as
a source of supply in wartime.80
Opposition to the navy’s plans now came from a former ally—the Economics
Ministry—which tried to convince the Naval High Command to abandon its
quixotic efforts. During an interagency conference on 15 November 1938, the
ministry warned the navy that increasing exports to Mexico to pay for imported
oil could undermine Germany’s overall financial position.81 The German navy
stuck to its guns, but its efforts proved fruitless; the navy and the Dresdner Bank
eventually had to abandon their negotiations with Mexico City for a concession
in the face of implacable opposition from the Economics Ministry, which again
denied the navy’s application for the release of foreign exchange in December
1938.82
There was one other possibility: the Mexicans were still sitting on copious
amounts of oil and willing to sell on the basis of barter with deferred payment.
Through supply contracts with the aforementioned William Davis (who owned
concessions within the rich Poza Rica oil field and had been pushing for closer
German-Mexican commercial relations since 1933), the German navy took full
advantage of the Mexicans’ difficulties following nationalization.83 In the short
run, it acquired extra oil to cover its additional requirements during the Spanish
Civil War. Also, Mexico quickly became an invaluable source of oil for the navy in
its redoubled efforts to find more-accommodating suppliers than the major U.S.
and British companies, such as Shell and Standard Oil, which had been demanding full payment in hard currency since 1937. The navy’s schemes were a thorn
in the side of the major oil companies, which started making vague threats and
sought to discredit Davis.84
The major oil companies also dangled a number of carrots to keep the Third
Reich from violating their boycott against Mexico. Both Standard Oil of New
Jersey and Royal Dutch/Shell (the two foreign firms with the largest interests in
Mexico prior to nationalization) offered to place additional commercial orders
with German firms and accept partial compensation through clearing agreements.85 In August 1938, Shell went farther and made the Third Reich an offer it
could not refuse: Shell would replace any oil imported from Mexico and accept
payment on a clearing basis. The navy was not fooled—Shell’s offer was a ploy to
poison Germany’s relationship with Mexico, which had been a reliable partner
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even during the Sudeten crisis that year. Both Standard and Shell, on the other
hand, had created numerous “difficulties,” including diverting tankers heading
to Germany to Britain. Mexico was also one of the few oil producers willing
to accept payment in Reichsmarks, and if Germany cut ties there, it would be
completely at the mercy of the major U.S. and British oil companies. Rather
than knuckle under to the major companies’ blackmail, the navy pointed out
that “there are in the world thousands of independent oil companies besides
the majors, among which many would be ready under favorable conditions to
undertake the delivery of all manner of fuels to Germany.”86 Economics Minister
Walther Funk did not dispute that his department had sought to maintain good
relations with the major oil companies but countered that this had been done in
accordance with Germany’s overall energy-security strategy, which stressed the
fulfillment of immediate requirements.87
The available evidence seems to support the navy’s argument.
Mexico, particularly under the left-wing president Lázaro Cárdenas,
had little affinity for the Third Reich, but it had to stifle its political
misgivings to make ends meet.88 The Reich imported 649,216 tons of
Mexican petroleum in 1938, compared with 281,266 tons in 1933,
much of it arranged by private firms. Imports continued to rise right
up to the outbreak of the Second World War. Davis’s oil company, for
instance, exported during the first eight months of 1939 1,972,609
Walther Funk at the Nuremberg war
crimes trials
tons of Mexican oil, most of which went to Germany—by now the
U.S. government photo
largest customer for Mexican petroleum products.89 As a result, the
German navy’s reserves of diesel fuel rose from 262,000 tons on 1 January 1938
to 650,000 on war’s eve (about three years’ wartime consumption), even though
its share of domestic German production had not increased.90
By the time the Second World War began, the German navy’s efforts to cover
the differential between its expected wartime consumption and actual domestic
production by stockpiling large quantities of imported oil had, in the assessment
of one historian, been consigned “to the realm of fantasy.”91 Raeder complained
that the other government departments had been “dismissive” of the navy’s suggestions, which he claimed could have provided Germany with the means to accumulate large military and civilian stockpiles. The Economics Ministry, Raeder
contended in a particularly nasty missive of June 1940, had been in the pocket
of the U.S. and British major oil companies, and its policies were “disastrous” for
Germany’s energy security. There was no better proof of the soundness of the
navy’s alternative strategy, Raeder argued, than the fact that Göring had been
forced following the war’s outbreak “to withdraw petroleum from the navy and
transfer it to the economy and other branches of the armed services.”92
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After the war, Raeder bragged that the navy had managed to stockpile roughly
a million tons of petroleum before the war from a variety of sources—“most of
all from Mexico.”93 Was his boasting justified? Yes and no. At the onset of the
Second World War, Germany’s naval fuel reserves were small compared with
those of Japan after Pearl Harbor (forty-three million barrels in total—about 90
percent of which was controlled by the Imperial Japanese Navy) or even Italy in
July 1940 (1,666,674 tons for all three services). These figures worked out to two
years’ wartime consumption, including domestic oil production, for the Japanese
navy and less than five months for the Italian navy (leaving aside army and air
force requirements, and based on the rate of consumption during the first quarter
of 1941, since Italy’s domestic production was minuscule).94
German naval reserves at the start of the war were therefore much smaller in
terms of volume than those of either Italy or Japan, but the German navy could
at least fall back on a burgeoning domestic oil industry (both synthetic and
crude), as well as a share of Romanian oil production. Japan and Italy were not
so fortunate, once they lost access to overseas imports and expended their prewar
reserves. Most importantly, the German navy’s position was much stronger than
that of either its sister services or of the German war economy as a whole. At
least some of the credit is attributable to the navy’s success in securing additional
imports from Mexico before the outbreak of hostilities. The Third Reich went to
war with a reserve stock of only 1,898,000 tons, which amounted to less than six
months’ worth of peacetime consumption.95 As of 25 November 1939, however,
the navy alone possessed reserves of 725,000 cubic meters (cbm—i.e., 6.3 barrels
of oil, or a little less than one ton) of diesel fuel and 382,000 cbm of fuel oil, not
including 50,000 tons of diesel fuel stored abroad. On the basis of the average rate
of consumption during the first three months of the war (8,100 cbm of diesel and
71,500 cbm of fuel oil), and assuming no new construction in 1940, the diesel
reserves including U-boat consumption would have lasted for more than seven
years, while supplies of fuel oil would suffice for five and a half months.96 Sufficient quantities of diesel fuel for U-boats were available until 1944, but the supply
of fuel oil tightened after 1940, when the navy had to start transferring some of its
stocks to the German army and then the Italian navy.97 Like the industrious ant,
the navy was punished for its success by having to support unprepared grasshoppers across Germany and Italy.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND HARD CHOICES
No one can deny that a war machine in the Hydrocarbon Age requires fuel, but
not all fuels are created equal. Nor for that matter are the interests of consumers, even within a single nation, identical. Both historical and contemporary
energy analysts would be wise to avoid a monolithic understanding of the role
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of energy (strategic or otherwise) within a given society. Such an understanding
has unfortunately been the case with the Third Reich. Building on the work of
wartime analysts such as those of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, students of
Germany’s prewar oil policy have focused their attention on the Third Reich’s
development of synthetic fuel from coal as a means of breaking Germany’s dependence on overseas oil sources that were controlled by its enemies, priced in
foreign exchange, and susceptible to blockade in wartime.98
Synthetic fuel did indeed afford Germany a measure of energy independence
on the eve of the Second World War, but only for certain kinds of petroleum
products, namely, lighter fuels, such as gasoline. While the German army and air
force enjoyed considerable benefits from prewar policies, the navy did not and
was forced to pursue imaginative means of securing the diesel fuel and fuel oil it
required but Germany’s domestic synthetic- and crude-oil industries could not
provide. The bitter feud that ensued exposed one of the contradictory tendencies
at the heart of the Third Reich’s supposedly totalitarian approach to rearmament
—one between a dominant, “continental” faction obsessed with “autarky” and a
navy that retained a “maritime” perspective.99 Leaving aside whether its assessments of German prospects in Iraq and Mexico were justified, the navy’s pursuit of
an independent energy-security strategy ran afoul of the overall energy-security
strategy of the Third Reich. That larger strategy sought to appease the U.S. and
British oil companies in peacetime even as it stockpiled supplies and built up its
synthetic-fuel industry to wage a war that would forever free Germany from its
dependence on overseas raw materials—in part by expropriating the assets of the
very companies with which it had traded in peacetime.100
Since the German navy (aside from its U-boats) played a relatively minor role
during the Second World War, it is tempting to dismiss the story of its efforts
to secure oil from Iraq and Mexico during the 1930s as a historical curiosity.101
But this would be a mistake, for those episodes afford us insight concerning
Germany’s wider grand strategy. Germany did not reject a stake in the oil of Iraq
or Mexico merely because of financial constraints. Starting in October 1936,
around the time Ferrostaal began selling off its interest in the BOD, the Third
Reich would expend 574,000,000 RM on synthetic-fuel projects (partially offset
by higher duties on imported crude oil) during just the first year of the so-called
Four-Year Plan of 1936.102 Compared with such astronomical sums, several million Reichsmarks in the form of industrial goods or foreign exchange appears to
have been a relatively small price to pay for hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of tons of Iraqi or Mexican crude oil per year.
The problem, instead, was that the navy’s ambitions clashed with the Third
Reich’s overarching strategy, since the latter was geared for preparing for war at
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the earliest possible time. The German navy’s perspective on energy security was
shaped by the fact that it required years, if not decades, to design and construct
platforms capable of implementing any naval strategy—be it a guerre de course
using cruisers or a “Mahanian” concept centered on capital ships. The navy had
been prepared to wait a decade between the design and commissioning of its first
“pocket battleship” in 1933 (Deutschland); waiting a handful of years while German interests developed new oil fields in Iraq or Mexico was not a tremendous
sacrifice.103
But the Third Reich as a whole had only a narrow window of opportunity
to achieve its continental objectives. This meant that decisions, especially after
1938, concerning the allocation of economic and financial resources would be
made on the basis of Germany’s immediate needs. Such thinking, for instance,
also encouraged the German air force to prioritize the production of medium
and tactical bombers over four-engine heavy bombers, even though German officers shared the prevailing strategic consensus regarding the potential efficacy
of strategic bombing.104 In the case of the navy, whose oil-related schemes would
require considerable time to reach fruition, the Third Reich had no option but
to maintain its businesslike relationship with the U.S. and British major oil companies, which had proved relatively accommodating with regard to Germany’s
crippling shortage of foreign exchange. Their oil might have been more expensive
than that offered by either Iraq or Mexico, but it was available immediately, and
its purchase did not jeopardize relations with other great powers. Within this
context, even Hitler realized that the German navy’s confrontational policies visà-vis the oil companies promised little material gain over the short run, and that
at a potentially high strategic cost.
From the perspective of contemporary energy security, the example of the
German navy before 1939 represents a valuable lesson in resource management
in an era of tight economic and financial constraints. Force development, especially in peacetime, when a nation has yet to mobilize completely, requires hard
choices about whose requirements can be met and at what cost to other national
consumers. In a constrained resource environment, a policy that seeks to maximize advantage for any one service may entail costs that run contrary to interests
of rival institutions. Rather than deluding themselves that it is possible to achieve
security in every area, civilian and military decision makers should recognize the
potential trade-offs that their decisions can have on other institutions residing
under the national security umbrella. Most importantly, they must always be
prepared to adjust their expectations and reconcile their parochial interests to
the evolving demands and priorities of national strategy in a dynamic strategic
environment.
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121

4/21/15 1:50 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

		Salewski, Deutsche Seekriegsleitung, pp. 20–
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Amt, “W. R. Davis, Boston,” 16 April 1936,
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FROGMEN AGAINST A FLEET
The Italian Attack on Alexandria 18/19 December 1941
Vincent P. O’Hara and Enrico Cernuschi

I

n March 1939 Italy’s Regia Marina established a specialized and secret naval
warfare unit called Decima Flottiglia MAS (Motoscafo Anti Sommergibili),
generally known as the 10th Light Flotilla or X MAS. This unit was innovative,
in that it employed selected, highly trained personnel using special weapons and
delivery systems to conduct sneak attacks. On the night of 18 December 1941,
six members of this unit penetrated the main British naval base in the eastern
Mediterranean at Alexandria, Egypt, and disabled the Mediterranean Fleet’s two
battleships, a tanker, and a destroyer. In few military endeavors has so little been
risked to achieve so much. This article examines
the Alexandria action and some of the factors that
Vincent P. O’Hara of Chula Vista, California, is a
naval historian and the author most recently of In
contributed to its success. It also considers how this
Passage Perilous: Malta and the Convoy Battles of
action applies to today’s threat environment.1
June 1942 (2013); coauthor with Enrico Cernuschi
The concept of using stealth and unconvenof Black Phoenix: History and Operations of the
Marina Repubblicana 1943–1945 (2014); and edi- tional weapons to strike enemy forces, especially in
tor of On Seas Contested: The Seven Great Navies
of the Second World War (2010). His work has also port, is an old one. The American Turtle’s daring
appeared in periodicals and annuals including War1776 endeavor against the British ship of the line
ship, MHQ, and Storia Militare. He holds a history
Eagle is a case in point; Paraguay’s use of canoes to
degree from the University of California, Berkeley.
attack a flotilla of Brazilian ironclads during the
Enrico Cernuschi of Pavia, Italy, is a naval historian
War of the Triple Alliance (1866–70) is another. Itand the author of twenty books, most recently “Ultra”: La fine di un mito (2014). He is the coauthor
aly’s innovation, beginning in the First World War,
(with Erminio Bagnasco) of Le navi da guerra Ita
was to institutionalize what had typically been an
liane 1940–1945 (2003) and (with Vincent O’Hara)
ad hoc form of attack by creating special units,
of Black Phoenix. Mr. Cernuschi’s work has appeared in publications including Rivista Marittima,
weapons, and doctrine. Italy never intended that
Storia Militare, and Warship.
unconventional weapons should replace the battle
Naval War College Review, Summer 2015, Vol. 68, No. 3
fleet, only that they supplement it by providing a
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24
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capability for hitting targets the fleet could not reach. During World War II the
Italian battle fleet’s reach was the range of its escorting destroyers, about five
hundred nautical miles—as far east as Crete or Tobruk or the vicinity of Bône to
the west. Alexandria and Gibraltar, the two principal British naval bases in the
Mediterranean, were far beyond this battle zone and also beyond range of any but
harassment air raids. Italy’s naval command had one weapon capable of attacking
British units in these bases—X MAS.
A BRIEF HISTORY
In the First World War the Italian navy made many stealthy attempts to penetrate
Austro-Hungarian naval bases using small units and special weapons. It achieved
several successes, climaxed by the sinking of the dreadnought Viribus Unitis on
1 November 1918 by a Mignatta semisubmersible, two-man attack craft. When
the prospect of war against Great Britain arose in 1935 a cadre of naval officers
looked to this precedent and championed unconventional weapons as representing a way to offset the British Royal Navy’s battleship superiority. Benito Mussolini, Italy’s head of government, and the navy’s chief of staff, Admiral Domenico
Cavagnari, who himself had participated in a special operation to penetrate Pola
on 1 November 1916, endorsed these proposals and allowed research programs
to go forward.
The cadre of officers proceeded to develop or refine a variety of special weapons, such as small motor “crash” boats packed with explosives in their bows.
There were midget submarines and two-man motorboats armed with one or two
torpedoes.2 The weapon used to attack Alexandria was the siluro a lenta corsa
(slow-running torpedo, or SLC). It was twenty-six feet long (see photo 1) and
twenty-one inches in diameter. An electric motor gave it a range of fifteen miles
at 2.3 knots and a maximum speed of three knots. The detachable warhead contained 660 pounds (three hundred kilograms) of explosives. Although the SLC
was superficially similar to the Mignatta, it took advantage of new technology, a
self-contained breathing device known as the ARO (autorespiratore ad ossigeno),
or oxygen breathing apparatus. This was a rebreather system that predated the
Aqua-Lung and had the advantage of not leaving telltale bubbles.3 While the SLC
operated best just breaking the surface, like the Mignatta, the ARO allowed its
operators to submerge the craft as deep as fifteen meters. Thus, the SLC represented a capacity that had not existed before, it was cheap, it was expendable, it
was stealthy, and in 1940 it was unique.
The SLC was colloquially called a maiale (pig) by its operators, because it was
difficult to use and subject to breakdowns. The men who rode this device into
combat had to be excellent swimmers with strong lungs. Their training was intensive. Commander Junio Valerio Borghese (who began the war as captain of the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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PHOTO 1

SLC of the series used at Alexandria being slung on board a pontoon.
Both photos Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, Rome, used by permission

submarine Scirè and became the commander of X MAS and later in 1944 of the
Marina Repubblicana, the post-armistice naval force of Mussolini’s Repubblica
Sociale Italiana) characterized training as “continuous and drastic under difficulties even harder than those expected in action against the enemy.” A U.S. Navy
report produced shortly after the Italian armistice confirmed that SLC operators
required six to eight months of training and that “these training periods presume
that the trainee [already] has certain special qualifications.”4
The original strategic concept behind the Italian special-weapons program
was to attack simultaneously every major British Mediterranean base on the war’s
first day, before the enemy had any hint of the weapons it faced. However, Italy
declared war on 10 June 1940, long before its armed forces were ready. In the case
of X MAS, “given the relative unreliability of the assault equipment and breathing
equipment, insufficient numbers, and equipment worn out by intense training, it
was not until 10 August . . . that the chief of staff ordered [the first operation].”5
Instead of a simultaneous, decisive blow, because of Mussolini’s belief that the war
would be short X MAS was committed piecemeal and prematurely.
For the first special assault action (see map 1), scheduled for the night of 25/26
August 1940, the targets were the Mediterranean Fleet’s three battleships and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24
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aircraft carrier in Alexandria. The submarine Iride sailed to the Gulf of Bomba
in Libya and met there a torpedo boat bringing four SLCs. British aircraft foiled
this operation when a flight of three Swordfish from HMS Eagle sank Iride on 21
August, just after it had fastened the SLCs to its deck and was about to conduct a
test dive preliminary to departing for Alexandria (the SLCs could not withstand
water pressure at depths greater than thirty meters). However, the survivors, who
included X MAS personnel, were eventually able to recover the SLCs (as well as
seven trapped crewmen) from the wreck, which had settled on the bottom at a
depth of fifteen meters.
The next attempt was a double operation against Alexandria and Gibraltar
scheduled for late September 1940. For this mission two submarines, Gondar
and Scirè, were modified to carry three SLCs each in special canisters fitted to
their decks. This adaptation allowed the submarines to dive deeper, because the
canisters had the same pressure resistance as the submarines. The mission, however, was aborted after intelligence discovered that the targeted warships were
away from port. British forces sank Gondar on 29 September as it was returning
to base from the vicinity of Alexandria; its crew and embarked X MAS personnel
were lost or captured.
On 30 October 1940 the surviving modified submarine, Scirè, successfully
released three SLCs off Gibraltar. One, whose compass did not function, was
forced during its approach by a patrol boat to submerge. The patrol boat dropped
an explosive charge nearby, and the concussion caused the SLC to lose depth
keeping and plunge to the bottom, where water pressure collapsed it. The second
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SLC made it to the boom, but when the operator tried to submerge he found that
his ARO and the backup were both inoperative. Consequently, he could not submerge; he scuttled his craft so as not to jeopardize the other attackers. The third
SLC likewise had a faulty ARO, as well as a leak in its battery compartment that
reduced its speed and compromised its buoyancy. Nonetheless, it penetrated the
harbor barrier on the surface. However, when the operator, Lieutenant Gino Birindelli, submerged for the final approach to his target, the battleship Barham, his
SLC became stuck on the bottom about thirty meters short. Dismounting, he was
unable to pull it close enough before carbon monoxide poisoning overcame him.
The charge’s explosion caused no damage, and he and his fellow operator (who
had previously run out of oxygen) were captured. (The other four operators made
it to Spain and thence back to Italy.) Although the captured operators did not disclose any information, the British observed the recovery of the SLCs washed up
on Spanish territory and appreciated them to be some type of manned torpedo.
These setbacks led to system improvements, intensified training, and the exploration of other attack methods. In March 1941 X MAS deployed six one-man
crash boats known as MTMs against British units at Suda Bay, Crete, and sank
the heavy cruiser York and the tanker Pericles. An April 1941 operation against
the Greek port of Corfu involving the first use of the torpedo-armed boats known
as MTSs was a failure. Defects foiled another effort by Scirè and its three SLCs
against Gibraltar on 27 May 1941. The battleships were at sea, so the raid was
launched against commercial shipping anchored in deep water. One SLC could
not start its engine and had to be scuttled. The other two were lost owing to accidents (one operator lost consciousness, causing his SLC to sink, while the other
suddenly plunged to the bottom as the warhead was about to be detached). All
six operators landed safely in Spain.
A large-scale operation followed in July when MAS 451 and 452 (24.5-ton
motor torpedo boats accompanied by a 1.9-ton, two-man MTS torpedo boat),
nine 1.3-ton MTM crash boats, and two SLCs (carried on board an adapted
motorboat called an MTL) attacked Malta.6 Radar (a capacity the Italians lacked
and of which they were largely unaware) having detected the force en route, the
attackers encountered an alerted defense. They lost all craft committed save the
MTS and suffered fifteen killed, including the unit’s commander, and eighteen
captured. This was a great blow to X MAS. The surface elements needed reconstitution, but Scirè and most of the same SLC operators who had participated in the
May operation conducted another strike against Gibraltar on 20 September. Two
crews failed to penetrate the military harbor, being delayed by wind and then by
the need to avoid patrol boats. Instead, they attacked merchant shipping in the
commercial harbor and sank Fiona Shell (2,444 gross register tons, or GRT) and
Durham (10,900 GRT). The third craft did penetrate the harbor but having been
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24
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seriously delayed in the process settled on a larger tanker rather than a battleship.
The operator could have attacked a cruiser, but X MAS command believed that
leaking oil from a tanker could be ignited by small explosive charges, thus causing
more harm. The SLC successfully attached a charge to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary
oiler Denbydale (8,145 GRT), and the subsequent explosion broke the ship’s back.
Although disappointing in terms of its original goals, this successful attack confirmed—both to its operators and to its targets—the SLC’s potential. A breathing
apparatus recovered near Fiona Shell led the British to conclude that the probable
cause of the attack had been “two man submarines.” The port admiral replied
to an Admiralty inquiry about his defensive measures that “until improvement
could be designed and made to net defences, security of the harbour against
miniature submarines depended on firing of explosive charges in the entrance.
This is now being done at both gates by separate boats at very short intervals.”7
THE SITUATION
By the end of 1941 Italy was losing a desperate struggle to supply the ItaloGerman army in North Africa. A combination of surface ships, aircraft, and
submarines was so effectively blocking Italian shipping that in the month of
November 1941 only 38 percent of materiel (29,813 of 79,208 tons) sent to Libya
arrived.8 The Italian high command plotted a number of actions to redress the
situation. These included changes to convoying patterns, the use of the battle fleet
to escort convoys, and an SLC attack against the British naval base at Alexandria.
By this time, X MAS had fifteen months of wartime experience. Its equipment,
especially the SLCs and AROs, had been modified to account for problems that
had affected past missions. Despite the several failures, morale was high, and
every SLC operator in the force volunteered for the Alexandria mission.
On 3 December 1941 Scirè, under Borghese, departed La Spezia ostensibly on
an ordinary training cruise. That night, well away from shore, a lighter loaded
with three SLCs rendezvoused with the six-hundred-ton submarine. After fitting the SLCs into their canisters, Scirè proceeded to the Italian base of Leros in
the Aegean. It tried to avoid contact with enemy vessels, but there was one close
call: on 9 December an aircraft of the Royal Air Force 201st Group sighted Scirè
on the surface. The Italian crew greeted the enemy aircraft with waves and the
day’s correct Aldis-lamp recognition signal. The aircraft reported: “A U-boat
bearing ‘GONDAR2’ features was spotted South of Crete. . . . This particular
U-boat was challenged by the aircraft and answered with a green light signal
which was the correct signal for the day; she was therefore not molested.”9 The
submarine knew the correct signal because Italian naval intelligence had broken
the Royal Navy tactical code, designated QBC, which was used to communicate
such information.10
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On 12 December the SLC operators flew from Italy to Leros and met Scirè
there. They had traveled separately because experience had shown that specialcraft crews reacted poorly to prolonged submarine voyages, because the recycled
air and lack of exercise compromised their all-important lung capacity. On 14
December, in the dark of the moon, Scirè sailed for Alexandria. After receiving
final confirmation that the battleships were in port, Borghese maneuvered to the
preplanned position, 2,400 meters off the Eastern (commercial) Harbor.
The Allied intelligence source ULTRA had given little hint of the operation,
because the main Italian naval ciphers and codes were secure. The decryption
of a German report regarding a reconnaissance flight over Alexandria led the
Admiralty to issue a general attack warning to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham on the afternoon of the 18th. A member of the crew of the battleship Queen
Elizabeth, Midshipman Frank Wade, later recalled that the crew was mustered on
the quarterdeck that evening and warned to watch out for anything suspicious.
However, “The reaction in the mess was one of unconcern. How the devil did
they think that they could penetrate a harbour as well protected and defended
as this one was, with its very substantial entrance boom? We further consoled
ourselves with thoughts of proverbial Italian inefficiency, and by ten o’clock had
forgotten all about the matter.”11
That very evening, at 2030 (8:30 PM) on 18 December, Scirè released the SLCs
off the commercial harbor as planned. There was a problem with the door of
one of the canisters, and a reserve diver nearly drowned, but the six operators
and their three “pigs” set off. They traveled in company on the surface nearly
twelve kilometers along the Ras el Tin Peninsula and thence along a breakwater
to the military harbor entrance. The plan called for securing explosives beneath
the target hulls and setting the fuses for 0600 (6 AM). In addition, all three SLCs
were to distribute incendiary devices timed to detonate an hour after their main
charges had exploded. The planners hoped these would ignite drifting oil and
cause a massive conflagration that would damage more shipping in the port and
spread to shore facilities. (This aspect of the plan was based on experiments made
with Italian fuel oil. An attempt to ignite Denbydale’s oil at Gibraltar had failed,
however, and analysis of the higher-quality fuel used by the British would have
demonstrated this scheme’s futility.) After attacking, the operators were to sink
their SLCs and make for shore. The submarine Zaffiro was to loiter off Rosetta
some days hence to give the operators a chance to steal a small boat and reach it.
THE ATTACK
There was considerable traffic in and out of Alexandria Harbor on the night of
18/19 December (see map 2). The boom was open from 2122 to 2359 to permit
the exit of the tug Roysterer and then the entry of the damaged sloop Flamingo,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

Summer2015Review.indb 125

130

4/21/15 1:50 PM

126

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2015 Review

MAP 2
m 2030
00
4,5

s
Ra

el

T in

Woolwich

Medway
Resource

destroyers
2300

French cruisers
cruiser
dry dock
Jervis
Sagona
Queen
Elizabeth
g li
a

tta

nn

Ma

Pe
a
De
l

l

r te
lo

e

Valiant

rc
Ma

e

Lorraine

cruisers

xxxxxx

boom

xxxxx

0040

SLC Attack on Alexandria
18/19 December 1941

1,000 m

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

Summer2015Review.indb 126

O’Hara 2014

131

4/21/15 1:50 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

O’ HA R A & C E R N U S C H I

127

assisted by Roysterer and another tug. It opened again at 0024 for the 15th Cruiser
Squadron, Naiad and Euryalus, and for the destroyers Sikh, Legion, Maori, and
Isaac Sweers, which were returning from an unsuccessful attempt to engage an
Italian convoy. The SLCs reached the boom shortly after midnight and encountered a large motorboat that was patrolling and periodically dropping small
explosive charges. Lieutenant Luigi Durand de la Penne, the operator of the SLC
assigned to attack Valiant and commander of the three crews, later described this
development as “rather worrisome.”12 As he was inspecting the defenses, navigational aids suddenly illuminated, and he saw three destroyers begin entering at
ten knots. Although SLCs had twice penetrated Gibraltar’s barrier defense, De la
Penne decided to enter on the surface though the open boom. This was dangerous
—he was tossed about by the bow waves of two of the ships. The second SLC,
piloted by Captain (Naval Engineers) Antonio Marceglia and assigned to attack
Queen Elizabeth, had to avoid a destroyer, as did the third. That SLC, piloted by
Captain (Naval Weapons) Vincenzo Martellotta, was assigned an aircraft carrier
or, failing that, a large tanker. Martellotta passed within twenty meters of the
patrol boat. Shocks from the explosive charges discomforted all three pilots, but
the craft entered without being harmed or detected. Once inside the three SLCs
made their separate ways to their targets.
Marceglia had to cover 2,200 meters to reach Queen Elizabeth. He passed between a line of cruisers and the shore, navigating by such landmarks as the French
battleship Lorraine, and reached the net protecting his target. After exploring the
perimeter, he found a gap and at 0300 donned his ARO and plunged his SLC into
the darkness of the water. He would write, “The balance of the apparatus was
awkward, its speed of fall increased as we descended, and I could not hold it with
the rudders, perhaps because there was not enough forward thrust. I felt a sharp
pain in the ear; finally we touched bottom in 13 meters raising a cloud of mud.”13
From there Marceglia and his copilot worked to detach the explosive charge and
suspend it from the hull. There were a few mishaps. The SLC was fed air to bring
it upward to where the weapon was to be attached but rose out of control and
crashed “violently” into Queen Elizabeth’s hull. The copilot got sick before the job
was finished (the copilots, who occupied the rear seat, were submerged for much
longer [see photo 2] and consequently forced to use their AROs more). Marceglia, however, finished the job of slinging the charge on a cable clamped to the
battleship’s bilge keels. At 0325 he set the fuse. The two men escaped on their SLC
along the harbor bottom until, concerned about the copilot’s condition, Marceglia surfaced. They scattered their small explosive charges, scuttled their craft as
planned, and swam to shore, reaching land at 0430 after eight hours in the water.
De la Penne’s team had problems. As he came to within fifty meters of Valiant
he encountered “an obstruction of type unknown to me where the floats had
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24
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PHOTO 2

An SLC training in autumn 1941. The rear copilot was often submerged even operating on the surface.

spherical shapes of about 30 centimeters in diameter and supported a steel cable.
On the cable was hanging a rope net of 4–5 mm diameter.” He finally passed his
SLC over the top. “The cable and net got tangled with the clamps and propeller
and made a lot of noise. Finally, the [SLC] broke free and I got back on board and
headed for the funnel of the ship.”14 De la Penne hurried, because there was a tear
in his rubber suit; water was leaking in and body heat leaking out. It was about
0200. He submerged and bumped against Valiant’s hull but then lost control of
the SLC, and it fell to the soft and muddy bottom at a depth of seventeen meters.
After checking his position relative to the battleship, De la Penne unsuccessfully
tried to get the craft’s motor started. When he ordered his copilot, Chief Petty
Officer First Class Emilio Bianchi, to check whether the propeller was free, he
realized he was alone. Bianchi had fainted. De la Penne next tried to drag the
SLC under the battleship’s keel. It was an impossible task, and when the lieutenant
started to become overwhelmed by the effects of breathing pure oxygen at too
great a depth (not to mention physical exhaustion) he swam to the surface, where
he found Bianchi clinging to a mooring buoy, having inadvertently surfaced.
They were noticed and captured a few minutes later. Luckily for the Italians, De
la Penne’s “pig” had sunk less than ten meters from Valiant’s hull—near enough
to serve, as he had hoped, as a bottom mine.
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Martellotta’s SLC navigated along the shore following much the same route
as Marceglia’s. He slipped between Valiant and Queen Elizabeth and checked the
carrier berth. Finding it empty, he saw what he believed to be a third battleship.
He would write in his report, “At a certain moment I reached, near enough, the
bow of a large warship that seemed like a battleship that I had not seen before, at
a greater distance, because of the dark background. Noting clear distinctions between the two battleships that were the objectives of De la Penne and Marceglia,
I was sure that I had before me a different ship. I considered it my duty to attack
it, even if by doing so I disobeyed my operational orders.”15 However, Martellotta soon concluded he was looking at a cruiser, not a battleship, and that this
target did not justify violating his orders. So, in a demonstration of discipline, he
sought a tanker, although he would have much preferred attacking the warship.
(Incidentally, the difficulty of distinguishing between a cruiser and a battleship
at night from a small and virtually submerged craft should not be discounted.)
In the end he settled on the large Norwegian oiler Sagona (7,554 GRT). Unable
to submerge because of problems with his ARO, Martellotta kept his craft near
the oiler’s stern while the copilot fastened the charge beneath it. He set the fuse
at 0255. The men then scattered explosive charges, scuttled the SLC, and swam
for shore.
Egyptian police arrested Martellotta and his copilot shortly after they landed
and later handed them over to the British (Italy and Egypt were not at war).
Marceglia’s team stayed at large for two days. Although dressed in Italian navy
fatigue uniforms, they claimed to be French to anyone who asked. They took the
train to Rosetta on the coast, hoping to make the rendezvous with Zaffiro, but
Egyptian police arrested them.
The capture of De la Penne and his copilot, Bianchi, two and a half hours
before their charge exploded gave the British an opportunity to mitigate the attack’s worst consequences. According to De la Penne, the Italian captives waited
on board Valiant while an Italian-speaking officer, Sublieutenant S. T. Nowson,
was summoned from Queen Elizabeth. Nowson asked where the Italians had
come from and expressed ironic sympathy for their lack of luck. They were taken
ashore, accompanied by Nowson and Valiant’s skipper, Captain Charles Morgan,
to the intelligence offices at Ras el Tin. There they were questioned separately by
Major Humphrey Quill, Royal Marines, Staff Officer Intelligence (Levant). According to De la Penne, Quill kept a gun in hand and spoke excellent Italian. The
captives revealed nothing, and Quill concluded that there was no evidence they
had been successful. Meanwhile, at 0332, according to a Royal Navy staff history
published in 1957, “a general signal was made that the presence of ‘human torpedoes’ in the harbor was suspected.” This signal repeated previous instructions
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for patrol boats to drop explosive charges “if required” and ordered tugs to raise
steam. All ships were to pass lines along their bottoms to snag any suspended
charges.16 In his memoirs, Cunningham states that he was awoken at 0400 with
news of the capture. He ordered the prisoners immediately returned to Valiant
and confined deep within the battleship so that if there was a danger, they would
reveal it to save their own skins. Midshipman Wade on board Queen Elizabeth
was to remember that “we were all rudely awakened at 0400 by the alarm rattlers
buzzing us to action stations and a bugler blowing the alarm.” He saw Cunningham, who “had hastened up from his cabin in a raincoat over his pyjamas.”17
Valiant passed a line along its hull, but because the charge was resting on the
harbor floor, the line hit nothing. Queen Elizabeth’s line snagged. These measures were taken after the Italian captives were returned to Valiant from their
second questioning. During this whole time the British never confiscated De la
Penne’s “water-tight luminous wristwatch.” When ten minutes remained before
the expected blast, he asked to see Captain Morgan and told him his ship would
be sinking shortly but refused to give more information. Morgan sent him back
down below. De la Penne later recorded that as he was returned to his prison in
the ship’s bowels he heard the loudspeakers ordering the crew to abandon ship.18
The charge under Sagona exploded at 0547, followed by Valiant at 0606 and
Queen Elizabeth at 0610. De la Penne, who was belowdecks on board Valiant,
describes the moment: “The vessel reared, with extreme violence. All the lights
went out and the hold became filled with smoke. . . . The vessel was listing to
port.” He was knocked off his feet and injured his knee but climbed a ladder and
found an open hatchway abandoned by its sentry. He reached the weather deck
(Bianchi, in a separate compartment, survived the blast unharmed) in time to see
the effect of the explosion beneath Queen Elizabeth, moored five hundred yards
away. “[It,] too, blew up. She rose a few inches out of the water and fragments of
iron and other objects flew out of her funnel, mixed with oil which even reached
the deck of the Valiant, splashing everyone of us standing on her stern.” Admiral
Cunningham later wrote, “When I was right aft in the Queen Elizabeth by the
ensign staff, I felt a dull thud, and was tossed about five feet into the air by the
whip of the ship [that is, violent flexing of the hull, most severe at bow and stern]
and was lucky not to come down sprawling.” According to Wade, “there was the
low, rumbling underwater explosion and the quarterdeck was thrown upwards
about six inches, maybe more. . . . A blast of thick smoke and flame shot out the
funnel. Then the ship seemed to settle rapidly.19
On Queen Elizabeth the explosion ripped up the keel plates under B boiler
room and damaged an area 190 feet by sixty feet. Boiler rooms A, B, and X and
the 4.5-inch magazine rapidly flooded. Boiler room Y “and numerous other
compartments slowly flooded up to the main deck level.” The ship assumed a
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4.5-degree starboard list and settled eight feet by the bow. Valiant’s port-side protective lower hull-bulge structure had been holed, “blown into the ship over an
area of 60 ft. by 30 ft.” The lower bulge, inner bottom, shell room A and its magazine, and adjacent compartments had immediately flooded, causing the ship to
go down five feet by the bow. Sagona was holed aft, and its propeller shafts and
rudder were badly damaged. It was not repaired until 1946. The destroyer Jervis,
moored alongside the oiler, suffered a twisted bow; plates in the communications
mess deck and other compartments were blown in, and a fire was ignited in the
paint stores. Jervis required a month in dry dock.20
Valiant occupied Alexandria’s floating dry dock until April 1942, when it
moved to Durban, South Africa, to continue repairs and refit. The battleship returned to service with the Eastern Fleet in August 1942. Queen Elizabeth emerged
from dock on 27 June 1942 and sailed to Norfolk, Virginia, for permanent repairs.
Its first fleet operations occurred in January 1944.
Whom to blame? On 24 October 1941 the Admiralty had warned Alexandria
that “after the success obtained at Gibraltar it was considered likely that an attack
by human torpedoes and/or one-man motor boats will be attempted at Alexandria.”21 A Type 271 radar set was allocated to Alexandria to aid in the detection
of surface intruders, but seemingly more-pressing needs prevented it from being
dispatched before the Italian attack. As related above, the Admiralty issued a second warning on 18 December, but this was taken as a formality.
The subsequent inquiry, headed by Cunningham’s former second in command, Vice Admiral H. D. Pridham-Wippell, concluded that the fault lay in a
lack of advanced technology. Protection against such attacks “must not rely on
the comparatively out-of-date methods of lookouts, boats and nets. Warning of
approach by modern scientific methods was essential.” Pridham-Wippell also
blamed several junior officers. For instance, the harbor-entrance booms had been
left open “for an unnecessarily long period” due to “inefficient control exercised
by the Duty Defence Officer.” The commander of the solitary patrol boat at the
entrance was found at fault for not “firing more charges during the period” when
traffic was entering the harbor. (Pridham-Wippell did not question the actions
taken after De la Penne and Bianchi were captured two and a half hours before
the first explosion, and he exonerated Cunningham.)22 Midshipman Wade’s
observations suggest that complacency was a factor: “All of us thought that the
Italian navy was hopeless, inefficient, and even cowardly.”23 The British command
also suggested that treachery played a part. For example, prisoner investigations
produced a report that a French sailor on Lorraine had illuminated an SLC but
then merely “pointed down the harbour towards the battleships.” Then, the interrogation report continued, a “rowing boat with a native crew” had passed an SLC
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24
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so close the operator was hit by an oar, but the contact had never been reported.
In fact, however, both incidents were misinformation the prisoners fed to their
interrogators, eagerly accepted and uncritically passed along.24
The next SLC attack on Alexandria, conducted on 14/15 May 1942, was to fail,
in large part because extensive use of searchlights forced the craft to operate submerged and thereby threw them far behind schedule. As it turned out, vigilance
was the best defense.25
THE AFTERMATH
The immediate British priority after the attack was to prevent the enemy from
learning its results. Because Queen Elizabeth had settled on a level bottom, Admiral Cunningham stayed on board, and the ship’s company continued such
routines as the ceremony of hoisting the colors each morning. However, as Admiral Philip Vian later recalled, “Standing with [Cunningham] . . . on the cloudless morning after the disaster we saw, high above the harbour, a reconnaissance
machine which had eluded the defences. The battleships had settled on the bed
of the harbour, with submarines alongside supplying them with electric power:
a photograph would reveal disaster.”26 Indeed, photographs did show a scene
similar to that of Taranto Harbor after the British November 1940 air attack; the
Italian naval command’s initial assessment was that both battleships had been
damaged. Further reconnaissance on 6 January 1942 confirmed this, and the
first bulletin claiming success followed on 8 January. The Germans, however,
had their doubts. Throughout December the German naval staff, unaware that
U-331 had sunk the battleship Barham on 25 November 1941, believed that the
Mediterranean Fleet had three battleships available. The German command first
acknowledged the X MAS attack on 9 January, calling it a “considerable success.”
However, as late as 27 January it was cautioning that “radio intelligence reports
that there is no confirmation of the intelligence report according to which the
Queen Elizabeth sank in shallow water in Alexandria. According to the reports
from other sources, the battleship had repeatedly been at sea after 18 Dec. while
the Valiant was undergoing repairs in dock.”27
Success Must Be Exploited
The British navy strategist Julian Corbett wrote in 1911 that “command of the
sea . . . means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether
for commercial or military purposes.”28 At this time Italy’s naval priority was to
deliver supplies to the Italo-German army in North Africa. As related, by midNovember 1941 the British had come close to choking Italian communications
with Africa. In December 1941 the Regia Marina took several steps to regain
command of the central Mediterranean. The attack on Alexandria was one. It
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was preceded by the use of battleships to escort convoys. The practicality of the
latter was confirmed on 17 December in a brief sunset skirmish since known
as the first battle of Sirte. British cruisers and destroyers retreated after coming under fire from Italian battleships. British forces did not counterattack that
night, which convinced the Italian command that the big guns were an effective
deterrent despite what sailors called the enemy’s occhio elettrico (electric eye).
An unanticipated sea-denial victory followed on the same day as the Alexandria
attack, when the British cruisers and destroyers of Force K, based in Malta, ran
into an Italian minefield off Tripoli; one cruiser and one destroyer were lost, and
another two cruisers were damaged.
This trio of Italian victories of 17–19 December, especially the one at Alexandria, left the British without an answer to Italy’s battleship-escorted convoys. As
Admiral Cunningham expressed himself in a letter to the First Sea Lord, Admiral
Dudley Pound, on 28 December, “The damage to the battleships at this time is
a disaster.” Rome had claimed sea command and reestablished communications
with Africa. This new reality was demonstrated by the fact that in December
39,092 tons, or 82 percent of materiel shipped by Italy to Africa, arrived, and
in January 65,570 tons, or nearly 100 percent. The victory also enabled Italy to
blockade British communications from Alexandria to Malta. Prior to the Alexandria attack—from August 1940 to December 1941—all thirty-seven merchant
ships that departed Egyptian ports for Malta had arrived. After Alexandria and
up through the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa nearly a year
later, twenty-five merchant ships sailed from Egypt for Malta but only eight (32
percent) arrived. The Italian battleships delayed British convoys in February and
March, leading to increased losses from air strikes, and in June they repulsed
the large Vigorous convoy. The threat of battleship intervention prevented the
dispatch from Egypt of any convoys at all between late March and mid-June and
from June to late November 1942.29
Another logical response to the disabling of enemy capital-ship strength
would be to follow up with an operation that only capital ships could counter.
Truthfully, however, Italy had few practical options in this regard. Gibraltar and
the Egyptian coast were out of range. The Germans, however, always ready to
risk Italian assets, believed that the Regia Marina could have sent its battleships
against Alexandria or the Suez Canal. “Without making allowances for oil shortages or the unwillingness of the Italian Naval Staff to take risks . . . the Italian
fleet is fully capable of carrying out such operations if it makes use of the Gulf
of Suda.”30 The Italian staff, however, could not see what possible reward would
justify such a risk, and with the benefit of hindsight, they were clearly correct.
A much better option would have been to invade Malta, which the Axis powers
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indeed planned to do in late July 1942. Such an operation could have occurred
without intervention by British surface forces, but in this instance it was the German high command that was unwilling to take the risk, and the invasion was
canceled.
The Sincerest Form of Flattery
X MAS continued attacking (or attempting to attack) targets—in Gibraltar, Algiers, Alexandria, Bône, Palestine, and Alexandretta (in Turkey), off the coast of
Libya, and in the Black Sea. After December 1941 these efforts resulted in the
sinking of one destroyer and the sinking or damaging of eighteen merchant vessels totaling nearly 100,000 GRT. In October 1942 the British mounted their first
special stealth attack against the German battleship Tirpitz, using a direct copy of
the SLC they called the Chariot. For their part, the Germans deployed a multitude
of stealth weapons as the war went on, although with limited success. Meanwhile,
after the armistice, both the Regia Marina and the Marina Repubblicana undertook a number of such operations; in the case of the Regia Marina, these included
joint operations with their former enemies. In fact, De la Penne participated in a
British-Italian attack on German-held La Spezia in June 1944 that resulted in the
sinking of a hulked heavy cruiser. When De la Penne was awarded Italy’s highest
military decoration in May 1945, Admiral Charles Morgan, Valiant’s ex-skipper,
pinned the medal on his chest.
Expensive Weapons and Asymmetrical Threats
The attack on Alexandria was a case of expensive weapon systems facing threats
they were not designed to meet. This situation has been replicated often since
the end of the Second World War. If the repercussions have been far less severe,
in part this is because Alexandria was a blow by a major power in a large-scale,
conventional conflict for the highest of stakes. A review of unconventional attacks on warships involving crash boats or swimmers since 1945 shows that most
are carried out by small powers or political movements and for political as often
as military reasons.
• 22 October 1948: Egyptian sloop Farouq attacked at Gaza by Israeli explosive
boats
• 22 August 1975: Argentine destroyer Santissima Trinidad mined by guerrilla
swimmers
• 29 October 1980: Libyan frigate Dat Assawari mined in Genoa by unidentified swimmers (probably French)
• 16 July 1990: Sri Lankan auxiliary Edithara damaged by Tamil insurgent
(LTTE) explosive boats
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• 16 July 1995: Sri Lankan auxiliary Edithara mined and sunk by LTTE swimmers
• 19 July 1996: Sri Lankan gunboat Ranaviru sunk by LTTE explosive boats
• 12 October 2000: Guided-missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) damaged by
Al Qaeda explosive boat.
These cases demonstrate that, in crude terms, a rubber boat with a pair of
men and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher can cripple a destroyer. This is not
to suggest replacing a flotilla of modern warships (even a single frigate) with a
swarm of Boston Whalers. What it means is that every commander, admiral, and
politician must consider unconventional threats everywhere and at any time. The
real danger of politically motivated attacks is the possibility that risk management
may exercise a paralyzing effect on the use of major warships.
While warships make attractive targets for religious or political groups plotting blows against prestigious symbols of Western military power, this implies a
threat of a type different from that represented by the Italian X MAS commandos. The North Koreans and Iranians have war plans, and these include blows
by unconventional forces and probably special weapons—serious threats, but
such midgrade powers cannot aspire to sea control. A major power like Russia
or China, however, with the budget and resources to deploy carriers and nuclear
submarines, is another matter. One point of this study is that this most successful
unconventional attack in 1941 had a very conventional foundation. It suggests
that the real concern is not Al Qaeda or even North Korea but a great power that
plans, as the Italians did, to neutralize a rival’s main strength using unconventional weapons.
Today, the foundation of the sea control exerted by the United States and its
allies is the aircraft carrier. It is a foundation that rests on relatively few hulls.
There are only ten large American carriers, three of them generally out of service
in “Drydock Planned Incremental Availability” status, with the old Kitty Hawk in
reserve. NATO can contribute only the French Charles de Gaulle and the Italian
Cavour. This shoestring force is far smaller than the one possessed by the Allies
in World War II even after the multiple disasters of December 1941. Considering how far-flung are the theatres of crisis, between the Far East, the Middle
East, and Eastern Europe, these capital ships provide a thin margin of security
for such perilous times. The Western powers are clearly vulnerable: a successful
unconventional blow by a first-class power with the conventional forces to take
advantage of the damage wrought could make a difference in any future contest
for control of the seas.
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grand strategy and world order
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From the end of the Cold War in 1989–91 and with increasing urgency in
the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001, perhaps few subjects seemed
more important to those who frame and study strategy than developing a new
American grand strategy for the twenty-first century. Who would play the role
of George Washington in his Farewell Address advising Americans to steer clear
of permanent alliances (he did not say “entangling alliances”—that was Thomas
Jefferson’s phrase in his first inaugural message; Washington’s brilliant speechwriter, Alexander Hamilton, accepted that temporary alliances might be necessary or advisable from time to time, but feared to
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the next Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan watching the simultaneous decline of the
British Empire and rises of imperial Japan and imperial Germany? Who would
warn Americans that they would need to take responsibility to protect their
maritime trade and enforce the Monroe Doctrine by developing a navy second
to none, one that might often work in concert with other states in a “naval consortium,” a proto-NATO, so to speak, of great powers? Who would be the next
Harry S. Truman, Richard Nixon, or Ronald Reagan, each proclaiming his own
doctrine, to aid free peoples against external invasion or internal subversion in
Truman’s case, or to demand that other peoples supply the ground forces for their
own defense in the case of Nixon, or to insist that what is good for the goose is
also good for the gander, that the Americans might use insurgents in a proxy war
in Afghanistan to bleed the Soviets just as the Soviets had used insurgents in a
proxy war to bleed the Americans in Vietnam? Above all, who would be the next
George Kennan advocating containment of the Soviets as a Sun Tzuian strategy
to win a global conflict without fighting a third world war?
So far, no one has been able to explain a viable grand strategy for America in
our time, though not for lack of trying. The two books under review supply some
insight into why we have failed so far and what would be necessary to craft such
a strategy, however, so they deserve careful analysis.
Hal Brands has written a “breakout” book, the sort any mere assistant professor
in America today would love to have written. He begins by asking, “What good is
grand strategy?” Is it possible to have grand strategy in a world of exponentially
increasing flux? Might not a case-by-case approach be better, something like the
maxim “Don’t do stupid stuff!” espoused by some in the Obama administration?
Would it even be desirable to have such a strategy if it became a doctrine that
prevented adapting to events and trends not merely beyond American control but
also beyond anyone’s power to predict? And what, precisely, do we mean by grand
strategy anyway? Not without reason, Brands observes, experts—perhaps practitioners especially—often laugh at the very idea of anything like grand strategy
as either a “quixotic” or even a “pernicious” pursuit. “The result of all this is that
discussions of grand strategy are often confused or superficial. Too frequently,
they muddle or obscure what they mean to illuminate” (page vii).
Following Clausewitz, Brands sees the purpose of strategic theory as clarifying
“concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled” (page 1). After a
brief history of the development of the concept of grand strategy in the works of
such writers as J. F. C. Fuller, Edward Mead Earle, Basil Liddell Hart, and Colin
Gray, he defines grand strategy as “the intellectual architecture that gives form
and structure to foreign policy. . . . From this intellectual calculus flows policy,
the various concrete initiatives—diplomacy, the use of force, others—through
which states interact with foreign governments and peoples” (page 3). In other
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words, it is the conceptual framework, a mental map, so to speak, that helps states
determine where they want to go and how they ought to get there, all the while
accepting that chance, friction, and the reactions of foreign governments and
even nonstate actors, not to mention partisan politics at home, compel statesmen to tack, like sailors, trying to steer a constant course to reach their desired
destination.
With this understanding of the purpose of grand strategy in mind, the bulk
of Brands’s book is about helping us tell the difference between good and bad
grand strategy, so we can embrace the former and reject the latter the next time
either is proposed. In further refining his definition, he establishes some provisional criteria for critical analysis. Grand strategy is the “conceptual logic” that
ensures all the instruments of statecraft, including particular foreign policies,
are orchestrated to maximize benefits to a nation’s core interests—including
and with highest priority in the United States, a free way of life at home. Grand
strategy provides a crucial link between medium- and long-term goals. It is obsessed with the relation between means and ends, capabilities and objectives. It
is as much a process as a single principle—and an interactive process especially,
because to stay on course, it requires constant reassessment and adaptation to
the initiatives of adversaries and unpredictable, or at least unpredicted, events.
It operates no less in peacetime than in wartime, because one must go to war
with the tools developed in peace and using those tools well can make war less
likely or necessary. Because resources are always finite, and overstretch a constant
danger, grand strategy must establish priorities, like defeating Germany first in
the Second World War. With such a holistic perspective, it can liberate statesmen
from doctrine, dogma, and “theateritis” (page 8), all of which might lead to sacrificing higher ends to lower means. And it is not a magic bullet. All statesmen
work within constraints, sometimes from domestic politics, sometimes from
bureaucracies, sometimes from allies and other foreign countries, and not least of
all, from their very humanity. As human beings, their fate is bounded rationality,
the limits to their ability to understand a protean universe (pages 4–16, 190–206).
These criteria did not arise like Athena from Zeus’s head. They arose from
experience, or rather, an interrogation of history. Although never perfect, they
provide a rough-and-ready basis to evaluate grand strategy, which Brands does
by holding up to these standards the administrations of Harry S. Truman, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush. Brands
has two success stories, more or less: the Truman and Reagan administrations,
the bookend presidencies of the Cold War. The Truman era is sometimes treated
as a “golden age” for American grand strategy. Giants seemed to walk the earth:
George Kennan, George C. Marshall, Paul Nitze, Dean Acheson, and many others who were “present at the creation” of the grand strategy of containment, a
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middle ground between appeasement and war. Bit by bit and year by year, the
leaders of the Truman administration created “situations of strength.” They
revitalized Europe with the Marshall Plan, built NATO, brought Japan into the
greater American coprosperity sphere, and generally ensured that in the age of
industrial warfare, the key centers of industrial power outside the Soviet Union
were aligned with the United States. Whether consciously or unconsciously,
they followed Halford Mackinder in their determination to prevent any single
country from dominating the Eurasian landmass. A concomitant danger was
overextension, with the United States, in the words of one American official,
“stretched from hell to breakfast” around the globe. That containment meant
restraining the United States, not merely the Soviet Union, was a Kennanesque
subtlety many did not understand. So Americans had to learn the hard way from
overextension in Korea that they needed to set priorities (some theaters—Europe
and Japan—were more important than others, like the Asian mainland, including
China and Korea). And money was often more important than arms, especially if
it enabled allies to take on the burden of defending themselves, and the strength
of the American economy was always the American comparative advantage, or
Clausewitzian center of gravity, in the Cold War. Perhaps most important, the
Truman administration was capable of learning from its mistakes and adapting
to unanticipated challenges, like the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949
and Chinese intervention on the side of North Korea in the Korean War. Timely
reassessments led to enacting much of NSC-68, calling for the largest peacetime
military buildup in American history, and to settling for limited objectives in
Korea, thus enabling the United States to refocus on Europe, the primary theater
of the Cold War.
The opposite bookend for the Cold War is the Reagan administration from
1981 to 1989. Did this administration have a grand strategy? Some dismiss Reagan as a mere ideologue, or even caricature him as an anti-intellectual buffoon
more fortunate in his timing than skillful in his statecraft. Brands demurs. After
American defeat in Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Soviet expansion in such far-flung places as Angola, the momentum of the Cold War appeared to many, not merely Reagan, to have shifted in the Soviets’ favor. Yet Reagan especially had an acute understanding that the Soviet Union was far weaker
than it had looked in the late 1970s. Reagan and his advisers sensed that the United States could take advantage of that weakness by exerting military, economic,
political, and ideological pressure—not to bring about the regime’s collapse,
though some hoped this might happen, but rather to provide diplomatic leverage
to moderate Soviet behavior and reduce Cold War tensions. Thus, for example,
the Reagan-era arms buildup was designed not merely to close the “window of
vulnerability” presumed to arise from Soviet advances in missile technology but
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also to increase the economic strains on the Soviet system, which spent at least 20
percent of its GDP (and probably much, much more) on the military in the early
1980s. Henry Rowen at the CIA, and Caspar Weinberger and Andrew Marshall
at the Pentagon, developed what Marshall called a “cost-imposing strategy” that
would confront the Soviets with a painful dilemma: concede defeat in the arms
race or overstretch their economy in an effort to keep pace (page 112).
For Reagan, the Strategic Defense Initiative, a.k.a. “Star Wars,” was an end in
itself. He deplored the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, was determined
to find an alternative to it, and would never bargain it away, even when Soviet
leader Gorbachev offered generous concessions. Nonetheless, those concessions
arose, in part, from Gorbachev’s own awareness that the arms race was moving in a new direction in which the Soviets could not compete at a price they
could afford. And Gorbachev was not the only one to change. From the ABLE
ARCHER crisis of 1983, in which the Soviets misinterpreted a NATO exercise as
the beginning of a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, Reagan learned
to recalibrate American policy. He understood that the successful negotiations
he sought would be possible only if he toned down his rhetoric (pages 124–25).
This reassessment led to five summits between Reagan and Gorbachev between
1985 and 1988. Although the administration’s accomplishments were sullied by
the Iran-Contra scandal, the results of Reagan speaking more softly while carrying an ever bigger stick were stunning. By the time he left office, the world was
a much safer place, with the Soviets agreeing to eliminate all intermediate-range
nuclear forces in Europe, accepting deep cuts in their strategic arsenals, withdrawing from Afghanistan and other third-world conflicts, unilaterally reducing
their conventional forces, and signaling a commitment to self-determination in
Eastern Europe and liberalization at home.
Brands also looks at two cases that deserve to be counted as failures. For
Brands, President Nixon and his brilliant national security adviser (later Secretary of State), Henry Kissinger, failed because they were too heroic; President
George W. Bush and his national security team because their strategy was too
grand. It is difficult to imagine a more unlikely team than Nixon and Kissinger.
The former began his political career as the sort of red-baiting demagogue
Kissinger could only detest. As a European émigré and Harvard intellectual,
Kissinger represented everything in the so-called East Coast establishment that
Nixon despised. Yet they had one important thing in common. They believed
that extraordinary individuals could change the course of history, so Nixon was
fascinated by the drama of the “big play” (like the opening to China) that could
cut through the daily morass of politics. Kissinger, the archpolitical realist, had
an almost romantic vision of the lonely statesman imposing his vision on his time
(pages 59–60). To be fair, few American leaders have faced such extraordinary
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challenges. Management of the end of the Vietnam War, negotiation from weakness with the Soviet Union, and the implosion of American society in the late
1960s limited their flexibility. They were dealt a weak hand, and, one might conclude, played their few cards as best they could.
Their chief goal was to decrease American burdens and increase American
flexibility, while at the same time maintaining global order and keeping radical
forces in check (page 60). The key was triangular diplomacy, especially the opening to China, as a way to balance against the Soviets, and détente, as a means
to create a structure of legitimacy, an agreed set of rules for superpower competition, with the Soviets especially. This experiment was partially successful,
but it came at a terrible price. Heroic statesmanship, as practiced by Nixon and
Kissinger, led to a conspiratorial ethos that required working outside the constraints of the American political system, and sometimes in opposition to those
constraints, to international law, and to the traditional American commitment to
democratic governments, in Chile, for example (pages 76–79). This effort to circumvent the system was bound to produce a backlash on both the right and the
left, with Democrats tying their hands and undermining their credibility against
North Vietnam and the Soviets, and many Republicans, like Reagan, denouncing
détente as appeasement. By the end of the Ford administration in 1976, it is fair
to say the structure of peace Nixon and Kissinger had sought to establish on the
model of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 was close to collapse. Not only had their
efforts produced enormous domestic opposition but also the Soviets themselves
did not buy into the theory of “self-containment” that détente had been designed
to produce (pages 69, 82). They refused to “link” ongoing competition in the
third world to trade concessions and arms control. Partisan politics at home and
the Soviets’ refusal to play by the proposed new rules of the game made the heroic
approach look increasingly quixotic.
Brands bends over backward to be fair to the George W. Bush administration,
but his final judgment of that administration’s grand strategy is damning. Quite
rightly Brands observes greater continuity than is commonly acknowledged between the Bush administration and that of President Clinton. In the aftermath of
the Cold War, American grand strategy, if there was one at all, was “enlargement”
of the world’s free community of market democracies. Under the Clintonites, that
meant hegemony on the cheap. Americans would globalize free institutions and
economic interdependence, but would not commit substantial military forces
anywhere, thus leading to a variety of ineffective half-measures, in Somalia and
Kosovo, for example, which made hawks on the right see the Clintonites as amateurs (pages 145–49). Nonetheless, like Clinton before him, it appeared President
Bush would be a domestic-policy president primarily. The “Vulcans” surrounding him did not gain substantial influence until 9/11. Within months of that
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/24

Summer2015Review.indb 143

148

4/21/15 1:50 PM

144

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

War College: Summer 2015 Review

atrocity, however, the president was proclaiming his intention to preserve lasting
American military hegemony, to strike preemptively—and unilaterally—against
gathering threats, and to treat “rogue states” seeking weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) as no less a danger than terrorism (page 151). Promoting democracy in
places where it had few cultural roots, if any at all, was not the primary objective
of the Bush administration’s grand strategy. That is better understood as making
an example out of noxious regimes that might support terrorists, but democracy
promotion was a serious secondary objective and one that loomed larger as a
pretext for war after the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
In the course of eighteen months President Bush embarked on a path that was
breathtaking in its neo-Wilsonian scope and ambition. He would democratize
not only Afghanistan (hard enough), but also Iraq, a country that had nothing to
do with 9/11 and whose ethno-sectarian cleavages made democratic consensus
unlikely and democratic pluralism downright dangerous. Indeed, the Iraq war
was intended to launch a campaign to democratize the entire Middle East on the
erroneous assumption that revolutionary change would make Middle Eastern
states more stable, less violent at home, and less likely to support terrorists or become havens for them. Worse still, the declared objective of perpetual hegemony
risked producing the very international resistance—including among allies, not
merely adversaries—it was meant to avoid.
Many blame the postinvasion anarchy in Iraq and resurgence of the Taliban in
Afghanistan on failures of strategic planning among Bush’s advisers (for “phase
four” peace and stability operations especially). Under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the United States was notoriously unwilling to commit forces large
and long enough to have a chance of achieving its ambitious objectives in nation
building. Brands concedes these problems, but concludes that the fundamental
problem was poor assessment of the capabilities and limitations of American
power. Hyperpower offensives were justified with worst-case scenarios (rogue
states passing WMD to terrorists), but the strategies to pursue them were based
on best-case scenarios about the ease of establishing any kind of order, much less
a democratic one, in the wake of merely military victory. If so, grand strategy in
the Bush administration was conceptually flawed from the beginning, because
it overestimated what American power could achieve and underestimated the
costs, risks, uncertainties, and unintended consequences inherent in trying
to transform a large portion of the world in the American image (pages 164,
176–80).
What ultimately is the object of grand strategy? This question invites reflection on the latest book by the most famous American grand strategist alive today,
World Order by Henry Kissinger. This is not Kissinger’s best work, but at age
ninety-one, it may well be his last. Indeed, it is fair to say that Kissinger has been
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rewriting the same book, focused on the same problem of establishing a balance of power and a structure of legitimacy, for decades, ever since the German
émigré, appalled by the devastation of the Second World War, wrote his doctoral
dissertation at Harvard. When revised as his first book in 1954, A World Restored:
Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problem of Peace, 1812–22, the dissertation established his place as one of the foremost students of peace and peacemaking in
the twentieth century. Arguably his best book is Diplomacy, which surveys efforts
to blend legitimacy and balance from the Treaty of Westphalia to the present.
With one important exception, readers will find little Kissinger has not already
said (and often better elsewhere) in World Order, but the exception is so huge
that some might even think Kissinger has defined what American grand strategy
ought to seek to accomplish in the twenty-first century.
Missing from World Order is a silent, now deceased interlocutor. As the book
comes to an end, Kissinger appears to be in a conversation with Samuel Huntington about the possible clash of civilizations and what, if anything, can be done
about it. In particular, he is worried about the rise of China. Says Kissinger, “To
strike a balance between the two concepts of order—power and legitimacy—is
the essence of statesmanship” (page 367). International crises that can lead to
major wars tend to occur as this balance unravels. China is a potential problem
not merely because of its growth in power but also because it does not share all
or even most Western conceptions of legitimacy. The Westphalian system, based
on the principle of sovereignty, that Kissinger admires was designed by and for
European states. It is partially enshrined in the United Nations Charter. If there
is anything like a universal code of legitimacy in international affairs, it is in that
charter, but it is largely a creation of the West in 1945 at a time when Wilsonianism was resurgent in the United States and the United States was powerful
enough to be a global hegemon setting the terms of future world order. Understandably, those who did not partake in framing that order, or were marginalized
as it was framed, do not necessarily have the same stake in its preservation, or
any stake at all. They may be more inclined to pursue its transformation, which
is inevitable, with the great question being how to do so peacefully.
Not surprisingly, when many wonder whether interventions in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and elsewhere produced strategic overextension for the United States,
Kissinger aims to strike a balance between American leadership and restraint, a
process he sees as “inherently unending. What it does not permit is withdrawal”
(page 370). As he sees that matter, “a reconstruction of the international system
is the ultimate challenge to statesmanship in our time” (page 371). The penalty for failure will not necessarily be a major war between states; perhaps more
likely is an evolution of spheres of influence identified with particular domestic
structures and forms of governance (for example, the Westphalian model of the
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West versus an Islamist model in the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan, and
elsewhere). A struggle between regions, a.k.a. Huntington’s clash of civilizations,
could be even more debilitating, and protracted, than the struggle among nations
has been. While never careless about the balance of power, Kissinger is close to
Huntington in claiming that the “quest for world order will require a coherent
strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions, and to relate
the regional orders to one another” (page 371).
To paraphrase Basil Liddell Hart, the object of war is a better state of peace, if
only from our own point of view. In like manner, Kissinger is suggesting that the
object of grand strategy is a more favorable world order, at least from our own
point of view. “The United States needs a strategy and a diplomacy” to serve that
end. Without setting prescriptions, Kissinger does list the questions a coherent
grand strategy would have to address. What do we seek to prevent, no matter
what happens, and if necessary alone? What do we seek to achieve, even if not
supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to achieve, or prevent,
only if supported by an alliance? What should we not engage in, even if urged
by a multilateral group or alliance? Above all, what is the nature of the values we
seek to advance? What applications depend in part on circumstances (page 372)?
The same questions apply in principle to other societies, but American universalism and sense of mission may cause unnecessary conflict with regions and
states that do not share similar premises. Kissinger’s preferred solution is a kind
of international pluralism, which is not to be confused with multiculturalism. As
a quest for truth, especially about the highest and most important things, Western philosophy requires considering whether there is one best way of life, but
the quest for peace allows, even demands, that there can be many civilizations—
Western, Sinitic, Orthodox, Muslim, etc., each with its own sense of legitimacy.
“To achieve a genuine world order, its components, while maintaining their own
values, need to acquire a second culture that is global, structural, and juridical—a
concept of order that transcends the perspective and ideals of any one region or
state” (page 373). Few students of Kissinger’s work will be surprised that, at this
moment in history, Kissinger sees this second culture, or weak universal civilization, as a “modernization of the Westphalian system informed by contemporary
realities” (page 373).
Attractive as this might seem to citizens of the West especially, one must not
underestimate the difficulty of the task. As Brands reveals, Kissinger and Nixon
failed in their efforts to get the Soviets to buy into the structure of legitimacy
they sought with détente. If they failed when dealing with just one major power,
one must wonder about the possibility of doing so with a multiplicity of civilizations. And of course, what people consider legitimate does change over time. The
Concert of Europe established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 seemed to many
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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in 1848 and on other occasions to lock in an illegitimate order for the benefit of
the ruling elites, and its seeming illegitimacy contributed to the origins of the
First World War. Moreover, Kissinger’s call for order within, not merely among,
civilizations seems to imply a need for regional hegemons, though Nixon and
Kissinger’s vision of “regional sheriffs” failed dismally for the United States when
the Iranian Revolution led to the overthrow of the shah of Iran. Indeed, at times
Kissinger seems nostalgic for a world of “classical diplomacy,” when states seemed
to be all that mattered and diplomacy appeared to be made only by cabinet ministers, that has long since passed away; in more than a few ways, that world is often
more the creation of contemporary academics seeking order than of the increasingly disordered period following the Congress of Vienna. On the other hand,
the perfect must not be the enemy of the good, or even the merely satisfactory. If
Kissinger’s understanding of statesmanship sometimes seems unduly romantic,
he deserves credit for pointing out the best possible objective, to be pursued bit
by bit as time and opportunity allow, for American grand strategy in our century: a world in which we are safe to live according to our own principles based
on the shared international culture of sovereignty, which would allow others to
live according to their own principles, free from outside intervention, however
distasteful their way of life might seem to us, so long as they do not threaten us
and allies essential to our security. This leben und leben lassen approach would
guard against the sort of liberal-democratic jihad feared by Brands while allowing for the continuing engagement with the world Kissinger quite rightly sees as
necessary to geopolitical balance.
In sum, neither of these books lays out a complete grand strategy for our
time, but each pushes the conversation in a useful direction. Kissinger’s potential
“last hurrah” represents his attempt to square the circle of Huntington’s clash of
civilizations and compels us to ask what grand strategy is for. Brands’s fine work
establishes him as a major-league strategic thinker whose book deserves multiple
readings. It would grace the curriculum of any program in grand strategy.
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BOOK REVIEWS

A BIT OF A MAVERICK
Pillsbury, Michael. The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the
Global Superpower. New York: Henry Holt, 2015. 319pp. $30

The Hundred-Year Marathon is the
culmination of a lifetime’s work on
Chinese security policy by Dr. Michael
Pillsbury (1945–), an independent
China analyst based in Washington,
D.C. The book is popular, not academic.
That said, it is by and large accurate
and must be read and digested.
At the outset, though, two issues must be
raised. One is the title. The other is the
author. The title suggests, with no evidence, that somehow a secret Masonic
cabal has existed in China for a century,
having as its purpose the overthrow
of the United States as leading world
power. Taken literally that would mean
planning got under way in 1915, under
President Yuan Shikai, continued during
Chiang Kai-shek’s watch, and then on
through Mao Zedong and beyond—
which, bluntly put, is not history at all,
but classic tinfoil-hat conspiracy theory.
China’s changing international behavior
over the last century is indeed difficult
to explain, but it is most certainly not
the product of some arcane “Protocols
for the Replacement of America.”
As for Pillsbury, he is well-trained, hardworking, and independently wealthy.
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He is the author of original and definitive books about the People’s Liberation
Army. He is also a bit of a maverick: a
one-man show, rarely part of a team.
Long a proponent of pro-China policies,
including sale of weapons to Beijing in
the 1980s and 1990s, he has, as he tells
it, changed his mind as he has learned
more. While a “panda hugger” he was
well treated and given much “access”—
which means access to people whose job
is to deceive you, as well as hospitality.
In 2006, however, he published an article
in the Wall Street Journal decisively
repudiating his previous views—and felt
the back of Beijing’s hand until 2013.
Then he was able to return to China,
as Beijing sought to shore up support,
faced with the South China Sea crisis,
to be discussed below (pages 129–30).
Pillsbury is not to be believed without
question. He has had numerous runins with counterintelligence officials
owing to his seemingly uncontrollable proclivity to leak secrets—to this
reviewer, for example, in the passenger
seat of his vintage Jaguar motorcar.
Here, however, we are reviewing neither
the sales strategy nor the author of
this book, but rather its argument.
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The book makes two fundamental
contentions. First, Pillsbury states
that the Asian region and the United
States currently face the problem of
an unexpectedly aggressive China.
Second, he argues that this unpleasant
surprise is no more than the product
of decades of official self-delusion
about Beijing, even when confronted
with mountains of facts that supported
opposite conclusions. This reviewer
agrees with these two points, albeit with
many academic caveats that will be
spared. Disagreement arises only when
speculation begins about the future.
For roughly forty years, from the Nixon
diplomacy of the 1970s to about 2010,
the idea that China could pose a threat
militarily was considered so mistaken
as to be effectively beyond toleration
in either academic or governmental
circles. The insistent conviction was that
“engagement” would transform China
into a strong economy, a friend, even an
ally, and most likely a democracy as well
(page 7). Among the few in Washington
not convinced by these arguments was
the longtime head of the Pentagon’s
Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Marshall, who did much to support Pillsbury’s work through contract research.
China is of course a new country. The
first states having that word as part of
their official names were founded in
the last century: the Republic of China
in 1911; then after the Chinese civil
war, the People’s Republic of China in
1949. Before that a myriad of states,
some ethnically Chinese, some not,
rose and fell on the East Asian plain.
To lump them all together as a political “China” to be treated as a historical entity having thousands of years of
history is a profound error, as specialists
now recognize. Still, the continuity of a
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distinct culture belonging to the Chinese
people must not be underestimated.
If one were to undertake a comprehensive study of the view of force
within this cultural tradition, the first
consideration would be the extreme
pacifism expressed in the classics of
Confucianism, created two millennia
in the past, and long official orthodoxy.
The mainstream of Chinese thought—
not a pretense but a conviction—sees
superior virtue and civilization as the
way to genuine power, as is testified
by the vast corpus of classical writings,
memorized by scholars for generations
and not forgotten today, as well as the
volumes of official memorandums on
foreign policy, in which opposition to
force is regularly the winning argument.
Pillsbury, however, makes no claim to be
writing about “China” in general or even
broadly about today’s People’s Republic.
He says little about Confucianism because others have said much, and focuses instead on the all-but-forbidden tradition of writers on military topics, the
bingjia whose heyday was also two millennia ago, but whose influence has continued, like an underground stream, ever
since, to emerge today in what Pillsbury
calls “the Chinese hawks,” or yingpai.
Seemingly overlooked by official American estimates, these hawks have no truck
with engagement, are deeply antiforeign
and anti-American, and seek Chinese
hegemony to be achieved through
deception, strategic dominance, and the
use of particularly effective weapons
usually called in English, rather awkwardly, “assassins’ maces” (shashoujian).
They do not lack influence.
Pillsbury has come to know and understand this group by employing the
most elementary but often neglected
methods of information gathering:
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namely, reading their work and having
long conversations with them (he speaks
excellent Chinese). The results of years
of such research, by Pillsbury and others,
effectively upend the conventional wisdom of nearly half a century. The questions that follow are: First, how did we
go wrong? And second, what to do now?
To answer the first question, “what went
wrong,” requires going back to President
Richard Nixon and his national security
adviser, Henry Kissinger. That China
would reenter the international system
was long a near certainty in their time.
Maoism was beginning to be recognized
internally as having been an unmitigated
catastrophe, not only for the Chinese
people, but also for the military—though
many foreigners still idolized the man.
The Soviet Union moreover presented
China with a threat requiring a counterweight. The only question was how
exactly China would return. Sadly, these
two Americans devised an utterly unrealistic plan that set our diplomacy on a
course that, unsurprisingly, has brought
unexpected and baleful consequences.
Nixon and Kissinger seem to have
imagined a future in which an intimate
Beijing–Washington political axis would
supersede the entire then-existing
security system in Asia. Such a vision
seems the only possible explanation
for Nixon’s quite astonishing question
to Mao when they met on 21 February 1972: “Is it better for Japan to be
neutral, totally defenseless, or it is [sic]
better for a time for Japan to have some
relations with the United States? The
point being—I am talking now in the
realm of philosophy—in international
relations there are no good choices.”
Put bluntly, Nixon seems already to
have decided, long before the meeting,
to drop relations with Japan, then our
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closest ally, in favor of China. (Japan
was of course kept in the dark.) But
Mao was bored and somnolent as the
two leaders spoke. Neither he nor any
other Chinese ever took up this offer.
How could so unrealistic an American policy plan have come into being?
The answer is by wishful thinking and
self-deception: in this case, aided by the
rigorously selective limitation of sources
to those that supported the policy
already adopted. Only a tiny secret
team knew of the plan. The books they
read were uniformly from the strongly
pro-Mao school of writing then current
(Kissinger, White House Years [Boston:
Little, Brown, 1979], p. 1051). Other
books, many by better scholars, existed
but were not consulted. Likewise, the
speaker invited to the White House to
enlighten the Americans was the erratic
Frenchman André Malraux. Others
were incomparably more knowledgeable and available—to name but two,
the American Foreign Service officer
Edward E. Rice and the Berlin professor Jürgen Domes—but they were not
even contacted. Thus, information that
had been intentionally biased formed
the deepest foundation for our policy.
But the longed-for axis between Beijing
and Washington never came into being. Quite the opposite happened.
Starting in the first decade of this
century, with now-retired leaders holding the reins, China openly changed
its visible foreign policy to dangerous military adventurism, for reasons
no one can explain. The change has
not succeeded. Thus the conquest of
Scarborough Shoal undertaken in spring
2012, which Beijing no doubt expected
to be a military cakewalk against the
Filipinos, has turned into a military
and diplomatic standoff, drawing in
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more players, losing China prestige, and
showing no sign of ending (page 203).
It is as yet unclear that continuing
irresponsible expansion will be the
gravamen of President Xi Jinping’s
foreign policy. China’s current leader
took power in November 2012
months after the Scarborough Shoal
standoff began and while he has not
repudiated the policy he seems far
more intent on domestic reform.
China could even liberalize: recently
the down-market and often xenophobic
Beijing tabloid Global Times attacked
Western “pro-China” scholars for
insulting that country by explaining
away repression as the only answer to
otherwise inevitable chaos. “Western
scholars have never imagined that
China might have a ‘peaceful democratic transition,’” the tabloid observed
(8 March 2015). These astonishing
words did not appear by accident: the
Global Times is wholly owned by the
party’s most authoritative mouthpiece,
the People’s Daily. Xi must be aware that
even small external distractions will
almost certainly derail domestic reform.
As for what the rest of the world should
do, obviously it is time to prepare: to
rearm and deter seriously. The region,
however, is responding so robustly
to Chinese aggression that Beijing is
alarmed. Japan today is not a mighty
power only because it chose to try
peace instead. Let no one doubt that if
Tokyo deems it necessary, it will emerge
again—indeed that is its current
direction—which would be perhaps the
greatest imaginable setback possible
for the Chinese political and economic
future. Nearly every other state in
Asia too, from India to the Philippines
and beyond, is rapidly and effectively
preparing military capabilities that
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could present China with a nightmare
scenario in which it is at war with a
multiplicity of capable adversaries
along a front of more than four thousand miles, from India to Tokyo.
Pillsbury speaks of the risk of prematurely “asking the weight of the emperor’s cauldrons,” or wending (page
196), which sounds exotic. What it
means is showing your cards too soon.
China has in fact done just this, with the
consequences the Chinese sages would
have predicted: creating failure as others
react in time. My conclusion: we will
certainly soon see a highly militarized
Asia; we may see some skirmishes or
worse (though recall that the Chinese
esteem most those victories achieved
without fighting; they abhor long-term,
attritional war), but we most emphatically will not see Chinese hegemony,
either in the region or in the world.
ARTHUR WALDRON

Morris, David J. The Evil Hours: A Biography of
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015. 338pp. $27

The numbers are staggering. In 2012
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) estimated that eight thousand
veterans take their own lives every year.
Think about that—twenty-two people
die every day of whom many, in pain
and having lost hope, have carried their
war with them for far too long. For
some it may have been recent fighting in Afghanistan or Iraq; for others
it may have been decades ago in the
jungles of Southeast Asia. Regardless,
the trauma these people experienced
knows no boundaries between deserts
and mountains, between marshes and
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oceans. Or as the great First World War
poet Wilfred Owen said: “These are men
whose minds the Dead have ravished.”
David J. Morris, former Marine infantry
officer turned war correspondent, tells
us that post-traumatic stress disorder,
or PTSD, as it is commonly known, has
been called many things throughout history: shell shock, combat exhaustion, the
blues, or simply being worn down and
played out. It’s a condition that “went
unacknowledged for millennia . . . and is
now the fourth most common psychiatric disorder in the United States.” Not
until 1980, when PTSD was added to the
psychiatric manual—the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
or DSM—did PTSD get more attention.
Morris’s book is not only timely—
arriving at the end of two long wars—
but it is grand in its ambition and scope.
Similarly to Siddhartha Mukherjee’s
approach in his Pulitzer Prize–winning
book, The Emperor of All Maladies: A
Biography of Cancer, Morris covers the
history of trauma and war; how trauma
affects the mind; the therapies that are
often used to fight it; the drugs that
are prescribed to numb it; and some
alternatives to modern medicine. But
what makes it truly a powerful book,
beyond a journalist’s endeavor, is that
PTSD is personal to Morris. His book is
an exploration that begins with basic yet
difficult questions: “Why does the world
seem so different after I got back from
Iraq? Why do I feel so out of place now?
What does one do with the knowledge
gained from a near death experience?”
In October 2007, in the middle of the
surge, Morris was imbedded with the
Army’s 1st Infantry Division. While
riding in a Humvee in the volatile
neighborhood of Saydia in southwestern
Baghdad, his patrol was attacked. The
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Humvee in which Morris was riding
was hit by an improvised explosive
device. Battered and bent, the vehicle
held together and the patrol was able to
get back to its forward operating base.
Morris escaped serious physical injury,
and after a short medical examination
he left Iraq and was back in California a week later. The explosion would
change his life. It would lead him on a
long journey, trying to understand his
experience, through literature, research,
and writing. It left him with nightmares
and anger. It left him sitting in VA
centers watching others suffer silently,
with shaking legs and blank stares.
Morris tells us, in beautiful, searing
language, that “we are born in debt, owing the world a death. This is the shadow
that darkens every cradle. Trauma is
what happens when you catch a surprise
glimpse of that darkness, the coming
annihilation not only of the body and
the mind but also, seemingly, of the
world.” And yet the world is still trying
to understand how trauma affects us.
Not surprisingly, the science is mixed.
Some therapies have empirical evidence
showing that they help trauma victims—
whether it is combat trauma or one of
the other big-T traumas that Morris
describes. The big-T traumas are those
that are soul crushing—airplane
crashes, extended combat, rape, physical assault, and natural disasters. These
are the traumas that overwhelm our
brains and destroy our sense of time.
The VA’s response to trauma patients,
the “gold standard” therapies, focuses
on two types: prolonged exposure and
cognitive processing therapies. Most
have heard of prolonged exposure. It is
essentially a reliving of the event, over
and over, in which the patient, with help
from a therapist, is trying to change

157

4/21/15 1:50 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 24

the stimulus to the traumatic event. Yet
there is no consensus on what the best
treatment for PTSD may be. For as Morris notes, the “gold standard” treatments
often do not account for those that
leave the program prior to completion.
Drugs are just as questionable. Some
drugs, like selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors—Prozac and Zoloft—have
been around for years, and are the more
popular drugs prescribed for PTSD.
And like many of the therapies, some
patients find that the drugs help them.
Then there are drugs like propranolol,
originally developed to prevent heart
attacks, which now challenge our ethics
on how we deal with trauma victims.
That is because propranolol, when
provided correctly, can inhibit the
brain’s ability to etch a traumatic event
in your mind if taken within a few hours
of the traumatic event. This is a drug
that can disrupt the brain’s ability to
embrace a memory; it can change our
sense of self. Morris rightly raises the
concern that messing with our “flight
or fight response” can fundamentally
alter what we view as dangerous or not.
In the end, we are reminded that as
humans we are idiosyncratic creatures—
each of us responds to traumatic events
in our own way. Therapies that work
for some do not necessarily work for
others. Just the simple act of listening
to our bodies—say, practicing yoga—is
a powerful therapy for some PTSD
patients. As for Morris himself, he
does not discount anything that might
work for you, even if that is a moderate amount of alcohol; if it works, then
consider it a remedy, or just another
way to make it through the day.
The Evil Hours is not simply a book for
combat veterans and service members.
It is a book that deserves a much wider
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audience. Trauma and the suffering
and pain that follow have been with us
since Homer’s time and will be with us
for many more years to come. David J.
Morris has shed much needed light on
this all-too-human and -deadly thing.
CHRISTOPHER NELSON

Jones, Charles A. More than Just War: Narratives
of the Just War Tradition and Military Life. London: Routledge, 2013. 224pp. $120 (Kindle $33)

Pedestrian forms of philosophical innovation often involve the application of
old ideas to new cases. It should therefore come as no surprise that the creative
bulk of what is published today on the
ethics of war achieves its novelty
—when it does at all—by applying
the just war tradition to hithertounexamined aspects of contemporary
warfare, for example, drones and
unmanned systems, cyber warfare,
intelligence and covert operations,
asymmetric warfare, and terrorism.
Now, this is a useful thing to do; it has
expanded conceptual categories within
the literature on the ethics of war (e.g.,
the jus post bellum and jus in intelligencia). But it falls short of that deeper
kind of philosophy that overthrows
preconceptions and generates entirely
new areas of rational inquiry. This more
difficult (but potentially more fruitful)
way to innovate in philosophy would
call into question the entire edifice
of knowledge that, through university schooling or professional military
education, everyone takes for granted
when discussing the ethics of war.
Charles A. Jones does exactly this in his
provocative, original, fun-to-read, and
tightly argued book More than Just War:
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Narratives of the Just War Tradition and
Military Life. Jones is Emeritus Reader in
International Relations at the University
of Cambridge, and such a conceptual
tour de force is exactly what one might
expect from a Cambridge don by comparison to many military authors who
understandably confine their work to
areas of their own tactical expertise. By
contrast, Jones offers perhaps one of the
most interesting and penetrating theses
about the ethics of war since Michael
Walzer’s classic Just and Unjust Wars.

bello and jus ad bellum assume the vantage point of the state over the individual
and have a difficult time dealing with
unorthodox forms of modern warfare.
Just war doctrine assumes a conception
of ethics that is rule oriented and largely
ignores character—something actual
militaries spend a lot of time cultivating. Finally, the doctrine’s origin is
more wedded to religious theology than
most secular philosophers (like Michael
Walzer) and champions of international
law (like Yoram Dinstein) today admit.

Jones shows that the pithy stories that
appear in almost every book or article about the just war tradition, tales
that narrate the tradition’s cumulative
development from venerable origins to
postwar resurgence, mask important
complexities crucial to understanding its applicability to contemporary
warfare. Since the 1960s, the resilience
and ubiquity of just war discourse,
combined with continual reference to
late-classical and medieval theologians
in contemporary texts, give the impression that a continued and coherent
“tradition” of thought about war existed
and continues to develop. Yet, Jones
argues, careful examination reveals that
just war thinking was largely ignored
from the middle of the seventeenth
century only to be revived in the middle
of the twentieth. What is now spoken
of as if it were an unbroken tradition
owes its veneer of coherence to resuscitation by modern scholarship. Upon
close examination, both selectivity and
instrumentality characterize its revival.

Jones brings to light an intriguing dichotomy between the way practitioners
and authors closest to war account for its
normative dimensions, on the one hand,
and the narrowness of just war discourse
on the other. An intriguing question gets
raised: How did this dichotomy between
theory and practice come about? More
than Just War answers by offering a
different account of how the just war
doctrine became what it is today, an artificial “tradition” unable to account for
the most interesting normative aspect
of modern warfare—the phenomenology experienced by war’s participants
themselves. An alternative tradition of
military ethics, Jones says, exists alongside the just war doctrine. This tradition,
found in both film and literature, fills
the experiential gaps that the just war
doctrine leaves barren. Any account
of military ethics that ignores both
traditions will suffer from this neglect.

Alongside this historical critique, Jones
exposes contemporary just war doctrine
for its implicit adherence to a set of assumptions that he argues are objectionable when applied to contemporary warfare. For example, the doctrines of jus in
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Perhaps the most intriguing part
of Jones’s book offers a penetrating
survey of a variety of authors within
this latter tradition. Works by William
Shakespeare, Sir Walter Scott, James
Fenimore Cooper, Stephen Crane,
John Buchan, Robert Louis Stevenson,
Joseph Conrad, Tim O’Brien, and Kurt
Vonnegut are featured. Since many of
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these will be familiar to students, More
than Just War makes for an excellent supplement to the curriculum
at military service academies, war
colleges, and civilian institutions.
While the book’s strength rests in its
ability to unmask the just war tradition
critically and outline its alternative,
there are several points where the author
could have done more to substantiate
the philosophical views that undergird the argument’s positive side. For
example, Jones leans quite heavily on the
American pragmatism of John Dewey
without fleshing out the exact connections between Dewey’s epistemology
and his own. Nevertheless, since most
readers will be nonphilosophers such
omissions are the slightest of concerns.
At over one hundred dollars (hardbound), the book’s expense may
be prohibitive for many. Routledge
is expected to offer a less expensive paperback sometime in 2015.
Meanwhile, an affordable digital
(Kindle) version is available.
JOSEPH M. HATFIELD

Biggar, Nigel. In Defence of War. Oxford, U.K.:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2013. 384pp. $55 (paperback
$30)

Nigel Biggar is Regis Professor of Moral
and Pastoral Theology and Director of
the McDonald Centre for Theology,
Ethics, and Public Life at the University of Oxford. This volume collects
seven essays on various aspects of the
just war tradition. It is very much a
book of theological ethics, although
in strong dialogue with contemporary
philosophical just war thinking and the
international legal framework of the law
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of armed conflict. Although the essays
are to some degree independent of each
other, they are united by Biggar’s clear
and consistent theological perspective.
Anyone familiar with the culture of
“mainline” Protestantism and much
liberal Roman Catholicism will recognize that these traditions, at least since
the Vietnam War, have moved strongly
toward positions that are to various
degrees close to pacifism. Some are
straightforwardly pacifist—a position
most closely identified with the American theologian Stanley Hauerwas. Some
Roman Catholic organizations such
as Pax Christi are on this end of the
spectrum as well. Others hold a position
generally called “just war pacifism” in
that they continue to use the categories
of just war, but apply them in such a way
that almost no actual conflict could meet
them (by, for example, interpreting “last
resort” as requiring one to do literally
everything conceivable short of war). A
position called “just peacemaking” has
emerged in many denominations as preferable to just war, stressing anticipatory
actions to be taken to prevent war over
the necessity of the use of force in some
circumstances. Biggar’s first two chapters
address these trends directly, arguing
against the coherence of the pacifist view
and in favor of a meaningful sense in
which Christian love can be manifest,
even in the midst of military conflict.
The next two chapters take up two central principles of classic Christian just
war thinking: double effect (in which a
given action is militarily desirable but
also has a foreseen, but not intended,
“evil” effect such as destruction of civilian lives and property) and proportionality. The principle of double effect has
been under considerable criticism from
philosophers, who prefer to reduce it to
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utilitarian calculus, and from Christian
thinkers who worry that it smacks of
hairsplitting casuistry. Biggar strongly
defends it, noting that a hallmark of distinctively Christian ethics is its attention
to the intentional state of the actor—an
emphasis that reaches all the way back
to the Sermon on the Mount. Christian
ethics has always maintained what the
Germans call a Gesinnungsethik—an ethic of intention. Therefore the “foreseen
but not intended” requirement of double
effect captures that in an essential way.
The proportionality requirement of just
war appears on both the jus ad bellum
and the jus in bello sides of the just war
ledger. Biggar’s fourth chapter considers
it on the jus ad bellum side and takes up
the most challenging of cases to test it:
World War I. In the face of widespread
belief that World War I was a blunder
and certainly not worth its vast toll,
Biggar argues that it indeed was worth it.
While this reviewer didn’t find the argument completely persuasive, it is closely
and carefully argued and provides an
excellent presentation of an uncommonly held and therefore provocative view.
Chapters 5 and 6 deal with questions of
the relationship of international law to
the parallel ethical tradition of just war.
Against black-letter-law fundamentalism, Biggar strives in these chapters to
establish the principle that the ethical
tradition is deeper and may on occasion
trump the legal. Some contemporary
philosophers (most notably David Rodin
and Jeff McMahan) critique aspects of
just war tradition from the perspective of a modern liberal rights-based
perspective. In particular, they attack
the traditional division of responsibility in war between the political leaders
who make the decision to go to war in
the first place (jus ad bellum) and the
soldiers who do the actual fighting (who
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bear no responsibility for the overall justice of the war, but only for the
conduct within the war [jus in bello]).
They challenge the “moral equality of
soldiers,” which holds that soldiers on
both sides are not culpable for the killing
they do as long as they fight within the
bounds of the law of armed conflict. In
their account, at least one side in any
war must be wrong in fighting it, and
therefore the soldiers who prosecute that
side are not morally equivalent to their
opponents. Biggar rigorously critiques
this account, while granting it flows
from the ethical framework its advocates
are bringing to bear on the issue. But
that is itself the problem, as Biggar sees
it: the older and deeper traditions of
Christian just war, he asserts, provide
the resources and show the wisdom
of retaining the traditional account.
Biggar also challenges the complete
adequacy of the current international
system in capturing fully legitimate
decisions to use military force in the first
place. According to the legal framework
of sovereign states, possessed of political sovereignty and territorial integrity,
response to aggression is the “gold standard” justification for the use of force.
At least since the Kellogg-Briand Pact of
1928, and certainly according to a close
reading of the Charter of the United
Nations, states may use force only when
responding to aggression, when assisting
another state responding to aggression,
or when part of a collective security action authorized by the United Nations.
Biggar uses the Kosovo conflict as one
that clearly falls outside that normative
legal framework and yet, he argues, was
absolutely necessary as an ethical matter.
The book concludes with another
hard case: the war in Iraq beginning
in 2003. Against those who argue the
war was justified on manufactured
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and dishonest grounds and not worth
the cost, Biggar once again provides
a clearly argued case that the cost
was justified. Whether readers come
away persuaded or not, Biggar’s argument will sharpen their thinking.
Biggar’s is very much a theological
book, and therefore mostly of interest to readers interested in a strong
normative Christian argument. In that
context, whether one is persuaded on
every detail or not, it is a welcome tonic
among the often shallow and sloppy
thinking about war and the international
system from some Christian circles.
Yet there is value in the book even for
readers who may not share the full
theological view. It certainly brings a
historical depth to the discussion that
much contemporary philosophical just
war thinking does not, detached as it is
from the long historical tradition in the
West Biggar represents, and attempting
to grapple with the ethical problem of
war with a comparatively small tool kit.
MARTIN L. COOK

Pattee, Phillip G. At War in Distant Waters: British Colonial Defense in the Great War. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2013. 274pp. $59.95

Phillip Pattee, a retired naval officer and
professor at the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College, examines
British efforts before the First World
War to craft a global maritime strategy
to deal with threats that were expected
to arise during a war with Germany. In
doing so, he makes a compelling case
that British naval thinkers were not
completely fixated on the German High
Seas Fleet, nor were they unconscious
of the critical need to keep the sea-lanes
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of commerce and communication open
for their merchant navy and England’s
national economy. Threats included
the inevitability of impossibly high
insurance rates during times of war,
the combat capability of the overseas
German East Asia squadron, and the
possibility of persistent predations by
German raiders. British leaders also
understood that, despite the size of
the Royal Navy, British assets would
initially be stretched thin, as most
British capital ships would be kept in
home waters to respond to potential
action by their German counterparts.
Pattee discusses British efforts to overcome these threats. His review of British
involvement in insurance programs designed to keep merchant vessels in trade
is fascinating and illuminates what must
be one of the least known programs of
the First World War. Strategies to deal
with the German East Asia squadron,
raiders, and shore-based supporting
communication systems are better
known, but Pattee still does them justice.
Taken all together, At War in Distant
Waters is a useful addition to a complete account of the First World War.
However, this book could have been
much more. For starters, the title is misleading. Although the book chronicles
actions taken in colonial waters, the
depicted purpose is much more aimed
at defending Britain, not its colonies.
Nor does Pattee convincingly prove
that Great Britain conquered German
colonies to provide maritime security. Although some actions, such as
the seizing or destruction of German
high-frequency radio installations, were
designed for this purpose, others, such
as the conquest of German Southwest
Africa, were not. Britain could have
easily conducted limited operations and
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denied naval basing and support from
the German colonies. A major second
African front, although sensible for
other reasons, was not needed to protect
seaborne trade. Additionally, the book
is surprisingly dry, when it definitely
did not need to be so. The eradication of
German raiders from the world’s oceans
is a remarkable story, complete with
drama, excitement, and extraordinary
personalities. Spee’s one-sided German
victory at Coronel and his subsequent
defeat at the Falklands were two of the
major naval battles of the war, yet are
given short shrift by Pattee. The tale of
Count Felix von Luckner and his raider
Seeadler, although occurring after the
raider threat was greatly diminished,
would provide a compelling illustration
of the challenges in hunting down a
gifted and tenacious raider captain.
Pattee does relate the story of SMS
Königsberg, but in such a brief manner as not to do justice to the very real
concerns the cruiser created for the
Admiralty, or the sheer magnitude of
effort it took to destroy the warship. To
compound matters, Pattee claims the
destruction of Königsberg was carried
out by two mortar-equipped barges.
This is an error. To put Königsberg out of
commission, the Admiralty dispatched
the monitors HMS Mersey and HMS
Severn on a long and hazardous journey
to the Rufiji delta, where Königsberg
was hiding, to sink it. For a book of
this nature, this error is surprising.
While Pattee does include a description
and evaluation of British operations in
Mesopotamia—and ties these actions to
the strategic importance of oil—the book
is strangely silent on the Dardanelles
campaign and the U-boat war. Perhaps
this is because Pattee does not see the
Mediterranean or Atlantic as “colonial”
waters, or because neither Gallipoli
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nor submarines figured sufficiently in
prewar planning. Still, each of these
challenges either demanded or resulted
from evolving British strategies and
both would seem worthy of inclusion.
Still, when all is said and done, Pattee
has contributed to a deeper understanding of British—and German—maritime
strategy in the First World War. By
shifting focus away from the North Sea
and the clashes between the Grand and
High Seas Fleets, he has reminded the
reader that British maritime leaders
understood global vulnerabilities and
planned to deal with them long before the guns of August opened fire.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Appelbaum, Peter C. Loyal Sons: Jews in the German Army in the Great War. London: Vallentine
Mitchell, 2014. 347pp. $79.95

Centennial commemoration and observance of the First World War have generated many books studying major and
minor aspects of what was hoped would
be the “war to end all wars,” or as H. G.
Wells titled a 1914 book, The War That
Will End War. It wasn’t; instead, it was
the first act of a century-long tragedy.
The present volume provides a significant study of the more than 100,000
German-Jewish and 320,000 AustroHungarian Jewish soldiers serving
during the war. One in eight was killed.
First World War historian Jay Winter is
correct when he writes in the volume’s
foreword, “we owe a debt to Peter Appelbaum for bringing to light the Jewish element in this tragic story.” The volume is
groundbreaking in its scope and depth.
The volume consists of eight chapters
and four appendixes. The first chapter
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provides an overview of Jewish soldiers
in the armies of the German states from
the Prussian Wars of Liberation beginning in 1813 until the beginning of the
First World War. The quest for respected
and accepted service was part of the
larger Jewish experience of nationalism
and participation in German society
and met with varied results. Although
no Jew ever attended or graduated from
the Prussian Military or Naval Academy,
there were Jewish officers in the prewar
Bavarian army and Austro-Hungarian
army. The second chapter looks at mobilization and German-Jewish attitudes
at the outbreak of the war. The outbreak
of the war furthered German-Jewish
patriotism. While there were dissenting, pacifist Jewish voices, they were
largely ignored and overcome by Jewish
organizations and individuals who
published calls to volunteer. GermanJewish society responded at all levels and
all ages. As the war progressed the initial
zeal was replaced by calls for service
based on duty (Pflicht) and honor (Ehre).
German Jews entered service with hopes
and confidence of no anti-Semitism.
They were misguided. The third chapter
studies in detail the experiences and
opposing views of the war of two officers
who served on the western front, Julius
Marx and Herbert Sulzbach. This chapter and the fourth chapter, which looks
at diaries and memoirs from the front,
show the diversity of experiences and
perspectives of religious and nonreligious Jews, all fighting with national loyalty, patriotism, and pride. The chapters
also provide a good snapshot of everpresent Christian-Jewish sentiments.
With respect to naval matters and
the Kriegsmarine, there is little available information on Jewish sailors. By
geography and profession, maritime
life was not a significant part of the
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experience of German Jews. However,
Jews did serve in the Kriegsmarine
aboard surface vessels and U-boats. The
fourth chapter provides information
on these activities, noting that the 1916
census of Jews in the military (Judenzählung) registered 134 in maritime
service. At least thirty were killed, some
in the May 1916 battle of Jutland.
Chapter 5 studies the experiences of
German Jews who served as physicians, physician assistants, and medical
orderlies. It shows that Jewish participation spanned the strata of society and
reminds readers of the pain and trauma
of those who were wounded and dying.
This chapter is enriched by the author’s
knowledge and experience from his
first career of forty years as a physician,
microbiologist, and professor of pathology. The sixth chapter moves to the air
and looks at the approximately 250 Jews
who served in airships and single-engine
aircraft. Several pilots were killed,
several became prisoners of war, and
others—such as Fritz Beckhardt, who
was credited with seventeen recognized kills—garnered fame and glory.
By 1916 there was rising anti-Semitism
on the home front and rumors that
Jewish service and sacrifice were not
comparable to those of non-Jews. The
seventh chapter recounts these rumors
and perceptions and the solution of
the landmark Judenzählung. The final
chapter provides an analysis, epilogue,
and transition to the interwar years.
In an attempt to counteract growing anti-Semitism during the postwar
period German-Jewish veterans banded
together in 1919 and formed the Reichsbund Jüdischer Frontsoldaten (Association of Jewish Front Veterans). One of
the main activities was the publication of
a monthly newspaper and other works
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attempting to neutralize anti-Semitic
agitation. All of this effort was shattered
by the National Socialists after Kristallnacht (1938) and the anti-Semitism
experienced during the First World
War culminated in the anti-Semitic
tragedies of the Second World War.
The present volume is Appelbaum’s
second book addressing the Jewish
military experience of the era. The
earlier work, Loyalty Betrayed: Jewish
Chaplains in the German Army during
the First World War (2013), received
significant attention and acclaim and
Loyal Sons is deserving of the same.
Appelbaum delves deeply into published and unpublished diaries, letters,
and memoirs of those who served. For
the first time, widespread personal and
archival materials are gathered and
analyzed in a single source. The work
is meticulously researched, well written, and enjoyable to read. The author
has produced a volume that bridges the
chasm between studies for academic
specialists and works for general readers.
It is a welcome addition to the military
history bookshelf that is lively, engaging, and thorough. The appendixes and
numerous photographs are interesting and enhance the work. Loyal Sons
deserves a wide readership and will not
disappoint even the most casual reader.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY

Vaill, Amanda. Hotel Florida: Truth, Love, and
Death in the Spanish Civil War. New York: Farrar,
Straus, Giroux, 2014. 436pp. $30

Spain was the only nation to take up
arms against fascism in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the
Second World War. England, France,
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and the United States did not act against
this impending threat. While the Spanish Civil War began as an internal domestic matter between the newly elected
Spanish Republic and reactionary
Nationalist forces led by General Franco,
the conflict would draw in Germany and
Italy in support of Franco, and the Soviet
Union in support of the Republic. The
conflict pitted forces of Europe’s far left
and right against each other, eventually
overshadowing the Spanish Republic’s
attempt to maintain power. Against this
backdrop, Amanda Vaill follows the lives
and fates of three couples. She weaves
their lives and fates into the larger fate
of Spain as Europe’s only stand against
fascism collapses under the weight of
Franco’s forces in early 1939. In doing so, she provides the reader with an
overview of the political and military
events of the Spanish Civil War, as well
as minibiographies of six eyewitnesses
to the war in an eminently readable
and gripping account of the savage war
that ended with the fall of Madrid.
Vaill’s characters are presented in pairs.
They are couples, romantically and
professionally. The first to appear is
the chief of the Spanish government’s
foreign press office in Madrid, Arturo
Barea, and his future wife, Ilsa Kulcsar,
an Austrian radical who has come to
Spain after the war begins. Spain’s tragic
fate is most explicitly illustrated through
Barea’s slow descent from moderately
prominent government official to ordinary refugee, finally settling in France
with Ilsa. His observations on the Spain
of his youth contrast with the savagery of
the conflict between Republican and Nationalist forces that takes place throughout the book. Following Barea and
Kulcsar, Vaill presents the Hungarianborn André Friedmann, who would
come to be known as Robert Capa,
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one of the greatest war photographers
of all time. His relationship with the
similarly gifted and prominent photographer Gerda Taro (Gerta Pohorylle)
forms much of the central narrative
of the book. Finally, American novelists, journalists, and war correspondents Ernest Hemingway and Martha
Gellhorn are the third couple, rounding
out the book’s six main characters.
Hotel Florida is much more than just an
account of the Spanish Civil War—or
the story of the six main characters
during those years. It is as much a story
about the nature of truth and reality in
wartime as it is a gripping narrative of
the seminal conflict of the interwar years
in Europe. Vaill’s characters become who
they are through their interaction with
the war, and they create themselves—
and the meaning of their own lives—as
much as they create accounts of the war’s
events, whether through the written
word or the photograph. Their stories
and pictures are in many cases used for
propaganda purposes, and the characters know this. However, the fine line
between truth and propaganda largely
disappears, if it is ever distinguishable
in the first place. With the exception of
Barea and Kulcsar, the characters want
to be close to the fighting, to see the
troops and the refugees and the destruction caused by the war, so that they can
capture its meaning and portray the
tragedy to the world, which does not
seem to understand the importance
of defeating fascism. A host of minor
characters appear, many of whom are
fighters in the various International Brigades (to include the famous Abraham
Lincoln Battalion of American volunteers). These characters might as well
have walked right out of a Hemingway
novel—tough whiskey drinkers hunting
fascists and eating trout and vegetables
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cooked over a fire. In fact Hotel Florida
itself reads like a novel, and it is no
irony that the book concludes with the
first sentence of For Whom the Bell Tolls
as Hemingway begins to type the first
page, transferring his Spanish experience into his greatest literary work.
This book offers something for not
only the student of European history,
military history, or literature. It is a
first-rate account of the political and
military events of the Spanish Civil
War. It is also a deeply philosophical
examination of the relationship among
war, truth, and propaganda. It asks hard
questions that are immediately relevant
today even as the media landscape has
changed dramatically; the fundamentals
of human nature have remained such
that any of the main characters of this
book could sympathize with reporters,
photographers, and journalists today. I
highly recommend this brilliant book
to scholars and general readers alike.
JEFFREY M. SHAW

Bayles, Martha. Through a Screen Darkly: Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy, and America’s Image Abroad. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press,
2014. 336pp. $30

This is a wonderful, wonderful book.
It is very much more than even its
title and subtitle suggest. And it’s a
great read even though it deals with
subjects and policy debates about
which most of us would rather not
think because they’re either upsetting, or too complicated, or both.
The first half of the book is devoted
to the image of America that our low
(and getting lower all the time) popular culture projects worldwide. When
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I embarked on reading it, I was intimidated by how much of our popular
culture Martha Bayles proposed to cover
in detail by focusing on (seemingly) so
many individual products. I felt I already
knew how vulgar and vile the movies and television shows we export are.
When the author started in on Sex in the
City, I thought, “Well, better her than me
at least: somebody needs to know about
this particular offense, but not me.”
Then, I discovered that Bayles very cleverly combined her assessment of how
that television program gives a debased
view of America with the reactions of
interviewees abroad. Every example (and
there is a myriad of them in chapters
“The American Way of Sex,” “Empire
of Special Effects,” “Television by the
People, for the People?,” and “From Pop
Idol to Vox Populi”) proceeds in this
way. While she means us to look at and
understand the attraction of and “push
back” against American pop culture
from place to place abroad, she provides
excellent analyses of the indigenous pop
culture and non-American influences.
This takes one into society and politics
as much as culture, religion, taste, and
inevitable interesting peculiarities. The
outcome is a nearly complete global
vision of popular culture that I don’t
believe can be found anywhere else. Of
course, Bayles means to show the guiding influence of American pop culture.
In dealing with popular culture, Bayles
is slyly operating in the way in which
she will eventually commend that public
(or culture) diplomats proceed. She
holds that public diplomacy is made up
of four activities: listening, advocacy,
culture and exchange, and news reporting. These ought to be discrete from one
another but given equal importance.
Accordingly, a cultural officer ought to
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be able to tell foreigners how Americans
really regard Sex in the City (no one
takes the show as real or expressive of
his or her attitude toward life); be able
to explain how certain things fit (or
don’t fit) into the real American ethos
(this is the advocacy part); know enough
about the local culture to understand
the “push back” that should always be
sought; and, finally, tell the truth.
In addition to the foregoing, this book
does several other things, and all of
them excellently. Bayles is well versed in
American political thought and history
—enough to produce a fine essay on
the American ethos that combines the
historical, political, and cultural into
what is really American. Again, this is
an example of what every U.S. public diplomat should know and what
those abroad might learn if public
diplomacy were properly practiced.
The book is also a thorough history of
U.S. public diplomacy, from the first
master, Benjamin Franklin, through the
shutting down of the U.S. Information
Agency (USIA) in 1999, to the present. While she believes the abolition of
the USIA was a mistake, the book does
not advocate its revival. This is because
Bayles is clearly more concerned with
the content of government-provided
information about America since the
early 1950s (which is a distressing history) than she is about the institutions.
On top of it all, Bayles treats most
related subjects—for example, the
experiment in “strategic communications” as a kind of public diplomacy
inflicted on the Department of Defense
after 9/11 (and terminated by Admiral
Michael Mullen, then Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011); the history
of the tight relationship between Hollywood and Washington that secured
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the worldwide domination of American
pop culture, while allowing its content
to sink lower and lower; the troubled
career of U.S. international broadcast;
and the Internet and social media.
And yes, she deals also with the problem
of U.S. promotion of democracy abroad.
To quote from the last sentences of the
book: “The premise of this book has
been that a significant number, perhaps
even a preponderance, of today’s tiny
battles are being fought not in the news
media but in the mundane realm of
popular culture. The wisdom of America
is clear and straightforward: political
liberty can be sustained only by selfgoverning individuals and prudently
designed institutions. Yet when our
fellow human beings look at America
through the screen of our entertainment,
what they see most darkly is a rejection
of tradition, religion, family and every
kind of institutional restraint, in favor
of unseemly egotism and libertinism.
Attracted and repulsed by this image,
they might be forgiven for not appreciating the part about self-governance.”
KENNETH D. M. JENSEN
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be new ground raids into Cambodia
and Laos to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh
Trail—the network that allowed Hanoi
to supply communist forces in the
south, and that at its peak even included an oil pipeline from the Chinese
border to the environs of Saigon. The
raid into Laos, code-named LAM SON
719, is the subject of Robert Sander’s
recent book Invasion of Laos, 1971.
Despite the term “invasion” in the
book’s title, LAM SON 719 was designed
as a cross-border raid on the town of
Tchepone. It was here communist military supplies were shifted from trucks to
porters, bicycles, and pack animals. The
town had received attention from American military planners as early as the
Kennedy administration. Sander quotes
General Westmoreland explaining to
General Abrams in March 1968, “I’d like
to go to Tchepone, but I haven’t got the
tickets.” Westmoreland’s plans called for
at least four divisions to undertake the
assault. For its part, the government of
Saigon had been planning an operation
into Laos from at least 1965. In reality, as Sander notes, the United States
had been conducting CIA and covert
air operations in Laos since the 1950s.

Sander, Robert D. Invasion of Laos, 1971: Lam
Son 719. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press,
2014. 304pp. $29.95

President Nixon’s policies of détente
and outreach to China meant a reduction of the chance that expanding the
war into “neutral” Laos would trigger Soviet or Chinese response.

“The only chance we have is to initiate
bold moves against the enemy,” national security adviser Henry Kissinger
confided in 1971. This was his advice to
the administration of President Nixon,
which sought to end the Vietnam War
by creating “peace with honor.” “Bold
moves” would include two new strategies. One was resumed bombing of
North Vietnam. The second would

Congressional restrictions designed
to limit the war meant that American
involvement in the 1971 operation
would be confined to supporting roles in
artillery and fire support. Yet, as Sander
points out, this was still a bloody battle
for the Americans. American casualties
ran high, with over two hundred killed
and at least 1,100 injured. Sander, who
was a pilot during the battle, observes
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that “U.S. Army helicopter crews
endured incomparably higher losses
during this two-month operation in
heavily defended airspace than during
any other period of the Vietnam War.”
The overall impact on the Ho Chi
Minh Trail was limited but communist
forces suffered at least thirteen thousand
casualties, and the offensive blunted
any North Vietnamese attempts to
strike at withdrawing American forces.
The withdrawal at the conclusion of
the operation was memorialized by
journalists who photographed Army
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
soldiers hanging on to the skids of
returning American helicopters.
The operation’s overall dismal results
were not due to a lack of ARVN bravery,
Sander argues, but to poor operational
planning and politics. Indeed, the ARVN
suffered some 7,500 casualties out of
the seventeen thousand soldiers committed to the operation. Rather, the
ARVN battle plan for LAM SON 719 “was
complex, far too complex for a corps
commander and staﬀ that had never
conducted corps-sized operations.”
In Washington, the Army’s Vice Chief of
Staff, General Bruce Palmer, remarked
that “only a Patton or a MacArthur
would have made such a daring move;
an Eisenhower or a Bradley would
not have attempted it.” Yet, at the start
of 1971, South Vietnam had such an
officer: General Tri, the daring corps
commander who had led the successful Cambodia offensive. General Tri’s
bravado extended to his trademark
swagger stick and stylish sunglasses.
Tragically, General Tri died in a helicopter crash en route to take command of the stalled Laos offensive.
Sander identified the operation’s relative
failure as “the unintended consequences
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of a decision to launch a major military
operation involving corps from two
nations that did not share a common
objective.” While President Nixon
“hoped to prevent the North Vietnamese
from launching an oﬀensive that could
endanger, and even delay, withdrawal
of American forces remaining in
Vietnam,” South Vietnamese president
Thiệu’s ultimate “objective was to give
South Vietnam more time to prepare
to meet the North Vietnamese without direct U.S. military assistance and
without sacrificing his best divisions.”
American frustration during the operation was compounded by President
Thiệu’s refusal to commit ARVN reserve
forces to the battle. Sander suggests that
many of these unused ARVN divisions
were less than combat ready. Many
were hampered by soldiers who spoke
regional dialects and had strong ties
to their local areas and could not be
deployed far from home without fears of
desertion. ARVN readiness was affected
by another problem on which Sander
does not dwell: “flower soldiers.” By the
early 1970s, South Vietnam had as many
as a hundred thousand “flower soldiers,”
soldiers who paid commanders to
continue civilian life as normal. In other
instances the names of dead soldiers
were kept on the muster rolls so their
commanders could collect their salaries.
There are apparent parallels between
LAM SON 719 and more recent events.
It was revealed in November 2014 that
the Iraqi Army had fifty thousand “ghost
soldiers” who similarly did not exist.
Likewise, where President Thiệu saw
ARVN elite units first and foremost
as a force to crush potential rivals, in
Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki had similar
views of using military force to suppress Sunni rivals. Thiệu was hesitant
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about committing forces to LAM SON
719, and in 2014, when ISIS seized
Fallujah, Maliki allowed the problem
to fester. In neither case was suppression of a hostile insurgency put above
the objective of maintaining a grip
on power—much to the frustration
of Washington. As Henry Kissinger
would later say of LAM SON 719, it was
an “operation [that was] conceived in
ambivalence and assailed by skepticism,
[and] proceeded in confusion.” Today
what was then the town of Tchepone lies
abandoned, though the lessons of 1971
remain fresh. Sander’s work will likely
remain the definitive record of the Laos
campaign until such time as archives
in Hanoi are made fully available.
JOSEPH HAMMOND

Haddick, Robert. Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2014. 288pp. $37.95

Robert Haddick proposes a revised U.S.
strategy toward China. He argues—
agreeing with recent U.S. national
security strategies—that continued U.S.
forward presence is the only option that
supports the American objectives of “an
open international economic system;
respect for universal values around the
world; and a rules-based international
order that promotes peace, security, and
opportunity through stronger cooperation.” He articulates a two-front effort
to ensure China rises within the existing
international structure: positive reinforcement of good behavior combined
with significant defense reforms to
allow punishment of bad behavior.
Haddick discusses the nature of China’s
military modernization and how it
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bodes ill for the U.S. ability to punish
Chinese transgressions against international order. He believes that current
U.S. force posture is inadequate because U.S. air and naval capabilities are
vulnerable to Chinese land-, air-, and
sea-launched cruise missiles and ballistic
missiles. And future U.S. capabilities—
the F-35 in particular—have insufficient range to operate from existing
bases under the antiaccess umbrella
created by these weapons. To counter
the tactical and operational challenges
these weapons create he advocates the
Pentagon develop a new long-range
bomber and long-range cruise missiles able to penetrate Chinese airspace
and hold critical targets at risk. He also
promotes autonomous aerial projectiles
based on a 1990s DARPA model to
locate and destroy road-mobile missile launchers. He argues convincingly
that his acquisition proposals solve the
likely tactical and operational problems
of a future war with China, but he does
not engage with the highly contested
literature on the strategic effectiveness of
airpower. Without a theory of strategic
effectiveness, he fails to make the case
that these new capabilities would support his strategy and influence Chinese
decision making during crisis or war.
Additional proposals are designed to
threaten presumed Chinese fears. These
include encouraging America’s regional
allies to develop their own antiaccess
capabilities on the First Island Chain,
improving U.S. Navy blockading capacity, developing irregular warfare capacity
among China’s minority populations,
and developing antisatellite weaponry.
However, if China continues its policy of
“salami slicing,” these weapons and plans
will never see battle. By incrementally
challenging the existing regional order,
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China is, as Haddick agrees, achieving
its objectives without risking war. Beijing
understands there is a threshold for U.S.
military response and will continue to
operate below it. An American president
would be loath to fire the first shots over
the Chinese occupation of an uninhabited island. Haddick therefore argues the
United States should develop policies to
encourage China to follow the existing
international rules in letter and spirit.
Unfortunately, he does not detail these
policies, leaving his strategy wanting.
Haddick states that strategy is about
managing risk. While much of what
Haddick proposes seems commonsensical, it is unfinished, and this poses risks.
Focusing only on punitive measures
against possible Chinese actions runs
the risk of ignoring the ways China
has played by the rules while furthering a mind-set where every development in the PLA’s modernization is
perceived as a threat to U.S. regional
interests—regardless of Chinese intentions. This book should be read as part
of an ongoing and equally unfinished
debate on how to handle a rising China.
IAN T. SUNDSTROM

Hughes, Wayne P., ed. The U.S. Naval Institute
on Naval Tactics. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2015. 192pp. $21.95

The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics
is a collection of thirteen essays assembled by Captain Wayne Hughes,
USN (Ret.)—author of several books,
most notably Fleet Tactics and Coastal
Combat and Military Modeling for Decision Making. Captain Hughes is also
an accomplished naval officer, having
served as commanding officer of USS
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Hummingbird (MSC 192) and USS
Morton (DD 948). Notable authors appearing in On Tactics include Admiral
Woodward, RN, who commanded
British forces in the Falklands War, and
Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Admiral of the
Fleet, Italian Navy. On Tactics is part
of the U.S. Naval Institute’s new Wheel
Books series, which is a collection of
books containing some of the Naval
Institute’s most well-regarded articles
from Proceedings—and other sources—
on such topics as naval leadership,
command, strategy, and cooperation.
On Tactics is well worth the reader’s
time, and appropriate for both junior
and senior officers. It benefits greatly
from Hughes’s insightful commentary
and tactful editing, which boils the combined length of the selected essays down
to a manageable 190 pages. Although the
topic of tactics is broadly applicable to
all naval communities, surface warfare
officers will probably have the easiest
time relating to the selected essays.
Of the thirteen essays in the volume, a
favorite was “Missile Chess: A Parable,”
written by Hughes himself. “Missile
Chess” describes a game created by
Hughes in which players sit down to play
a traditional game of chess but with a major twist: the players have a fixed number
of “missiles” that they must distribute
among their pieces as they see fit. The
pieces still move according to the rules of
regular chess, but each time they capture
an opposing piece they expend one “missile.” Once a piece’s missile inventory is
depleted a piece can still move but can no
longer capture. After he walks us through
several hypothetical scenarios, it is clear
that despite its simplicity, missile chess
nicely elucidates some of the most vexing operational challenges with which a
modern naval commander must contend.
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My only criticism of On Tactics is
that some of the selected essays veer
into areas that could more aptly be
described as “strategy” or “enterprise
management.” For example, “Toward
a New Identity” chronicles Admiral
Luce’s struggle to keep the Atlantic fleet
together long enough to test the tactical
doctrines flowing out of the recently
founded Naval War College. Although
this is a fine essay, it does not provide
the reader with any particular insight
into tactics. Rather, it provides insight
into why new tactics can be difficult to
develop. Similarly, “Creating ASW Killing Zones,” although an excellent piece
on Cold War antisubmarine warfare
operations and strategy, does not provide much in the way of tactical insights
on how to defeat the submarine threat.
The great advantage of this book, and
indeed the entire Wheel Books series, is
that it makes many excellent articles and
essays readily available to the reading
public—essays that might otherwise
have fallen by the wayside. Overall,
this volume is an excellent addition to
any personal library. The size of the
book and length of the articles make
it an excellent work for professional
development, wardroom discussion,
and thought-provoking conversation.
CHARLES H. LEWIS

Wachman, Alan M. Why Taiwan? Geostrategic
Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007. 272pp.
$25.95

Tufts Fletcher School professor Alan
Wachman was a giant in the China, East
Asian studies, and international relations field who remains sorely missed
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following his untimely death in 2012.
In what is widely considered one of his
major scholarly contributions, through
this pithy, well-researched book—rightly
considered a classic—Wachman engages
in exceptional interdisciplinary analysis
to offer provocative coverage of historical episodes that have shaped Taiwan’s
status fundamentally. Some events raise
penetrating questions about what might
have resulted had they ended differently;
other factors inspire critical questions
about East Asia’s future. Wachman develops a theme of the strategic salience
of “imagined geography” as the best
explanation for the significant variation
over time in the association of Taiwan
as part of Chinese sovereign territory
in the minds of the leaders, and even
the populace, of mainland China. He
does so through close examination of
key Chinese documents and terminology as well as careful consideration of
their relative authority and reliability.
Wachman suggests that Sun Yat-sen,
Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, and even
possibly Deng Xiaoping did not initially
consider Taiwan to be part of China in
the sense that it is understood officially
today. This approach raises compelling
questions about state formation and
national identity that are critical to the
understanding of international relations.
Indeed, it may be argued that “imagined
geography” is a global phenomenon and
hardly peculiar to China. It is important
to remember that Taiwan was formally
incorporated into Qing administration
in 1683, nearly a century before the
founding of the United States. One may
contrast such historical events as the
American acquisition and incorporation of Hawaii and Alaska and conclude
that the factors Wachman considers do
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not negate mainland China’s sovereignty
claim to Taiwan. Rather, it is primarily concerned for the maintenance of
Taiwan’s democracy and the freedoms
of its citizens that continue to inspire
Washington’s involvement long after
the Carter administration abrogated
the United States–Republic of China
Mutual Security Treaty in 1980.
While Wachman clearly documents
Taiwan’s strategic salience (real and
perceived), other factors may be important as well. An alternative explanation
might consider the challenge of Taiwan
as a separate polity (e.g., democratic
system). The vast majority of the other
“lost territories” to which Wachman
compares Taiwan have never been
separate polities; the few that have been
have not persisted for significant periods
of time. Hence, political salience may
be an appropriate variable. In fact, the
challenge of Taiwan as a separate polity
has emerged periodically throughout
history (e.g., through Dutch occupation,
Qing dynasty separatism under Ming
loyalist Zheng Chenggong, Japanese
imperialism, Nationalist rule, and
today’s multiparty democracy). China’s
imperial rulers initially viewed Taiwan
as a remote, politically unorganized
hinterland. Subsequently, however,
as alternative political systems were
imposed or developed on it with identities and objectives potentially at odds
with those of Beijing, it periodically
assumed heightened importance. This
has geographic underpinnings in the
sense that physical location rendered
Taiwan susceptible to both influence and
conquest by foreign maritime powers
and later to technological acquisition,
trade, and the attainment of per capita
gross domestic product at levels that
the vast majority of political scientists
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agree are conducive to the development of a democratic political system.
But the Taiwan question has been, and
remains to this day, a fundamentally
political one. While Taiwan’s geography
has not changed, its political identity has
varied tremendously. Since the end of
the Cold War, U.S. support for Taiwan
has arguably hinged on its rapidly liberalized political system, not its geostrategic significance. Taiwan is fundamentally useful in a geostrategic sense
primarily for the basing of capabilities
to facilitate its own defense. While some
U.S. policy makers no doubt see geostrategic benefits to the island’s present
status even today, it is difficult to imagine Washington being willing to risk the
expenditure of increasing amounts of
blood and treasure if and when Taiwan’s
democratic system is no longer at stake.
Should the day come when a majority of Taiwan’s populace favors formal
unification with the mainland—and
this popular will is expressed through
a transparent democratic process with
no external coercion—it is inconceivable that Washington could actively
oppose such a transition on geostrategic
grounds. There is, however, the disturbing possibility that even if Washington’s
policy toward Taipei is not fundamentally geostrategic in motivation, policy advocated by elements of China’s government (particularly the military) may be.
Wachman does acknowledge related
complexities and the difficulty of finding
conclusive evidence for his geostrategic
explanation. However one may view
these sensitive issues—which remain
hotly contested—Wachman has made a
valuable contribution on a critical issue
whose complex history and enduring
significance are forgotten at the peril of
all in the Asia-Pacific. The complexities
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Wachman introduces provide important
considerations for the continuing debate
over Taiwan’s future. Those fortunate
enough to have known Wachman
personally know what a fine friend and
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colleague he was; all can benefit from
his intellectual legacy, of which this
book is an important, enduring part.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the program man-

T

ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

he 23rd of February, 1455, is widely recognized as the date when German
inventor Johannes Gutenberg printed the first Western book produced using
movable type. This is the date commemorated by Printed Book Day, an occasion
that brings together authors, librarians, and bibliophiles to pay homage to the
printed word. The Gutenberg Bibles printed over five and a half centuries ago are
arguably the most famous books in human history. Only twenty-one complete
copies exist today, each with an estimated value of between twenty-five and thirty
million dollars. The invention of movable type transformed society as few other
inventions have before or after, making books available to the general public
rather than only individuals and institutions that could afford precious engraved
or handwritten manuscripts. In the modern era, the number of books published
by a country is often seen as a measure of the nation’s standard of living and level
of education. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization estimates that over two million new titles were published worldwide in 2013.
In the United States alone over 304,000 new titles appeared. Reading is big business, even in a world often dominated by television, cinema, and other forms of
the moving image.
One reason why many still have a fascination for books is the long-term bond
engendered between a reader and a book’s characters and events. This bond is
formed in part by the amount of time a reader must dedicate to a book. Many
social critics bemoan the fact that modern Americans, particularly younger
citizens, seem to have developed very short attention spans. There is evidence to
support this assertion. The average hour-long television program provides less
than forty-three minutes of actual content, the remaining time being taken up by
commercial messages. In this short period of time, situations must be described,
characters introduced, and the issues brought to an acceptable conclusion. The
length of the average motion picture is 120 minutes, longer than many television
dramas yet still a severe time constraint.
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By contrast, consider the investment of time and the commitment necessary
to read a book. Reading speed depends on many variables, including the subject
matter and the physical surroundings. But for purposes of discussion, it is interesting to note that at an average reading pace of two hundred words per minute,
Harper Lee’s classic To Kill a Mockingbird takes over eight uninterrupted hours
to complete; Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace will demand your undivided attention
for upward of forty-nine hours! As a final example, reading the 1.7 million words
of the five books of George R. R. Martin’s Song of Ice and Fire series (the basis
for the immensely popular television series Game of Thrones) will take nearly 142
hours of focused effort.
Some might see these statistics as an indictment of the process of reading, but
I see them in another light altogether. Reading a book is often an escape from
the world around you. It enables you mentally to visit places and meet characters
that you may never see in real life. Books offer detail and richness of description that can rival reality, and they are accessible to all. Books have often been
described as doorways to other worlds, to other times, and to other perspectives
on life. When you allow yourself to be captured by a book, the dozens, or scores,
or hundreds of hours spent reading seem to fly past and often leave you wanting
more. Press reports indicate that millions of readers are anxiously awaiting the
next installment in the Ice and Fire series, still hungry even after a mental meal
lasting about 142 hours.
The lesson then seems clear: if you really want to understand a subject or
want to experience vicariously a different culture, career, or destination, reading
a book is the way to achieve your objective. One final thought about the value of
books comes from Harvard University’s longest-serving president, Charles William Eliot, who once noted, “Books are the quietest and most constant of friends;
they are the most accessible and wisest of counselors, and the most patient of
teachers.” Over the past eight years, the Chief of Naval Operations Professional
Reading Program has purchased over a hundred thousand books and distributed
them to ships, stations, and libraries throughout the fleet. We encourage you to
seek out a book from one of these collections (or from a nearby public library or
bookstore) and find in it a friend, counselor, or teacher of your own.

JOHN E. JACKSON
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